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Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of political conflict on microfinance engagement to put forth 
a theory of sparse networks traps. It leverages a natural experiment to distinguish between the 
effects of conflict on determinants of microfinance efficiency and impact, and includes 
qualitative evidence from 235 (208 microfinance users and 27 microfinance providers) 
interviews in the Northeastern Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Through 
a combination of regression analyses and panel data modelling with fixed effects, the research 
indicates that conflict has a stronger effect on the nature of demand for credit and savings 
services than it has on the actual performance of financial institutions. By introducing informal 
financial service providers, including community level rotating savings and credit associations, 
payday lenders, and moneylenders, the research indicates that the demand for financial services 
is not greatly reduced during conflict.  The reduction in demand reported in the literature is 
seen in the formal sector, while in the conflict area the demand shifts to the informal sector, 
resulting in a threefold increase in the likelihood to borrow from an informal source of credit 
in times of political violence. This shift in user preferences is reflective of an overall decrease 
in engagement in formal networks and reliance on informal ones, and is reflected in other 
coping mechanisms such as reduced investment in business creation and increased expenditures 
in areas that can be considered charitable. The mechanisms by which these choices occur are 
hyperbolic discounting and reduced trust. In turn, these individual level decisions lead to a 
sparse networks trap, defined as a fragmentation of the economy into independent enclaves of 
production and the correlating reduction in interregional interdependence, which may have 
compounding consequences for post-conflict economic recovery and stability.     
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Introduction 
I. Background 
 
This thesis investigates patterns of everyday survival in Northeastern Democratic Republic of 
the Congo.  Written with practitioners in mind, it outlines the responses of institutions as well 
as individuals to the challenges to development posed by armed conflict. War is bad for growth, 
and it destroys efforts to develop healthy societies. As Costalli, Moretti, and Pischedda (2014:3) 
note, "War is about killing people and breaking things. It is thus unsurprising that civil wars 
entail significant economic costs". They find (2014:9-10), using synthetic controls developed 
using Kalyvas’ and Balcells data, that war reduces economic growth by about 1.5% in GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parity terms, or an average of 17.5% over the course of a 9.5-year 
civil war. Collier (1999:175-176) finds similarly, that civil wars occur an annual GDP loss of 
2.2% per capita, and an average loss of 30% for a 15 year-long war.  
 
Yet the conflict literature all too often chooses a framework of national-level analysis, without 
accounting for the day-to-day lived experiences of citizens in conflict zones. Within this 
framework, citizens are either possible rebels or non-rebels, and governments are either weak 
or strong. This framework stems from the lack of sociological, micro-level data from volatile 
research environments, not adequately incorporating the work of behavioural economics into 
conflict studies, and the belief that randomized controlled trials are only suitable for stable 
environments. 
 
The problem, however, is that unless we can trace the mechanisms linking conflict to poverty, 
as Humphreys (2005:2) says of the natural resource curse, the “advice of conflict scholars will 
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be of limited use to the policy community. And unless we test these mechanisms, we will be 
unsure of the generality of the processes we observe in individual cases”. But in trying to 
understand the mechanisms linking conflict to poverty, we unearth myriad research questions. 
Specifically, this thesis chooses the lens of financial services as empowerment as an assumption 
that can be tested in a conflict-affected environment. Like Humphreys, I argue that there is a 
diversity of mechanisms through which conflict will have an impact on development. At the 
most fundamental level, the threat of violence transforms the ways in which people reach their 
potential, either through structural or psychological changes. At the same time, conflict 
transforms societies. Pushing the boundaries of previous social norms and mores, those 
affected are often involuntarily yet irrevocably different following conflict, the effects of which 
are inherited for generations to come (Yehuda, 2015).  
 
This thesis explores the link between conflict and citizen’s financial strategies, through research 
investigating the impact of conflict, for an illustrative account. This account, highly relevant for 
the Post-2015 Development Agenda, the newest framework developed by the UN following 
the target date for the Millennium Development Goals and solidified in the Post-2015 
Consensus Project1, delves into the lived experiences of citizens affected by civil war. Vice-
versa, since war creates economic cycles of underdevelopment (Costalli, Moretti, and 
Pischedda, 2014), the financial strategies of citizens may well bear consequences for the 
outcomes of violent conflict. Although large scale, quantitative studies indicate a global, 
regional and national picture of the detrimental effects of conflict on development, it misses in 
the mechanism specifications that may or may not be present in the everyday politics, or 
assumes that certain mechanisms may be apply universally to all cases.  
                                                          
1 See Hoefler and Fearon, 2014 and Bloomberg, 2014 for examples of papers in this series. 
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This thesis contributes to a framework to understand the interaction of different impacts of 
conflict on citizen-level coping strategies. It begins with presenting the current state of the art 
of empirical studies of conflict, which currently emphasizes the need for a more micro level 
approaches and subnational studies in conflict studies. The thesis then introduces the current 
frameworks used to understand the interaction of credit with household economic structures, 
and draws a number of observations from practitioners to illustrate the current conceptual 
understanding of realities experienced by credit users, including those extant for conflict-
affected contexts. Having characterized the distinct bodies of literature and the few 
practitioners working on the subject, the thesis introduces a tentative theory that stresses the 
shifting reliance on different levels of credit, and lasting effects for post-war reconstruction.  
 
Using a series of financial institutions in a single country context as case studies, a natural 
experiment was used to provide an estimate for the costs incurred during conflict on financial 
institutions. Financial institutions, a key actor for facilitating economic activity necessary for 
society to function and thus for development, were chosen as the level of analysis for the first 
part of the research in order to provide the important, contextual groundwork for the second 
part of the thesis. Secondly, and more importantly, the impact of violent conflict on financial 
service usage was investigated, using a natural experiment and over 200 interviews conducted 
with financial service users in two towns, almost perfectly comparable, except for their variance 
in exposure to violence. In doing so, the thesis bridges the gap between some of the recent 
behavioural economic work being done in non-conflict zones for their applicability in politically 
unstable contexts. It provides an explanation for some of the contradictory viewpoints currently 
expressed in the literature, and outlines an alternative narrative which is consistent with the 
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suggestion of behavioural economics that different decisions might be made by the same person 
at different times. Finally, it provides critical recommendations for policy-makers in post-
conflict countries for the development of pro-poor financial services which allow for the 
salience of expressed concerns.  
 
These policy changes would, the thesis argues, create more attractive formal financial structures 
and negate some of the poor development outcomes experienced through large reliance on the 
secondary economy in conflict zones. Hence, these findings differ from existing accounts of 
microfinance that focus exclusively on regulated structures, consider solidarity networks as 
linear relationships, and consider an inclusive financial sector mutually exclusive to the 
introduction of conflict.  
 
The main point of reference for this research is the Small Enterprise Education and Promotion 
Network's series of papers on Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services (AIMS), 
henceforth referred to as the SEEP/AIMS project, yet with added elements of the work of the 
comparative international development literature related to financial service provision, 
specifically in post-conflict contexts (Meissner, 2005; Nagaragan and Mc Nulty, 2004; Jacobsen, 
2003; Kuehnast, 2001). However, the SEEP network’s conceptual understanding of a 
household economic portfolio is situated as an individual unit in further exploring Collier’s 
(1998) work on shifting capital in war-vulnerable sectors.  
 
The subnational data collected extend the research on household economic portfolios into a 
micro-level study in a conflict zone to contribute to this framework, verifying whether or not 
the SEEP/AIMS literature can be applied in conflict zones. The theory suggests a 
transformation of household structures and processes which re-orients users in the direction 
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of their extended social networks, an alteration to the model in which the interactions of actors 
with incidents of selective, indiscriminate, or indirect violence yield varying degrees of 
responses. These suppositions provide a number of hypothetical predictions which can be 
tested empirically using data collected in the field. Finally, by charting the actual, individual 
experiences during violent conflict, the thesis analyses the utility function of different financial 
decisions, and contributes to a better understanding of risk aversion and social insurance during 
war, a blind spot in the behavioural economics literature. I also offer tentative suggestions for 
the implications of these findings.  
 
This introduction to the work outlines a summary of the research context, an overview of the 
central research question and the main sub-questions, a working hypothesis, and the 
methodological approach which has been chosen to address them.  
 
II. Research Context 
 
Although indigenous cooperatives, where “goods, money, or labour services are pooled for the 
benefit of one member at a time in a rotating system” (Damachi and Seibel 1982: 215), have 
been recorded as early as the 16th century in Nigeria (Oluyombo, 2012), microfinance in its 
more modern incarnation rose to prominence as a government sponsored credit system in 
various countries in the 1980s2, and exploded into popular media in 2006 with the Nobel Peace 
Prize award to Mohammed Yunus and the Grameen Bank. As development interventions have 
become increasingly fine-tuned for fragile states, so too have financial services been pioneered 
as part of post-war reconstruction efforts. Yet despite externally supported financial services 
                                                          
2 For more information, see for example India’s NABARD program of agricultural credit, or Bank Rakyat’s in 
Indonesia 
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being increasingly seen as a pillar of post-conflict reconstruction (ILO, 1999; Ohanyan, 2002; 
Kuehnast, 2001; Barr, 2004; Cain, 2007; Matabisi, 2011), the literature on financial services in 
conflict settings falls short in addressing several key questions.  Notable among these are how 
the empowerment effect of microfinance services interacts with limitations imposed by 
insecure environments, such as, for example, ill-defined property rights and poor contract 
enforcement (Blattman and Miguel, 2010).  
 
While the intellectual community has remarked qualitatively on the challenges posed to financial 
services and their introduction in conflict-affected contexts, contradictory statements abound. 
For instance, Kimberly Maynard remarks (1997 cited by McDonald 2002): “Intimate exposure 
to brutality and subsequent displacement and civil disorder leave individuals psychologically 
scarred and the intricate network of social interactions deeply torn…in war-torn societies, 
healthy social patterns between dissimilar groups are replaced by distrust, apprehension, and 
outrage, impairing community cohesion, interdependence, and mutual protection.” Meanwhile, 
on the other end of the spectrum, Dunn, Kalatzandonakes and Vladivia (1996: ix) state that “In 
response to risk, households may seek to maintain non-market relations, such as communal or 
kinship relations, as a means of accessing resources and spreading risk through sharing. 
Establishing access to credit is also a critical insurance mechanism that can be called on later 
for consumption smoothing”.  
 
In terms of existing operational advice, some practitioners are more cautionary than others. 
Frederick Cuny warns well before the Do No Harm framework that “by failing to understand 
the elements of each community activity and their interrelationships, an outsider may respond 
inappropriately and delay or prevent a return to normal. (1999:58)”. The Consultative Group 
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to Assist the Poorest, a leading think-tank on microfinance impact evaluations, corroborate 
this, noting that in post-conflict settings, “Poor economic conditions, weak social and physical 
infrastructure (education, health, roads), corruption, and lack of security adversely influence the 
ability of clients to benefit from financial services (Cohen, 2003:1)”. 
 
On the other hand, in a more optimistic voice, Elaine Edgecomb of the SEEP Network 
remarks that:  
 
[M]icrofinance and microenterprise development programmes successfully operate in 
policy environments where regulations are often not in place, or where they are 
unfavourable to best practice. There are few governments that understand the 
implications of interest rate ceilings or of regulations on the informal sector. 
Implementing institutions have found that the fluidity of the situation allows them an 
advocacy role that ultimately may result in more favourable legislation further down the 
road. (1998: viii) 
 
When microfinance is offered, it may be provided in a targeted manner, prioritizing selected 
groups based on ethnicity or other status designations such as returnees, refugees, women, or 
demobilized soldiers (Bücker 2001, as quoted by Ohanyan 2008: 24), while other programmes 
pursue the expansion of microfinance services for a commercial, financial, or general 
reconstruction gain, regardless of pre-existing local tensions, presenting, as Ohanyan (2008: 24) 
terms it, a zero-sum landscape. 
 
In one of the better-researched writings, Nagarajan and McNulty (2004)’s report for the ILO 
on microfinance in post-conflict settings, the evaluators conclude that main lessons to date that 
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can be agreed upon by practitioners include that microcredit can be initiated with very few 
environmental requirements, yet it is only one tool amongst many for economic development. 
Yet such divergent views on collateral requirements, pricing and product design, and the 
suitability of loans over grants can lead to the proliferation of development programming in 
post-war contexts focusing on easier products than traditional credit (i.e. in-kind lending, 
business development training, and grants over loans [Nagarajan, 1997]).  
 
In both theory and practice, then, the main shortcoming of the state of the art of the literature 
is the current inability to bridge the qualitative, often contradictory statements of development 
practitioners with the more methodologically rigorous practices of micro-economic studies, the 
paucity of micro-economic studies conducted in conflict zones, and the lack of mechanism 
specificity in the currently existing macro-economic studies on conflict. This thesis thus also 
aims to tease out the contextual relationships between this observed paradox between the lip-
service paid to microfinance services in conflict and their actual provision- and the implications 
for providers and beneficiaries.  
 
III. Objectives and Contributions of the Study 
 
The research builds on existing literature in several key aspects. The first point of contribution 
is the comparative opportunity costs accrued due to conflict for microfinance providers, whose 
activities may be limited or affected during conflict due to security concerns. In post-war 
periods, the lingering effects of conflict continue to impose strategic and operational 
considerations on informal and formal development initiatives, including financial services. 
Collier (1998) calls this the war overhang effect, and substantiates a cost to capital-intensive 
sectors such as finance during conflict through an analysis of the National Accounts of Uganda. 
The research proposes, then, to extend Collier’s observations to a more discursive account, and 
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substantiate the aggregate findings of changes to capital intensive sectors through a study where 
individuals and institutions are the unit of analysis. It examines some of the trade-offs associated 
with offering formal financial services in conflict settings, including the transaction costs 
incurred by adverse security conditions, and the adaptive and reflexive strategies of 
microfinance programming in volatile environments.  
 
Since research is only beginning to experiment with methods to capture the comparative costs 
of conflict on economic indicators, this thesis is a timely one, and necessary for the remaining 
questions posed by the research. With the exploration of such subjects, the framework of the 
SEEP/AIMS project was expanded to include a more accurate and precise understanding of 
the implications of political risk, which Dunn, Kalaltzandonakes and Valdivia (1996:4) define 
as "the chance of loss due to the exercise of power. In the traditional sense, this category 
includes losses from riots, wars, or unfavourable acts by the state or its officials." 
 
The key finding from my initial explorations centres on the phenomenon of increasing reliance 
on informal financial service providers during conflict: that is, the discrete operational 
advantages and limitations of the informal sector in providing financial services at short notice, 
but sometimes high cost. Since returnees and war-affected regions are rarely economically 
inactive (Jacobsen, Marshak, et al, 2006), it is worth a second look at the changing demand for 
financial services. And in fact, this thesis finds a proliferation of these informal credit and 
deposit services, which is testament to the cash-management needs of highly entrepreneurial 
markets, regardless of the supply of services by formal structures. And this is not unique to the 
context studied. Yet reliance on informal sources of credit is poorly understood, and the micro-
level exploration of these providers is one of the key contributions of this work.  
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In a deliberate effort to include this often-unmeasurable aspect, this thesis illustrates how capital 
flight not only occurs through the expatriation of capital into foreign assets during conflict, as 
Collier has hypothesized, but also as assets are converted (or appropriated) into or by the 
informal sector. This is a critical distinction, and by taking the time to capture some measure 
of the magnitude of the effect, puts us in a stronger position to explain the mechanisms at work 
that create the net effects that Collier has picked up on.  
 
Usually, relying on official reporting figures for policy development only tends to point out 
what is known, and as large N quantitative studies also seek to utilize known figures for 
modelling purposes. Yet what is not known may be even larger than what is known, and it is 
reasonable to suggest that even small, local samples aimed at gathering these “unknowns” have 
some external validity for national-level analysis. Estimates of the size of Congo’s informal 
economy, for one instance, suggest that it could reach up to two thirds the size of its formal 
economy (MacGaffey, 1991). And in the DRC in 2011, only 1% of the population had access 
to banking services, according to the African Development Bank, and commercial bank credit 
comprises only 7% of GDP, “one of the world’s lowest rates (ADB, 2013).  Analogously, the 
informal financial sector will be a dominant repository of individuals’ savings in countries with 
high rates of a secondary economy, since high incidences of unregulated trading tends to reflect 
the lack of state reach and regulation in these areas. With such a low level of documented 
financial activity, it can be logically inferred that the majority of the financial activities in the 
DRC are undocumented, and most likely pass through informal financial institutions.  
 
Informal finance, characterized by the limited outreach of operations, the lack of formalization 
of procedures, and high interest rates compared to the formal sector (Matin, Hulme, and 
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Rutherford, 2002), is often assumed to have lower transaction costs and lesser problems of 
some kinds of risks than formal microfinance. It is also lauded for lessons in designing micro 
and formal finance (Schreiner, 2001; Ardener and Burman, 1995; Bouman 1995; Burkett, 1988; 
Caskey, 1994; Christen 1989; Graham 1992; Von Pischke 1992). The comparative costs of 
informal finance relative to formal finance during conflict, however, have not been empirically 
demonstrated sufficiently, as “there are no objective means to reliably measure its relevance pre 
and post conflict as no reliable records exist” (Matabisi, 2011:42).  
 
Yet, the relevance of informal finance in conflict zones is, as this thesis argues, precisely what 
drives the environment for credit in a post-conflict phase. And in turn, the salience of conflict 
drivers, structural and proximate, such as ethnic, tribal, and economic, will be reflected in the 
performance of financial services. Perhaps best put by Dunn, Kalaltzandonakes and Valdivia 
(1996:15), the authors note, in their paper submitted as part of the SEEP/AIMS project, that: 
 
Under conditions of imperfect markets for labour, land, credit, and insurance, 
households will try to build a number of alternative insurance mechanisms that they 
can draw upon in the event of a loss.  Principal among these will be the accumulation 
of savings and assets.  In addition, households may seek to maintain active non-market 
relations, such as communal or kinship relations, which represent important non-
market mechanisms for accessing resources and spreading risk through sharing (Ellis 
1993).  A third potential insurance mechanism is the establishment of access to credit, 
which may become a critical mechanism for consumption smoothing. 
 
The interaction between such kinship networks, or supra-household networks, is hypothesized 
without qualitative or quantitative evidence, and does not take into the current state of the art 
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on the related issues here.  How these mechanisms work (or do not) objectively across case 
studies could vary. For instance, preliminary evidence suggests ethnic diversity alone could bear 
a negative effect on coping mechanisms or their outcomes, and it is worth examining the role 
of trust in such networks, especially in conflict-affected contexts. Mauro (1995), for instance, 
identifies a negative correlation between ethnic diversity and institutional efficiency and 
corruption, contributing to a poor investment climate and thus weak economic growth.  La 
Porta et al (1999) also relate ethnic fractionalization to the quality of governance, while Collier 
and Hoeffler (2002) emphasise the dynamism and volatility of ethnically diverse societies as a 
significant factor precipitating the outbreak of civil war.  
 
How far the mobilisation of social cohesion, or the lack of it, interacts with other significant 
variables, especially at the level of individual institutions, has been largely analysed from a non-
conflict perspective (Dahl 1971; Horowitz 1985; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Merkel 
and Weiffen 2012). Indeed, apart from some work conducted in Liberia by Seibel and Massing 
in 1976 well before the Liberian civil war, there exist few ethno-linguistic power structure 
analyses relevant for the understanding of local-level development in conflict zones. There 
actually exist few studies with any micro-comparative evidence examining how individuals are 
mobilized in conflict zones (apart from a growing body of literature on voting patterns, and 
some post-war studies), as emerging studies concentrate increasingly on the quality of 
quantitative data instead (see Nunn and Qian, 2014; Dube and Vargas, 2006; Fearon an Laiton, 
2003 for examples). Stathis Kalyvas brought these shortcomings to light in 2003, and developed 
a sophisticated theory of engagement in selective vs indiscriminate violence in his seminal 
publication of 2006. This has seen been applied by Severine Autessere in the DRC in her 2010 
book “The Trouble with the Congo”, which are both key works of interest for their specificity 
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in this study. This thesis also provides further civilian level data, in a logical extension of the 
theoretical findings of Kalyvas and Autessere related to individuals currently experiencing 
conflict.   
 
In this light, then, a methodologically rigorous, mixed methods approach will be useful to 
examine the social, political, and operational implications of war vulnerable and war 
invulnerable activities, and their changing relationship with different levels and types of 
violence. But this alone is not sufficient.  In fact, it is the discussion of the qualitative evidence 
from this study which is its most important contribution to the literature. Because 
acknowledging the limitations of working within a conflict-affected context, the efforts of 
policy-makers and planners to promote stability and good governance in the financial sector in 
conflict-affected contexts such as Central Africa should be deeply appreciated. At the same 
time, these same limitations- curfews, armoured vehicles, accommodation which meets security 
standards- often define the experiences of said policy-makers, and provide a narrow 
understanding of the cultural-context at hand, leading to nonspecific, repetitive and sometimes 
prescriptive analysis that reflects such limited engagement.  
 
This research, on the other hand, spanning two years of field visits, and accessing information 
in French, Swahili and Kinande, offers a window into the homes and expectations of average 
urban Congolese citizens living in the Kivus3.   It recognizes that there is intrinsic value in 
understanding how they come about and what consequences and costs they may pose for the 
                                                          
3 The period of surveying was between 2013-2015 and included three visits to the field. Two separate 
translators were used for assistance in surveying, transcriptions and translations from French were done 
while in the field. Personal information was encrypted and physical copies destroyed for security reasons.  
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future. To adequately unpack the raised issues, the following overarching research objectives 
will be addressed:  
 
● Understanding the current difficulties in financial market programming in contexts of 
conflict. Exploring, through a combination of research techniques, the adaptations of 
regulated finance and informal finance in conflicted affected environments, including 
efficiency, outreach, and mission drift during times of high-intensity conflict and 
insecure post-conflict periods, compared with relatively secure periods.  
● Contributing to the understanding of reciprocity and solidarity-based forms of 
resistance to government oversight in post-conflict periods, through the development 
of in-depth typologies related to informal finance.  
● Understanding the rational choices made by actors to engage in utility maximizing 
choices, recognizing the universality or particularity of the cases chosen, and exploring 
the implications for development programming at the policy-maker level.   
 
IV. Why are citizen engagements with informal financial services remarkable? 
 
 
In many ways, the idea of working with informal sources of credit fundamentally clashes with 
the ideals of microfinance providers, who see themselves as providing a fairer credit product 
than the informal market, to the extent that entire parallel structures are often formed. 
Recommendations to subcontract are also aimed towards formal institutions. For example, the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) (Bruett et al, 2004:2) recommended that, 
during conflict “Donors should pick implementation partners that have experienced staff and 
a track record in microfinance in conflict affected areas. Preferred partners include local 
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financial institutions (commercial banks, credit unions, NGOs) and specialized international 
NGOs.”   In some countries, this means the replication of financial cooperative structures by 
microfinance agencies and the hedging of beneficiaries’ savings between various possible 
sources of credit services, each meant to serve different purposes. During a conference with 
the Women in Peacebuilding Network in Liberia, for example, where someone compared 
indigenous savings clubs (called SUSUs) to bank accounts, and many of the participants laughed 
(although I am sure some of the same participants were also members of SUSUs).  Ultimately, 
however, the deliberate lack of investment in, cooperation with, or understanding of informal 
financial services leads to several shortcomings, which are addressed through this work.  
 
Harm to the formal economy 
First of all, the rate of reliance on informal savings mechanisms in itself is a significant 
component to the second economy, or “all unreported or unmeasured economic activity falling 
outside the scope of a nation’s technique for monitoring the economy” (Feige 1979, as quoted 
by MacGaffey, 1991: 12). As financial services are constricted, halted, or redirected from 
conflict-affected environments, and informal financial services become a primary depository, 
this rate will become even more significant. Numerous scholars have documented the negative 
effects of large scale capital diversion into non-productive (Robertson, 1892, Keynes, 1930; 
Chamley, 1984; Bryant, 1987) or untraceable (Khan and Ajayi, 2000; Sharman, 2012) directions, 
which in conflict-affected countries becomes even more relevant due to the destruction of local 
production capacities. In a country with high rates of savings outside of a formal economy, and 
a high dependency on imports, capital flight (for lack of a better term) through indigenous 
savings mechanisms, in addition to illicit trade and capital relocation, threatens other kinds of 
financial reconstruction. Collier (1998:3), for instance, points to how, “Although it might seem 
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esoteric to focus upon portfolio choice in the context of civil war, the sheer scale of capital 
flight from capital-hostile environments suggests that its effects on economic performance are 
likely to be large”. To add to Collier’s point, the prevailing logic that the amounts saved in 
informal repositories are small and thus insignificant, can be rejected if in countries with 
majority secondary economies, only a small minority save formally.  Thus, if we are to instead 
consider the informal savings as a kind of dissaving, and examine some of the causal 
mechanisms behind such portfolio choices, we may stand a better chance at promoting 
sustainable reconstruction than if otherwise.  
 
Oversimplification misses opportunities to copy innovative successes 
Secondly, the generic labelling of informal financial services as ‘informal’ itself overlooks key 
contextual and discrete differences within their milieu, including discrepancies within operating 
styles and the very extent to which they can be considered exploitative or enabling.  Attention 
to informal governance structures is gaining increasing recognition among policy-makers and 
the international donor community, who admit that “Social and political leaders, social 
movements, institutions and political parties/formations and faith groups are critical to creating 
constituencies to promote pro-poor development. (DFID, 2013)” However, blanket 
assumptions of local governance as positive or negative can risk more harm than good if 
institutionalized too quickly.  Understanding typologies and their relative efficiency and 
effectiveness allows for a nuanced understanding of the types of coping mechanisms in the 
informal sector, including those which may be sub-optimal or exploitative, and those which 
may in fact represent scalable programming options and are enabling. 
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V. Research questions and hypotheses 
 
The thesis addresses the following key research question: 
How does violent conflict affect the efficiency and impact of informal and formal financial 
service providers, and/or change citizen engagement with financial services?  
 
From this, the logical development of sub questions can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. How does the presence of conflict affect the efficiency of formal and 
informal financial service providers? 
2. How does the presence of conflict affect the impact of formal and informal 
financial service providers?  
3. How does the presence of conflict affect citizen engagements with financial 
services?  
4. What are the implications of solidarity-based forms of survival for post-
conflict reconstruction? 
  
The above can be expanded into three hypotheses built upon relevant literature for empirical 
specifications: 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
While informal institutions may be more efficient, resilient, or effective in conflict-affected 
contexts (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Azari and Smith 2012; Waylen 2013, Sundaseran, 2008, 
Schreiner, 2001), formal financial institutions are, ultimately, more efficient and impactful in 
the long run. 
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Hypothesis 2: 
The decline in microfinance demand during and after conflict will be due to portfolio diversion 
to more liquid and private asset choices. This is due in part to the increase in depreciation due 
to insecure property rights, the documented attractiveness of liquid assets during civil war 
(Collier, 1998; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), low levels of trust, and hyperbolic discounting.  
 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
Citizens are well-aware of the levels of risk tolerated by formal and informal institutions, and 
intuitively understand their comparative efficiency. Therefore, citizens act accordingly in order 
to maximize individual utility from financial service usage. In periods of violent conflict, citizens 
will sacrifice efficiency in financial services in favour of services which are more risk tolerant, 
even if it costs a premium.  
  
VI. Overview of the Study 
 
The thesis itself is structured in four main parts: An introduction of the state of the art and 
theory, history, empirical analysis through two surveys, and discussion and conclusion.   
 
The theoretical framework is developed through a sectoral review of the literature. In the 
introduction of the state of the art, Chapter One examines, first, the surrounding evidence on 
the impact of conflict on countries. Providing a cross-sectional study of the literature in the 
field of conflict as it is currently studied in the political sciences, it highlights the overarching 
recommendations made by many for greater precision in empirical work and more subnational 
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studies. The chapter then dovetails the financial development literature into the discussion, 
recognizing the applicability of theoretical findings for physical structures, and microfinance as 
one example of these. The chapter then provides a brief state of the art of the current 
understanding of the impact of microfinance services, and the extent to which informal 
financial services have been analysed by economists. It also analyses the comparative 
considerations of microfinance services during and following periods of high intensity conflict, 
the considerations and precautions remarked on by leading practitioners and the operational 
strategies observed to date to counter high risks associated with low security. The gap in the 
literature on informal finance during conflict is highlighted- and suggested as a critical issue for 
further exploration.  
 
In Chapter Two, the thesis introduces the historical chronology necessary to understand the 
current situation of the Eastern Congo, bridging the theoretical framework developed in 
chapter one with the specific details of the case studies. The history presented has been chosen 
to provide an ontological understanding of the identities present in the parameters chosen for 
the cases. The main intention of the chapter is to identify and highlight conflict dynamics and 
mechanism (s) throughout the course of events detailed, since it makes the argument that it is 
the salience of conflict drivers that shapes the market for credit in the areas studied. Thus, the 
chapter pays special attention to highlighting weak governance and organisations, in an attempt 
to investigate the network mechanisms at work (or not) that contribute to the violence being 
studied. In illustrating the local-level dynamics in the area chosen, Kalyvas’ intuition is accepted 
that “It is the convergence of the local motives and supralocal imperatives that endows civil 
wars with their particular and often puzzling character, straddling the divide between the 
political and the private, the collective and the individual (2003:1)". Doing so strengthens the 
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case for the external validity of my arguments, since the structural issues pointed out to bolster 
the rest of our findings are, although shaped by their context, not unique to them.  
 
Chapter Three is an attempt to capture the preliminary suggestions from our data related to 
efficiency. First, the research is used to construct categories of financial institutions, including 
informal ones. By visiting all of these and treating them as comparable, a range of the same 
questions to managers, staff and accountants was asked to find similarities and differences in 
operating procedures. From these, standard microfinance methodology was used to create 
typologies needed to answer the research questions. Comparing key performance indicators 
across a range of informal and formal financial service providers, some of the data compiled in 
part one of the research was mapped onto my constructed typologies, and patterns found and 
discussed between categories of institutions in relation to typologies of efficiency and impact.  
The aggregated means found among the sample were substantiated with observations made 
about actual practices, pointing to some of the less efficient practices in addition to the 
importance- and sometime- unimportance of rhetoric.  
 
In Chapter Four, the design and mechanics of the natural experiment run in the study is 
introduced. Part one of the data collected is used to try to isolate the effect of conflict on 
performance of the financial institutions. In providing tentative regressions of the data, the 
direction of the findings suggests some probable underlying relationships. To check the 
robustness of these findings, there is a detailed look to the qualitative notes from the surveys 
taken, searching for narrative evidence from respondents to corroborate the findings.  
 
Chapter Five provides two case studies, one of an informal financial service provider in an area 
considered post-conflict, and one which is considered heavily exposed to conflict, in an attempt 
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to answer my question related to variance in impact. Here, the data used was collected in Part 
two of the study, which surveyed over 200 respondents related to their use of an engagement 
with microfinance services, as well as a range of socio-economic indicators that could 
conceivably be impacted by access to microfinance services. In attempting to isolate the impact 
of conflict on the outcome of microfinance engagement, a series of models was created that 
show the impact that the length of membership in a cooperative has had on a respondent’s 
spending, working hours, and revenue, with two types of conflict as added controls.   
 
Chapter Six seeks to further analyse the choices employed by individuals in conflict-affected 
contexts. Through modelling, the individual level dataset was analysed for meaningful 
relationships to substantiate hypothesized mechanisms with reference to field interviews and 
notes collected through the surveying period. Finding additional support for my hypothesis, 
alternative explanations and possibilities to reach tentative conclusions were explored, leading 
to some theretical linkages.  
 
The thesis concludes, in Chapter Seven, with a re-visitation to the original research objectives. 
Reapplying the examined theoretical frameworks, the empirical findings, the conceptual 
precision of recorded accounts can be used to substantiate the justification for the application 
of macro-economic principles to the study, while simultaneously reworking the findings of 
extant microfinance practitioners’ guidance notes to address some of the shortcomings of 
existing research. Finally, like much other research of this nature, the biggest implication of the 
study may be that the hypothesis confirmed leads to other, testable implications which are 
worth further examination.   
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VII. Methodology 
 
Case Study Selection and the Potential for Generalization 
In order to address the research objectives, a combination of a comparative and a statistical 
approach, triangulated with a literature review and key-informant interviews, has been chosen 
to explore and test the hypotheses. The comparative approach, understood according to 
Lijphart (1971:683) as a “method of discovering empirical relationships among variables” 
requires that cases should be sufficiently sensitive to variations in respect of different national, 
regional, institutional and sectoral dynamics. The comparative approach here is different than 
the experimental approach, where deliberate randomization ensures the selection of two groups 
who are equivalent, except that one is exposed to a stimulus and another is not (Lijphart 
(1971:683). Rather, it is a substitute for the experimental approach due to limitations imposed 
by ethical considerations4 (indeed, if we were to design this thesis as a perfect experiment, it 
would be necessary to distribute arms, spread ethnic hatred, or somehow introduce violence to 
one city and not to another in order to observe the effect of the treatment, which is armed 
conflict!). The statistical approach as well is regarded as an approximation of the experimental 
approach, entailing the mathematical analysis of observed data which is not managed 
situationally. As Lijphart points out (1971:685): 
 
It is logically possible and may be advantageous to shift from the comparative to the 
statistical method. Stein Rokkan distinguishes two aims of cross-national analysis. One 
is the testing of “macro hypothesis” concerning the interrelations of structural elements 
of total systems”; here the number of cases tends to be limited, and one has to rely on 
                                                          
4 The introduction of credit services in a conflict zone is not an activity of this study and thus will not be 
situationally manipulated  
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the comparative method. The other is “micro replications”, designed “to test out in 
other national and cultural settings a proposition already validated in one setting.” Here 
too, one can use the comparative method, but if the proposition in question focuses on 
individuals as units of analysis, one can also use the statistical method; as Meritt and 
Rokkan (as quoted by Lijphart, 1971) point out, instead of the “one-nation, one-case” 
approach, nationality can simply be treated as an additional variable on a par with other 
individual attributes such as occupation, age, sex, type of neighbourhood, etc. 
 
In this sense, then, that cases to test the “macro-hypothesis” should be chosen in order to 
minimize the limitations (i.e. limited sample size, lack of external validity) to the comparative 
method; we seek to comply with the following selection of Lijphart’s recommendations, as 
explained below: 
 
1.) Increase the number of cases as much as possible 
Cases will be extended geographically as much as possible. That is to say, financial services will 
be sought in as many locations as possible. Indeed, even if the total existing number of cases is 
too small for a statistical approach, investigating all available cases is a method by which to 
increase representativeness. More cases can also be included in the study by “restating variables 
in comparable terms (Lijphart, 1971:686)”, that is, terms which allow previously ineligible cases 
to be considered in the case selection. Using Gabriel A. Almond’s functional approach, Lijphart 
argues, political scientists can also establish general concepts which are not specific to certain 
cultures. When comparing financial services across formal and informal structures, then, this 
principle allows us to group “non-repayment rates” with “portfolio at risk estimates”, “clients” 
with “members”, and so forth.   
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2.) Reduce the “property-space” of the analysis 
Variables will be combined together in order to increase the number of cases representing a 
single variable, for example in our discussion of formal or informal. Attributed to Lazarsfeld 
(quoted by Lijphart, 1971), the “property space” of a sample refers to the number of classes 
into which variables are divided, which decreases the number of cases available for each 
relationship comparison. By reducing or combining these sets, the available number of cases 
per category increases.  
 
3.) Focus the comparative analysis on comparable cases 
Cases will be selected which are within an area, as opposed to in a randomly selected variety of 
areas, since “inter-unit” differences can be held constant if comparison is focused at the “intra-
unit” level. This follows the recommendation of Smelser (as quoted by Lijphart, 1971:689), who 
advocated focusing on intranational analysis rather than international analysis, hypothesizing 
that “For many purposes it would be more fruitful to compare Northern Italy with Southern 
Italy, and the Ruhr with Bavaria, than it would be to compare Germany as a whole with Italy 
as a whole”.  
 
The relevance of this principle for its application in conflict-affected contexts is further 
substantiated in the Oxford Handbook on Conflict Economics (2012), which states: 
 
An important challenge to be overcome in the unified approach is the construction of 
the hypothetical region. In their study, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) can use different 
regions from the same country, because the conflict is clearly contained in one part of 
the country. This   is optimal, and using other countries to replicate the conflict host is 
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fraught with difficulty (Brook, Groot, and Bozzoli, in Garkinkel and Skaperdas, 
2012:69).  
 
 
4.) Focus the comparative analysis on the “key” variables.  
Finally, cases will use parsimony in selecting a few key variables for ultimate comparison. In 
essence, in contrast to the decision-making approach of international politics, which calls for 
an analysis of an exhaustive list of all variables, focusing on key variables allows for the 
segmentation and simplification of social sciences for the scientific method.  
 
Criteria for Selection 
As such, in accordance with point 1: 
● The unit of analysis for the comparative part of the research should be financial 
institutions rather than countries, as this will allow for a greater number of cases.  
● A range of financial institutions will be considered for this research, including informal, 
semi-formal, and formal service providers. These categories, which are present in most 
countries, serve to identify and group a range of financial coping mechanisms under the 
categorical label and thus augments the number of cases.  
● All available cases will be included, so far as is possible and ethical, in order to ensure 
representativeness 
 
In addition, however, in accordance with point 2: 
● Distinctions between informal financial service providers and formal service providers 
will contribute to a composite indicator of “informality”, rather than creating a 
multiplicity of categories based on judicial status, for instance. When modelling, this 
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may even be dichotomized into informal and formal. In order to ensure an adequate 
number of cases for both groups, a 50% distribution between cases will be sought.  
● Distinctions between different types and levels of violence will contribute, again, to a 
composite indicator of “intensity of conflict”, rather than keeping separate 
categorizations for each institution on the amount of violence they have experienced.  
 
In accordance with point 3:  
● The limit of the area to be sampled will be a nation-state, rather than several nation-
states.  
 
And finally, in accordance with point 4: 
● The research will focus on the key variables of efficiency, impact, conflict and 
formalization. Each of these composite variables will have a limited number of 
contributing variables. 
 
As such, in the framing of the research question and criteria for case selection, it becomes clear 
that a nation-state which matches the following will be the ideal site of case selection: 
 
● Has varying levels of conflict in different parts of the country, which can be combined 
into a composite indicator, including areas of current conflict and areas which might 
better be termed “post-conflict” (in accordance with point 2) 
● Has both informal, semi-formal, and formal service providers which can be analysed 
using general western terminology (in accordance with points 1 and 4) 
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● Has a large but defined geographic mass for gathering more cases (in accordance with 
points 1 and 3) 
 
To find a nation-state suitable for the above criteria, the Heidelberg Institute for International 
Conflict Research’s 2013 Conflict Barometer was checked for the top 10 high-intensity conflicts 
worldwide. These countries are further examined below for case study selection suitability.   
 
 VARYING 
LEVELS AND 
TYPES OF 
CONFLICT? 
INFORMAL, SEMI 
FORMAL, AND 
FORMAL 
SERVICE 
PROVIDERS 
WITH 
COMPARABLE 
STRUCTURES?5 
LARGE LAND 
MASS6? 
DRC Y Y Y 
Mali Y N Y 
Nigeria Y N Y 
Sudan Y Y Y 
Afghanistan Y N Y 
Mexico Y Y Y 
Syria Y N N 
The 
Philippines 
Y Y N 
Somalia Y N Y 
South Sudan Y Y Y 
TABLE 1. COUNTRIES FOR CASE STUDY SITE CRITERIA 
 
                                                          
5 Here, countries with a majority Muslim population were ruled as not qualifying for, given the complex 
relationship between Islam and credit-activities, which is not the domain of this thesis.  
6 Here, the CIA factbook figures were checked for country size. So called “large countries” are those that 
fell in the top quintile of all countries in terms of land mass per square km.  
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As we can see when comparing criteria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and 
Mexico emerge as suitable nations. As all three nations fit the area selection criteria for the 
purpose of this project, relative size was then compared.  
 
COUNTRY LAND MASS (SQ. KM)(CIA, N.D.) 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
2,344,858 
Mexico 1,964,375 
South Sudan 644,329 
TABLE 2 COUNTRY SELECTION DELIBERATION 
 
In accordance with recommendation 1 of Lipjhart’s notes on the comparative method, then, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo is taken as the most appropriate site of the intra-state 
comparative study due to its greater relative land mass (905,600 square miles)- and thus ability 
to seek a greater number of cases.  
 
Preliminary investigations confirmed the suitability of the DRC for a case which matches the 
criteria. 2009 figures from the central bank indicate 19 banks and over 100 financial 
cooperatives present in the country (BCDC, 2010)- although a 2007 dissertation was only able 
to identify two banks present in North Kivu and 11 financial cooperatives (Tshimpaka, 2007), 
or roughly 10% the infrastructure registered in Kinshasa.  
 
CGAP partially explains this in a 2004 brief that mentions “In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, USAID and CIDA focused microfinance efforts on pockets of stability while other 
areas of the country remained inaccessible.” Meanwhile, 2013 observations observed a range 
of informal financial service providers not registered with the central bank, underscoring a 
combination of informal governance and opportunism by these actors. Together, these 
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indicators were taken as a promising sign that the country context of the DRC aligns well with 
the theoretical assumptions specified for Lipjhart’s comparative method, and could provide a 
number of suitable cases.  
 
Research Design 
Essentially, as can be seen from the multi-part research question, the independent variables on 
the left-hand side of table 3. were compared with the dependent variables on the right-hand 
side of the table. 
 
 
Independent Variables Divergent Outcomes 
Intensity of Conflict Efficiency 
Formal Integration Impact 
TABLE 3 KEY VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
 
Rephrasing these as models with an interaction term for conflict, and recognizing that 
individuals typically use a combination of formal and informal services within a year, monthly 
(t), yearly, and geographical (i) variants can be exploited in the intensity of conflict (Conflict), 
and the level of formality of financial service used, to see variance in the impact (Impact) and 
performance (Efficiency) of financial service providers, conditional on conflict.  
 
Impactimy= αi+ β1Conflicts im,y+ β2Formalim,y+ β3Informalim,y 
+β4Informal*Conflict+β5Formal*Conflict ϵi,m,y 
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Efficiencyimy= αi+ β1Conflicts im,y+ β2Formalim,y+ β3Informalim,y 
+β4Informal*Conflict+β5Formal*Conflict ϵi,m,y 
 
In order to compile the data for each of these variables, information on subindicators informed 
the building of composite indicators, or “the mathematical combination of individual indicators 
that represent different dimensions of a concept whose description is the objective of the 
analysis (Saisana and Tarantola, 2002).” Several extended field trips to the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo were made in order to collect subindicator informers, and a multi-step data 
collection plan was developed to guide the collection of responses. 
 
 
IX. Part 1: Groundwork, institutional data collection, and comparison: A collective 
inquiry into comparative efficiency 
 
To develop an analysis of the macro-relationships between the formal and informal financial 
sector, original data was collected in a methodologically rigorous evaluation of the comparative 
performance of both types. 21 financial institutions were identified and visited with a translator, 
in order to attempt to identify, for each institution, the relevant performance indicator7: 
 
● Age  
● No. borrowers  
● Total loan portfolio outstanding 
                                                          
7These performance indicators are modified from Microrate and IADB, 2003. Microfinance 
Performance Indicators: A Technical Guide. Washington, D.C: Microfinance Gateway 
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● Portfolio at risk 
● Write-off ratio 
● Average loan balance  
● Depth of outreach (Average loan balance/GNP per capita)  
● Administrative expenses (as % of average loan portfolio) 
● Average staff salary (as multiple of GNP per capita) 
● Staff productivity (no. borrowers /staff) 
● Cost per borrowers (Administrative expenses / No. of 
average borrowers) 
 
The indicators above, while taken from formal banking terminology, conform to principle 1 of 
Lipjhart’s work, that is, seeking the application of western terminology across cultural 
boundaries in order to include previously excluded cases. So, despite their origin in formal 
banking practice, these indicators should be present in even the most informal financial 
institutions.  
 
The research selected sites and cases in order to maximize variation in the key independent 
variables (conflict and formalization), while keeping all other situational characteristics 
constant. There was also an effort to create an even distribution in each group of cases, in an 
effort to reduce the property space and increase the number of cases of each type. However, 
in order to attempt approximate representativeness, all available, visible cases were approached, 
skewing the data in favour of formal institutions who were generally easier to identify and 
locate. As such, the following distribution was reached to this effect:  
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● 14 financial institutions were surveyed which are formal 
● 7 financial institutions were surveyed which are informal 
● 11 financial institutions were surveyed which operate in a context affected by conflict 
● 10 financial institutions were surveyed which operate in a “post-conflict” context 
 
Such a bias in favour of the formal sector is accounted for by the dichotomizing of sectors- the 
averaging of key performance indicators per sector compensates for the higher response rate 
from the formal sector. In addition, not all institutions provided all the required information, 
therefore averages by sector also compensate for missing or null responses to more sensitive 
questions.  Where needed, the binary category of formal and informal can be expanded into 
four types of financial services: 1. Moneylenders (informal), 2. Mutualities and unregistered 
Coopecs (informal), 3. Registered savings and credit cooperatives, and (formal) 4. Microfinance 
Societies and Banks (formal). In chapter 3, more detailed descriptions justify these groupings. 
 
 
X. Part 2: Evaluating impact through user analysis 
 
Part two of the project delves into some of the discrete variances between some of the financial 
institutions, and their interrelationship with conflict dynamics. In an effort to capture 
institutional effectiveness- and sort out how this may in turn be affected by the various conflicts 
of the particular area of location, an-in depth, statistical sampling of a select number of cases 
was conducted, in turn with Lipjhart’s conceptualization of a “micro-representation” of a 
“macro hypothesis”.  
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A questionnaire was administered to two sample groups of respondents, allowing for an impact 
assessment of two financial cooperatives.  
 
The sample groups were chosen according to the following: 
 
● One of the group of cooperative participants were based in a town which, due to its 
geographical location (mountainous, situated along roads maintained by Nande traders, 
and neighbouring Uganda) is predominantly isolated from the conflict 
 
● One of the group of cooperative participants and 1 control group were based in a town 
with, due to its geographical location (situated near what has been called the Eastern 
Congo’s second biggest threat to security) is considered in to be exposed to the conflict.  
 
Analysis of the surveys examined the impact of the length of a member’s membership in the 
financial cooperative against indicators of economic well-being, covering a wide-range of direct 
and proxy indicators of purchasing power and economic resilience.  
 
In total, part two of the research collected 208 surveys through the trial, including 103 
interviews conducted with the members of a local financial cooperative in the northern city of 
Butembo, North Kivu, and 105 interviews through a second questionnaire developed and 
conducted in Beni, North Kivu.   (The survey data are not published for reasons of 
confidentiality.)  The surveys were conducted in a mix of French, Swahili, Kinande, and Lingala. 
Survey participants were asked about the following proxies: 
 
● Number of businesses 
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● Monthly profit 
● Number of loans 
● Household size, including adopted 
● Household consumption (rent, fuel, transportation, clothing, recreation, taxes) 
● Household expenditures (education, furniture, repairs, appliances, vehicle purchases, 
vacations) 
● Savings 
● Resilience to emergencies (types of emergencies, coping strategies)  
● Family contributions 
● Lending to others 
 
Not surprisingly, part two of the research took considerably more time and effort than part 
one. The findings of part two contributed to the question of financial service impact, and at the 
same time enriched the discussion of results for both sections. 
 
Bringing the state of the art of microfinance to bear on survey design 
 
Informal finance takes many forms and presentations, and it should be noted that the lack of 
regulation of some providers is more from necessity than from outright resistance to regulation. 
Informal service providers claim their structures from indigenous and tribal practices which 
may not be uniformly exercised nor evaluated. This research, therefore, is based on studies 
gathered from a range of literature, ranging from post-conflict to comparative studies of 
political economy, and to the social, anthropological and political sciences. Its primary point of 
reference, as noted in the preamble, is the comparative literature on international development, 
specifically the literature on microfinance and post-conflict microfinance. Although the thesis 
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follows the work of the SEEP/AIMS project, it acknowledges the limitations in the current 
state of the art in microfinance evaluations.  
 
First of all, the noted limitations of using new microfinance members as a control group in 
evaluating microfinance impact, as summarized by Dean Karlan, (2001) include the sample and 
selection bias of only considering currently participating (i.e. successful) clients, as well as 
changing institutional and contextual dynamics over time. In order to control for this, 
comparable groups of financial service users were sought, attempting to sample a 
representative, rather than random, group of clients. Comparison of the two groups of users to 
each other reveals the treatment effect, exposure to violence, rather than access to financial 
services, whose impact is captured, and the case is made that in the area chosen, exposure to 
violence is as random as any that could be found in a natural experiment. 
 
Secondly, in evaluating efficiency, hidden operating costs such as time- or risks to personal 
security- are difficult to account for when surveying informal financial service providers. It 
should be noted, in addition, that although the work is grounded in empirical analysis, it is not 
a quantitative economics thesis. Nonetheless, the findings have revealed consistency with the 
central hypotheses to the thesis, and suggest a widening of the existing framework to include, 
in future studies, a consideration for the operational efficiency of the informal financial sector. 
 
XI. Data Collection, Sample Selection Issues, and Ethics 
 
The main body of data for the thesis comes from surveying financial service users, as these 
were identified, from the onset, as the unit of analysis for the case studies. A necessity in seeking 
representatives from local organisations required mediation of communication, in some 
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instances, as some participants did not speak French. In addition, there was a necessity to 
ensure, through the non-random selection of participant population, that data collected on 
participants and their families was sufficiently protected due to the high risk nature of collecting 
personal data in conflict zones.  
 
This required communication with organisations in order to secure the permission to collect 
personal information, and a use of changes to the original sampling technique. An original 
version of the proposal, for instance, sought to find two control groups from outside the 
microfinance clientele group, with the only defining characteristics being that the members of 
the control group should somehow themselves be in comparable economic circumstances. 
However, it has been pointed out by Lipjhart (1971) that randomized control groups pose 
ethical risks, which would be exacerbated in conflict-affected zones. As such, the ‘control 
groups’ were eventually chosen according to microfinance impact assessment methodology 
using randomization techniques recommended by Karlan (2001) to identify an appropriate 
group of new members to the cooperative as a control group8.  
 
Selection criteria for institutional cases, meanwhile, was kept broad in order to identify as many 
providers as possible. Starting in Butembo with the guidance of the annex to a paper discovered 
in the local university’s library “Les Innovations des Institutions Associatives et le 
Developpement Local Dans la Ville de Butembo” (Kahambu, n.d.), which listed a group of 25 
mutualities the author had identified. Representatives from my host organization, in turn, 
                                                          
8 Dean Karlan (2001) recommends excluding, from those members of the new and incoming clientele, 
those who do not conform to the characteristics of those who remain with the program for a long time in 
order to create two comparable groups. As such, the control group is more of a carefully selected subset of 
the original sample group than a separate group not linked to the financial institution.  
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helped me contact and meet with as many of the cooperatives on the list as possible, in addition 
to balancing these visits with an equal number of visits to more formal banks and even less 
formal sources of credit, such as money-lenders.  
 
Community mapping was also conducted with a translator in Butembo and Beni, using 
snowballing techniques to discover the location and approximate size of local financial 
institutions. Preliminary visitations determined case study eligibility and, where possible, 
scheduled a follow up visit to speak with as many staff as possible. Staff were recruited through 
asking local managers for permission to speak to their staff. Lastly, participants in the two 
impact surveys were recruited in close collaboration with institution managers, and these 
interviews followed a set questionnaire with anonymity assurances, consent forms, and in 
accordance with data protection best practices including ethical review and approval by the 
University of York’s ethics committee.  
 
Both sampling techniques for both surveys adopted may still have been affected by sensitivity 
issues, however. Questions related to the operational efficiency of financial institutions, for 
instance, tended to reveal, at times, out of date records or poorly organized client records, and 
research participants may have been unwilling to share these either due to their lack of due 
diligence or unwillingness to disclose clients’ personal details. A number of research issues 
therefore presented themselves. In the following section, nature and severity of 
conceptualization and bias issues are outlined, and efforts to mitigate their effect on the research 
are discussed.  
 
Partisan Bias 
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This research was begun as a well-intentioned member of the board of directors of a small 
credit and savings cooperative in Butembo. The original work with the cooperative had led to 
confusion over the declared efficacy of some of the less formal financial services seen in the 
community. In 2013, it was decided to frame the conflict as the treatment effect, and conduct 
further research on the participation in financial services as a way to understand the interaction 
between conflict dynamics and household coping strategies. However, the naturally competitive 
nature of financial services defined the methods of approach, which became a mixture of 
expressed solidarity and transparency. Gatekeepers (those with “ownership, stewardship or 
other executive authority in line with the existing cultural norms of the research setting” 
(Sanders, 2006)-at all levels- required the most careful handling. This included the divulgence 
of the association with another savings and credit cooperative, as well as the clear and 
straightforward introduction of the author as an academic conducting research.  
 
Copies of a letter of introduction from the University of York were provided to gatekeepers of 
institutional information as well as personal information.  At the institutional level, a multi-day 
review period, agreed to with managers upon first meeting, provided them the time necessary 
to check with their supervisors and headquarters, sometimes in Kinshasa, as well as make a 
decision to grant access to information and/or clients or not. Yet partisan bias-taking the side 
of one party over another- coloured many responses, a fact aggravated by the limited 
communication practiced between savings and credit cooperative. A pervasive form of partisan 
bias, the romanticism of the role of credit cooperatives was seen again and again. Conforming 
to S.P. Mackenzie (quoted in Kalyvas, 2006:37)’s observation that journalists can “accentuate 
the positive, the selfless, the heroic, in the revolutionary context, in order to legitimize a 
particular set of social beliefs”, financial service providers tended to exaggerate their positive 
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impact, and minimize the profit made through their operations. For instance, one credit 
cooperative, asked about its founding story, shared how: 
 
It started by raising awareness in Christian businessmen gathered within an association 
called AHAC (Association of Christian Businessmen) …they had to meet in churches 
and in other public areas in order to meet economic operators to join them, and then 
other social categories of people motivated by an interest in savings started to change 
their mind... That consisted of getting rid of egoism, and teaching or preaching the act 
of working together for economic independence 
 
A mirror image of informal finance or microfinance as usurious, however, is found in a bulk of 
the critical literature on microfinance, including stereotypes of moneylenders who exact 
punishment on noncompliant borrowers. More tellingly, by the casual handing of members’ 
savings was repeatedly perturbing, sometimes with high disregard for portfolio quality in favour 
of established family ties.  
 
As such, keeping an “intellectual distance” (Reig Tapia, as referred to by Kayvas, 2006:37) was 
considered ideal in order to avoid undue influence on the question of impact. As pointed out 
by Patrick Christian (n.d.), that in a conflict-affected setting “Given that gatekeepers or their 
participant populations have little ability to act on the full and continuing disclosure of agenda 
and purpose of the research effort, there is most often little harm that can result by full 
disclosure. What this disclosure does do however, is fulfil an underlying human need within the 
subject community of participation in the development of their narrative”. 
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Data Reliability 
The reliability of the provided information will depend largely on the gatekeeper’s perception 
of the researcher- their motivations, capacity and integrity. This becomes especially critical in 
contexts which, having been exposed to conflict perpetrated by foreign forces, may be extra 
sensitive to cooperation with foreigners. As Bearak (2000:30, as quoted by Kalyvas, 2006:41) 
tells, a journalist who was once investigating a massacre in Kashmir’s respondents started 
arguing with each other: “His translator leaned over him and whispered: “They are debating 
whether it is for the greater good of the village to lie to you, and if so, what are right lies to 
tell””. 
 
Gatekeepers such as institutional managers may have been either selective in the information 
provided, highlighted positive biases, or presented outright inflated or outdated data due to a 
combination of their cultural differences from the researcher. For example, the manager of one 
branch of a credit cooperative in Beni, when asked what the average staff salary at his branch 
was, simply told me “Here in Congo, we don’t have salaries. We live in the informal.”, although 
his counterpart in Butembo’s branch of the same cooperative was able to provide an average 
figure of $200 a month for staff. Where possible, interviews included sufficient time to work 
with staff in order to calculate the proposed indicators directly from financial books- and 
offered this as a useful and informative activity for the research participants. Time for repeated 
follow-up visits was allocated for each institutional case study. At the same time, it is 
acknowledged that results related to institutional efficiency may be positively skewed due to the 
reasons above, yet at the same time the data collected interviews providers who would have 
never appeared in formal or previously recorded records of financial services. 
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Question related to services impact and coping mechanisms, meanwhile, may have provoked 
embarrassment or recalcitrance from participants, thus efforts were made to allow for null 
responses when preferred and offer privacy, anonymity, and clear explanations of the nature of 
the survey before starting. A selection bias within the survey of financial service users, 
meanwhile, would imply problematic analysis due to non-random participants. Yet efforts were 
made to find a representative, comparable, group of users, and once identified, in coordination 
with the organisations managers, the research team were positioned in the location of surveying 
daily for a period of two months. At the individual level, a shorter review period (i.e. time to go 
over the information sheet and consent forms), as well as clarification that participating or not 
participating would not affect client’s access to services, nor be shared with the managers of 
institutions who clients may be wary of criticizing, was included in consent seeking processes. 
This was of course in addition to conducting all interviews in a private space in full 
confidentiality.  
 
It is therefore hoped that a representative cross section of users would have visited during this 
time period. Given a lack of automatic teller machines, those who do use financial services will 
have likely visited at least once. However, further coordination with the institutional managers 
following the survey adjusted the client-level service accordingly to ensure representativeness 
of the actual membership of the cooperative. Additionally, as we shall see in further chapters, 
microfinance methodologies to approximate randomness were used when required.   
 
Urban Bias 
Costly information is often a cause of urban bias (Kalyvas, 2006:41), in addition to a lack of 
interest, oftentimes, in more challenging research assignments. “Not coincidentally, one of the 
most intensely studied conflicts is Northern Ireland: an English-speaking country with good 
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hotels, very pleasant scenery, temperate climate, tasty local cuisine9, and most important, not a 
high level of danger” (Smith, 1995 as paraphrased by Kalyvas, 2006:42).  On the other hand, as 
Kat Nickerson colourfully recalls, travelling in the Beni/Butembo region can only be safely 
done if you are integrated into a local host family: 
 
Traveling by car for any length of time is an impossible task for there are no dependable 
gas stations, hotels, stores, or restaurants in the rural areas- and above all, no law 
enforcement agencies. That means no police force and above all, no one to turn to if 
something goes wrong unless you’ve been adopted by the local tribe. No one travels 
far in the Congo except for Congolese soldiers grouped together in small bands who 
walk the roads by day with automatic weapons in hand dispensing justice to those who 
pay them the highest fees… Pulling into a border town feels very much like entering 
the bar scene in Star Wars I where violent assaults literally occur at the “drop of a hat”. 
 
Without an official UN Escort (and indeed, one probably would have come with its own host 
of implications from this research), this research is limited to the cities of Butembo and Beni, 
with an acknowledgement that the experiences of financial service users here is not 
representative of those hardest hit by the conflict. At the same time, visits were made to 
surrounding rural areas and some limited inquisitions were made to villagers living around Beni. 
Yet, it was decided to focus the surveying sample frame on two comparable groups and these 
rural visits served more as out of sample observations and informal consultations than part of 
the formal structure of the research. In summation, for the timeframe spent in the field, the 
sampling technique was as effective as possible given political and security constraints. 
                                                          
9 Depends on the partaker 
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XII. Research Limitations 
While this research was a positive indication that the development of culturally specific, original 
tools based on microfinance evaluation methodology can be applied in even the most insecure 
research contexts, the study was limited to a certain geographical area. Thus, while 
methodologically sound, and likely to produce the same findings even if the timeframe was 
expanded and the sample size larger, it would be interesting to replicate in a more 
ethnolinguistically heterogenous area, or in an area where livelihoods are extremely different in 
nature, to aggregate to a more general level. Yet, the study chose to explore its cases in depth, 
and at the end of the day the data collected on the cases identified was more than sufficient to 
support an argument.  
 
Secondly, the survey design struggled to find a counterfactual not affected by spillover effects, 
and realizes the dampening effect that the proximity of Beni may have had to the responses of 
those in Butembo. Expectations of the future may still have been guarded by some in Butembo, 
and profits affected by interregional trade, including with partner cities such as Beni. Yet this 
effect would likely be one that would simply be larger, or more stark, if a more perfect natural 
experiment were found. As explained, the specific questions related to personal eperiences of 
victimization by the conflict were used as a robustness check, and usually indicated that  being 
located in Beni and being personally affected by the conflict resulted in similar outcomes. Yet it 
would be naïve to say that Butembo residents were not affected by the conflict at all, belittling 
the wide-ranging array of challenging and threatening aspects of life in Butembo today, which 
are hard to distengangle from other, potentially unobserved variables.  
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XIII. Preliminary conceptualizations 
 
In the following section, a series of analytical distinctions are introduced: between formal and 
informal financial services, for instance, and between efficient and impactful, including the 
subcomponents to the indexes created for the purpose of this study.   
 
Ethnicities and the DRC 
Throughout the course of this study, the terms “The Congo” and “DRC”, are used 
interchangeably, referring to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and not its neighbour, the 
Republic of the Congo. When referring to indigenous Congolese tribes, the French-origin term 
“autochthone” is used occasionally, which broadly includes all tribes who can trace their origin 
to the Congo and not Rwanda. Those tribes originating from Rwanda are generally referred to 
as “Banyamulenge” and “Kinyarwandan”, the distinction between these indicating the period 
in which the individual’s family migrated to the Congo, or collectively as “Banyarwandan”.  
 
Informal and Formal Finance Defined 
For the purpose of this project, microfinance can be understood as: “The provision of financial 
services to low-income clients, including the self-employed10” (Ledgerwood, 1999: 1).  
Microfinance therefore can be considered to encompass both informal and formal finance 
(when formal finance is offered to low-income clients). In fact, according to Matin, Hulme and 
Rutherford (2002), microfinance institutions can even be categorized into three types of 
providers: Informal, semi-formal, and formal finance. Financial services may be offered 
                                                          
10 Financial services generally include savings and credit; however, some microfinance organisations also 
provide insurance and payment services. In addition to financial intermediation, many MFIs provide social 
intermediation services such as group formation, development of self-confidence, and training in financial 
literacy and management capabilities among members of a group. (World Bank, 1999: 1) 
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through a variety of products: for the purpose of the following passages, let us consider that 
the microfinance programmes referred to may offer any (or a combination) of the following: 
savings, micro-insurance, microloans, and money transfers. 
 
Informal finance encompasses the range of traditional financial services that use unregistered 
sources of credit. Informal finance is characterized by the limited outreach of operations, the 
lack of formalization of procedures, and high interest rates compared to the formal sector 
(Matin, Hulme and Rutherford, 2002). Informal finance can be considered existent and 
indigenous to a location, enjoying advantages and disadvantages slightly different than formal 
finance- and tends to cover the broad range of institutionalized coping measures of low-income 
entrepreneurs to meeting cash flow shortages, including local wholesalers who operate on 
credit, pawnbrokers, money-lenders, rotating or accumulating savings and credit associations, 
savings clubs, and indigenous financial cooperatives. Risk is judged based on information held 
by the creditor regarding the client, and transaction costs, at least in terms of time, are typically 
high.  The member-owned financial institutions referred to in this research, meanwhile, were, 
for the majority, financial cooperatives, but included some more indigenous and informal 
structures as well, including church associations and indigenous savings clubs termed 
“likilimbas” in Swahili. Using the framework of ROSCAs and ASCAs to understand their 
operations, they can be defined as either (Rotating Credit and Savings Associations) an 
association formed upon a core of participants who make regular contributions to a fund, which 
is given in whole or in part to each contributor in turn, or Accumulated Savings and Credit 
Associations, where members are appointed to manage an internal fund (Ardener and Burman, 
1996).   
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Semi-formal financial institutions fall in between informal and formal financial institutions. Part 
or all of their operations are registered and licensed for operations at the national level (Matin, 
Hulme and Rutherford, 2002); however, they rely heavily on traditional and informal financial 
arrangements such as group lending, solidarity groups and the use of peer pressure to manage 
relatively small financial transactions. Semi-formal financial institutions may have an indigenous 
or an external origin- either they have slightly formalized previously informal operations in 
order to avoid legal repercussions or benefit from national opportunities, or they are new to an 
area- perhaps offering financial services as a component of a wider development strategy- and 
consider their operations below the volume needed for formal registration with centralized 
financial mechanisms. When splitting their services as formal or informal, it will be most 
accurate to check the status of the institution at the level of the Central Bank of Congo - and if 
pending or registered, count it as a formal service provider; whereas if the status is not registered 
or pending formal recognition, we can count it as an informal institution.  
 
Formal financial institutions are those that are subject to, and compliant with, their country's 
banking laws (Matin, Hulme and Rutherford, 2002). They often include the regular banking 
system as well as private and chartered banks. They are characterized by having the resources 
to give larger loans and often fill a void for banking services in more rural areas. In conflict 
affected and post-war contexts, they may be highly limited in their outreach, often centralized 
in capital cities, with limited operating hours and few rural branches. 
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XIV. Definitions 
 
Conflict Defined 
For the purposes of this study’s argument, the armed conflict definition developed by the Peace 
Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) and UPCD is adopted, as it is consistent with that used by 
the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data team. Here, an armed conflict is defined as: 
 
A contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use 
of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, 
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. (Gleditsch et al, 2002)  
  
Here, it also becomes relevant to discuss whether horizontal or categorical inequalities 
identified by Gurr and Moore (1997), Tilly (1999) and Stewart (2001), should be included in the 
composition of this understanding of conflict. Buhaug and Rød (2006), also identify salient 
indicators which can predict civil war, including ethnic discrimination, income inequality levels, 
the effect of geography, access to contraband goods, and international (crossborder) support 
(Jobbins, 2008). Kalyvas’s understanding, which is that civil war is “a product of large amounts 
of mobilizable social capital and networks of trust within communities, which are co-opted and 
organized for political violence (as quoted by Jobbins, 2008)”, serves to indicate, further, the 
presence of conflict in addition to the narrow one adopted by PRIO. As such, the additional 
factors are considered as contributing the maximalist concept of a “Positive Peace”, or one in 
which citizens have access to economic equality, social protection, and environmental justice 
as opposed to simply the absence of violence; a state which, it is argued in this thesis, none of 
the selected sites have yet reached.  
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Efficiency Defined 
Efficiency, as mentioned in Part 1 of the research overview, is a composite indicator including 
interval and ratio variables. In addition to these performance indicators, which are lifted directly 
from the finance literature and chosen for their relevance for the cases, we may do well to also 
ask the relevance of each indicator in a context affected by violent conflict. As such, these 
should also be periodically compared with, for perspective, the same variables in a case in a 
comparable country which has not been affected by conflict, for an idea of their generalizability.  
 
The relevance of each variable is below: 
 
Age: The age of the visited branch of the organisation, expressed in months. Related questions 
might have to do with the formation of the capital and, if relevant, what happened during high 
intensity conflict.  
 
No. borrowers: That is, the number of current accounts open, or total number of potential 
borrowers. This will indicate, especially for conflict-affected providers, the relevance of 
financial services. A related sub-question sought what percentage of these “accounts” have 
been opened and then became inactive, which might indicate financial difficulties due to 
difficult economic conditions, conflict, or the frustration with inadequate services provision, 
for example.   
 
Total loan portfolio outstanding: The total value of credit in active loans at the time of the visit- 
which is used to calculate other indicators. As Frederic Kalala Tshimpaka’s 2007 thesis stated, 
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in an environment such as North Kivu where microfinance organisations poorly structure their 
data, theoretical and foundational indicators of effectiveness need to be identified via others 
(p149). 
 
Portfolio at risk (PAR): The total value of late or restructured credit, compared to the total loan 
portfolio outstanding. Tshimpaka’s work on microfinance in the DRC found that “portfolio at 
risk is the dominant indicator for evaluating the effectiveness of microfinance organisations 
active in the Kivus11(2007: 149)”. Indeed, we will expect to see a higher PAR in conflict-affected 
environments, instead of expecting institutions to meet the golden benchmark of 5% when 
such benchmarks have evolved from the application of banking disciplines to microfinance. 
Dominik Bartsch mentions how, in refugee situations for example, UNHCR struggles to apply 
this particular principle: 
 
“Without the necessary technical experience in "banking for the poor", only scant attention will 
be paid to key financial benchmarks: UNHCR may consider a repayment rate of 50% quite 
acceptable although 'best practice' would demand much higher rates of around 95% (Bartsch, 
2004)” 
 
Write-off ratio: The loan loss reserve which is in place to write off bad credit, and forgive 
struggling clients. Taken from the organisation’s profit, it should cover all loans older than 1 
year which have gone unpaid. In addition to Tshimpaka’s prioritization of PAR in North Kivu, 
the write-off ratio, as this thesis argues, is incredibly important in balancing the internal 
                                                          
11 Translation is the author’s own 
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organisational resources with the outstanding credit portfolio, and in contexts of conflict, one 
would expect a correlated increase in the write-off ratio in forgiving a high PAR.  
 
Average loan balance: The average value of a loan, which will be constricted or augmented 
depending on the capacity of the organisation. 
 
Depth of outreach: This is the average loan balance, in comparison to the GNP per capita, 
which in the DRC is among the lowest in the world.  
 
Administrative expenses: This is expressed as a percentage of the average outstanding loan 
portfolio. It relates to purely financial expenses, and thus may not cover time and opportunity 
costs.  
 
Average staff salary: This is expressed as a multiple of GNP per capita, and is also an indicator 
of the profit that the organisation is making. In a conflict affected environment or one with a 
slow economy, staff salaries are expected to be lower.  
 
Staff productivity: Here, this is otherwise known as the loan officer ratio, of the number of staff 
divided by the number of borrowers they are each technically responsible for.  
 
Cost per borrowers (US$): This is expressed as administrative expenses, divided by the average 
number of borrowers. 
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Impact Defined  
Finally, impact, the dependent mentioned in Part 2 of the research overview, is a composite 
indicator including nominal, ordinal and ratio variables. In addition to the above, impact is 
calculated based on number of businesses, monthly profits, the number of loans taken and 
repaid, household size including adopted persons, household consumption on a set of items, 
household expenditures on a number of items, emergencies and coping strategies, family 
contributions to life events, and lending to others. In looking at individual households, further 
terminology would be useful to clarify, noting that terms are consistent with mainstream 
literature on international development.  
 
A household, for instance, was analysed as a common unit of consumption, wherein income or 
food was shared between members. 
 
suprahousehold networks, as the caveat on page 24 mentions, may render some depictions of 
household structures, especially those who have experienced conflict, displacement, and 
conflict-related adoption as unreliable. Here, they are taken to mean the wider social systems in 
which households are bedded, which include “a set of social institutions, each represented by a 
complicated system of rights, duties, sanctions, and consequences” (Guyer, 1981) 
 
Heads of households were, in this study self-defined through the question “who of the working 
members in your household earns the primary source of income for your household?”   
 
Poverty, meanwhile, is a term used to describe a variety of vulnerabilities, and in this study, 
generally refers to those who scored relatively low on selected indicators, namely the income 
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earned from the primary and secondary business of the household, which was estimated 
through the profits earned by businesses or employment over the period of a week or month.  
 
Vulnerability, another term with potentially non-economic meanings, is used throughout this 
study with the intended meaning of the FAO (Scaramozzino, 2006) or “The presence of factors 
that place people at risk of becoming food insecure or malnourished, including those factors 
that affect their ability to cope.”  
 
Coping mechanisms were looked at in a range of presentations, including non-economic 
survival strategies, but can broadly be summarized by a Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 
as “the coping responses over time to repeated or endemic shocks, which can become 
systematic and refined” (Lautze, 1996). 
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Chapter 1  
Financial Service Provision to High-Risk Environments 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between conflict and development, using the specific lens 
of financial services as empowerment to account for changing household economic portfolios 
during periods of political risk. On the one hand, poverty as a result, and cause, within conflict-
affected states is gaining increasing attention. A wave of recent scholarship identifying and 
contesting effective public goods provision strategies and limitations in these contexts have 
reviewed and commented on historical cases. They have offered models, theories and 
summaries of the literature which highlight the utility maximization choices of citizens and 
elites (i.e. Tepperman, 2016; Banerjee, 2007; Robinson, J, 2006: 4), and identify temporal 
economic consequences of civil wars on national outcomes (Collier, 1998). Yet the academic 
community has so far focused on more overarching questions of good governance, the 
propensity of societies to re-escalate conflict based on a range of indicators, and generally 
macro-level questions, or as Blattman and Miguel (2010) term them, “reduced form empirical 
relationships”.  The presence of conflict, of course, has a number of documented and 
undocumented effects on the efforts of development work. However, with the link between 
both levels only being addressed, currently, by development practitioners, we run the risk of, 
as Gramsci (1971, quoted by Blattman and Miguel 2010) puts it, overstating the proximate 
causes, and missing the complexity of the direct, divergent, and sometimes temporally fluid 
outcomes in conflict-affected situations.   
 
65 
 
On the other hand, the microfinance sector has grown into a regulated global market, with its 
own distinct theoretical underpinnings, research initiatives, and measurement studies quite 
separate from the conflict and development literature. At the same time, the understanding of 
the limitations in using financial services as a poverty alleviation tool is reaching a better 
conceptualization. The work of Cohen, Dunn and Chen (1996) for the Small Enterprise 
Education and Promotion Network/ Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services 
(SEEP/AIMS) project provides perhaps the best account for the dynamic expendability of 
credit. They summarize three levels of analysis that are used to approach microfinance 
(enterprise, household and client). In illustrating the continuum of intra-household 
arrangements and often separate (and competing) preferences of household members, we can 
better trace the introduction of credit and its allocation. Yet the household economic portfolio 
model (HEPM) is designed to illustrate a universal household, and in doing so reifies some 
non-specificity problems. Unfortunately the bulk of the interesting, comparative and 
experimental literature on development outcomes is12, often for good reasons, posited largely 
in non-conflict contexts. 
 
The following sections introduce an overview of the state of the art related to the main 
foundational underpinnings of the thesis, which aims to bridge the two literatures. More 
concisely, I attempt to link the conflict and development literature with the current state of the 
microfinance sector’s research. This includes an introduction of the “lay” concepts (Kalyvas, 
2006:5) which are usually discussed in the conflict literature and the microfinance literature, and 
which it is argued are plagued with evidentiary shortcomings. The chapter is organized by 
                                                          
12 Such as that being conducted by the Innovations for Poverty Action and the Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-
PAL) at MIT 
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sector, specifically by political background (the empirics of conflict), then practice background 
(post-conflict practitioners), then microfinance background (microfinance practitioners), and 
finally behavioural economics (microeconomic empirics), in an attempt to highlight the full 
scale of approaches previously taken to the subject. The chapter is organized from broad to 
specific, first within the conflict studies community, and then broad to specific within the 
microfinance and microeconomics community, since this provides a great insight into the 
actions of individuals. And, through laying out the relationship between empiricists and 
practitioners in both the microfinance and the conflict sectors, the theoretical framework 
developed aims to connect the literatures at the junction between empirical studies of conflict 
and empirical studies of microeconomics, as in the diagram below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 PROPOSED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
The chapter first discusses larger themes of conflict and development, which it argues builds a 
foundation for the work presented in this thesis, and the main empirical findings used to 
interpret results from the project are put forth. Second, it provides a survey of the opinions of 
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post-war practitioners on the subject of financial services in conflict, which are found to be 
rarely empirically tested.  
 
Third, the chapter introduces the state of the art of the microfinance sector. The addition of 
randomized controlled trials to the field of microfinance has introduced the concepts of impact 
measurement, and developed, perhaps better than anything, the metrics of evaluating outcomes. 
Yet it is only recently that long-term studies, coming to their end, have pointed to null or close 
to null results. Not having robust enough data to confirm some of the original hypotheses of 
microfinance, the micro-economics community is beginning to acknowledge that different 
questions should be asked. Taking this into consideration, the chapter explores alternative 
measurement frameworks, and explores the SEEP/AIMS project as the most theorized 
explanation of the interaction of credit products with household structures, including the 
introduction of risk and risk aversion as a decision-making factor in microfinance uptake and 
impact.  Yet this model lacks conceptual clarity in its understanding of political risk and 
distinction between informal financial services and typical microfinance ones.  
 
Fourth, the chapter proposes a number of alternative suppositions that could substantiate the 
null findings of the microfinance community, including a number of findings from behavioural 
economics. An alternative framework of conflict and development is developed, positing 
through the survey of the state of the art that an analysis which does not acknowledge the 
heterogeneity and divergence of coping strategies (i.e. the positive and negative aspects of 
unrecorded activities) at a grassroots level will result in biases that can perpetuate ineffective 
post-conflict development at the policy level. In doing so, this framework effectively links the 
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extensive body on behavioural economics with the mentioned gaps and recommended future 
studies of the conflict empiricist community, with implications for practitioners in both sectors.  
 
1.2 Financial Market Development in the Aftermath of Conflict 
 
Conflict Empiricists 
A large body of literature examines the relationship between drivers of conflict and the onset 
and duration of civil war and other violence, and has disentangled some of the competing and 
conflicting accounts of conflict from previous decades. Others have used datasets and written 
accounts, now more widely available than ever, to draw correlations between history and 
current economic, security and political outcomes. For instance, Timothy Besley and Marta 
Reynal Querol (2014) use variations between and within countries to identify that violence in 
African countries from 1400 to 1700 is associated with lower levels of trust, a stronger sense of 
ethnic identity, and a weaker sense of national identity.  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2000) have also pointed to correlations between the historical rates of settler mortality and 
lower income and institutional performance.  
 
Less work, however, has been undertaken to understand the economic consequences of 
violence, due to measurement problems and endogeneity concerns13. To date, the best estimates 
of the cost of armed conflict comes from the work of economists Anke Hoeffler and James 
Fearon (2014) and the Institute for Peace and Economics (2014), who use aggregated unit costs 
(from McCollister, 2004) interacted with UNODC reported figures on country incidence rate, 
to present a breakdown of the cost estimate for civil war. In addition, Hoeffler and Fearon 
                                                          
13 For a good overview of the issues, refer to the Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict 
(2012) 
69 
 
(2014) estimate the costs of homicide and other violent crime; violence against children; and 
violence against women14. These cost estimates, called for as part of the Post-2015 Consensus 
project (the follow-on for the UN Millennium Development Goals, which all had a deadline 
for 2015) have been used to formulate a number of recommendations for the Post-2015 
Development Agenda, and as such represent a positive step towards bridging the gap between 
top scholars in the academic community and implementers.   
 
Yet, as Costalli, Moretti, and Pischedda (2014) point out, “reliable costs estimates are [also] 
necessary for systematic analyses of the determinants of the impact of civil war, which, to our 
knowledge, no previous study has attempted”. Taking this logic further, we can also wonder 
what the cost estimates for the assumed determinants of economic consequences are, since as 
Hoefller and Fearon (2014) point out,  
 
If one looks at spending by the major multilateral and bilateral aid donors…one finds 
that at best a tiny fraction of their programming is targeted at reducing societal violence 
or improving judicial systems that deal with crime.  
 
This is likely to be due to a generalized approach to understanding the factors affected by and 
contributing to conflict. These tend to be assumed to be either obvious or solved by other 
channels, such as democracy, however, when the scope of the questions being posed are 
macroeconomic in nature. Macroeconomists, on the other hand, are usually more concerned in 
                                                          
14 Anke Hoeffler and James Fearon (2014)’s cost estimates for selected categories of violence include 
collective violence, interpersonal violence, and homicides 
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capturing the gross or aggregate effects of conflict. A convention has thus emerged in which 
macroeconomists seek to answer very specific questions on the effect of conflict. These 
accounts take economic growth and local-level development as mutually inclusive. In doing so, 
the main question which has commonly been posed has been: What is the effect of conflict on 
economic growth?   
 
A stylized summary of the developments in the answer to this question are as follows: Taking 
a basic economic growth model with the addition of human capital (Mankiw, Romer and Wei, 
1992:31, as quoted by Blattman and Miguel) as a starting point, it is straightforward to assume 
that conflict will affect economic performance, through either a factor of production, the 
augmenting infrastructure, physical and cultural, which created these factors of production, or 
on prices (Blattman and Miguel do not address the importance of savings, however, which is a 
determinant of capital in following periods in a traditional Solow-growth model). The model’s 
production function, shown as:  
 
Y(t)=K(t)α H (t)β (A9t)L9t))1- α- β 
 
augments the Nobel-prize winning Solow-growth model15, where Y is output, K is capital, L is 
labour, and A is a level of technology, with the addition of human capital (H). This addition is 
important in its contribution to the accuracy of the Solow Model, as well as in aiding an intuitive 
understanding of how human capital contributes to economic recovery.  
 
                                                          
15 Y(t) = K(t)α(A(t)L(t))1- α  where 0 < α < 1. 
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After 1992, a point of divergence is observed in the literature in predictions for the longitude 
of such effects (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:37). Thus, effects of destruction on a factor of 
production could be short term in a neo-classical model of growth, for instance. However, in 
models which assume a poverty trap, endogenous growth, or vintage capital, the effect of such 
an impact could also be persistent.  Preliminary evidence conforms to neoclassical growth 
models, Blattman and Miguel (2010:398) argue, rather than the poverty-trap models advanced 
by Jeffery Sachs (2006) and Collier (2008).  Miguel and Roland (2006), for instance, find few 
visible legacies left 25 years following the Vietnam bombings, in local living standards and 
human capital measurements across regions.  However, elsewhere, micro-economic findings 
have in some instances identified long term impacts on human capital. For example, lower 
nutritional intakes and malnutrition have been demonstrated to lead, in both Burundi 
(Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh, 2009, as quoted by Blattman and Miguel, 2010:40) and 
Zimbabwe (Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2006 as quoted by Blattman and Miguel, 2010) 
to lower height-for-age measures relative to others. Even studies of US and European veterans 
of WWII and the Vietnam war finds negative effects to later earning and higher rates of 
mortality (Angrist, 1990, Angrist and Krueger, 1994; Hearst, Newman and Hulley, 1986; 
Imbens and Van der Klaauw, 1995). 
 
One such model that addresses possibly variant speeds of recovery is a production function 
suggested by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003:246), which shows what could happen in a context 
affected by “highly asymmetric destruction”.  
Y=AKα(Lh)1-α 
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Where again A represents technology levels, K represents physical capital, L represents workers, 
and h represents "average worker human capital". Testing this model, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
find that where one type of capital is destroyed while another type of capital stays largely intact, 
an “imbalance effect” makes up for the destruction quicker than if both sectors are affected. 
Where the physical/human capital ratio is affected such as through war, adjustment costs 
accrue. For instance, when physical capital investments are destroyed, there are costs to recover 
physical capital accumulation. Conversely, when human capital is destroyed, there will be costs 
for human capital accumulation which can also result in slow economic growth and recovery. 
 
Peace dividends and War Overhangs 
In addition to the destruction of resources, Paul Collier (1999) points out some additional 
effects of Civil War on GDP, including through the disruption caused by the breakdown in 
social order (i.e. increased transportation costs), and the diversion of public expenditure from 
more to less productive activities.  Examples of this include reduced expenditures on police 
forces and the subsequent higher cost of enforcing contracts. 
 
Finally, Collier identifies both dissavings resulting from shocks to incomes (similar to the 
destruction of capital effect) and claims that private agents engage in portfolio substitution, 
shifting human, physical and financial assets out of the country.  Through these, he argues, wars 
may have lasting effects on GDP growth rates since portfolio substitution occurs through 
private choices, and post-war countries are still worse off than countries which have never 
experienced civil war and can encourage continued portfolio substitution. As Collier puts it, 
"The very fact of the civil war constitutes news that the society is prone to civil war".   
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From identifying these families of effects, Collier is able to predict that elements of the 
economy which are endogenous to civil wars will remain affected by the partial credibility of 
peace and the diversion effect, thus lowering the rate of return- and raising depreciation rates- 
on such elements, relative to their pre-war level, even after peace has been reached. He also 
predicts a lag, in for example shorter conflicts, where the adjusted rate of return to such sectors 
will continue to settle (and lower) even after a peace agreement, leading to what he terms a war 
overhang effect. Conversely, if the conflict has been going on for a long time, and the rate of 
return or depreciation of such endogenous assets is already adjusted, then the signing of a peace 
treaty could yield a peace dividend. 
 
This leads to a question of which sectors or assets are susceptible to diversion or disruption, 
which Collier terms as war vulnerable and manifestly war invulnerable. In dis-aggregating the 
GDP by sector, Collier points to the vulnerability of the finance sector through its extensive 
transactions. Specifically, through examining Uganda's national accounts he finds the war 
vulnerable sectors to have halved their share of GDP during a period of conflict, including 
finance. 
 
Limitations 
In the example above, one of the most renowned conflict experts is only able to test his 
prediction on the dataset of one country, given the standard of the national accounting available 
in Uganda in contrast to comparable data available in other war-affected contexts. Yet the data 
to test any such hypothesized relationship is usually problematic, and scarce in relation to what 
it could be. 20% of countries have experienced at least ten years of civil war since 1960 
(Blattman and Miguel, 2010:1), and 30% of Sub-Saharan African countries had civil war or 
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conflict during the mid-1990s. Yet, despite the clear and obvious relationship between conflict 
and development, Blattman and Miguel point out that the subject has not received the centrality 
it should (2010:4). In a survey of 63 development economics course syllabi in leading US 
universities, the writers find evidence that “war”, “conflict” and “violence” only make an 
appearance in 13% of undergraduate courses, and 24% of graduate courses. Their principal 
conclusions are that existing theory is incomplete (p5), leading theories remain untested (p6), 
and “theories seldom specify the empirical predictions that can test between competing 
accounts”. Fourthly, the writers find that cross-country regressions need more credible 
econometrics: 
 
Convincing causal identification of key relationships is rare, robustness to alternative 
specifications or assumptions is seldom explored; country-years are often assumed to 
be independent units in time and space, measurement error is rarely addressed; an 
absence of evidence about particular effects has often been interpreted as evidence of 
absence; and theories of individual or armed group behaviour are tested at the country 
level despite obvious aggregation difficulties (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:6). 
 
As ways forward, the authors suggest that subnational studies at the level of communities and 
individuals may be the most promising. Although they note that to date, such studies are 
scattered and highly context specific, they nevertheless urge for more such studies, as well as 
integrating quantitative evidence with case studies.  As a topic in conflict studies, economic 
consequences are highlighted as a gap which particularly deserves more attention: 
 
Both theory and evidence are weakest in assessing the impact of civil war on the 
fundamental drivers of long-run performance- institutions, technology and culture- 
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even though these may govern whether a society recovers, stagnates, or plunges back 
into war (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:7).  
 
For example, a function not yet explored in depth, to the best of my knowledge, is that in the 
original Solow growth model, the savings function of the economy will determine how much 
capital can be invested at any given time. Since the savings of one period become the capital of 
the new period, concepts of capital accumulation and convergence should necessarily also 
examine the variance (and impact from political crisis) on savings rate as a key determinant of 
growth. However, studies have not adequately addressed the diversion in savings to other 
activities due to conflict; nor has this been integrated into the study of the economics of armed 
conflict. Thus, as outlined, the disaggregation of conflict consequences and the specification of 
mechanisms have increasingly defined the objectives of the empirical studies of conflict 
literature, yet still deserve further attention. 
  
1.3 Post Conflict Development Practitioners 
 
The conflict literature has chosen the framework of national economic loss to understand the 
impact of violent conflict on societies, but it has not fully developed some of the practical 
implications of this loss, including an understanding of capital flight into the secondary 
economy, for instance, or the resilience of credit markets. As a way to address this, this thesis 
follows the work of the SEEP/AIMS project and applies it to the context of armed conflict in 
a sub-national, micro-economic study.  
 
However, to improve the AIMS project and its understanding of political risk, first of all, more 
can be said regarding the findings of practitioners who actually implement development 
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projects in conflict zones. Until now, the majority of relevant commentary for policy makers is 
coming not from scholars on development, but practitioners themselves whose comments tend 
to be experience and perspective-based. Veteran professionals, for example, when remarking 
on the subject, are often disparaging of associated risks. A UNHCR policy advisor, for instance, 
remarking on microfinance difficulties with refugee populations, decries poor performance 
benchmarks reached by financial programming in camp settings, saying that interventions 
should be designed as grant aid (Bartsch, 2004). Bartsch points out that “If microfinance is 
pursued in isolation from other interventions and not based on a thorough understanding of 
what constitutes viable avenues for self-reliance, it may easily become a "strategic fig leaf"; an 
activity that is implemented because it is presumed to be effective as opposed to one that is 
known to be effective.”  
 
Others (Knaute, as quoted by CGAP, 2014) remark, on the other hand, on the absence of 
providers in conflict zones: 
 
[In conflict zones], there is a dearth, if not total absence, of local financial operators 
who fail to serve the market in an effective way…. It turns out that the issue of 
outstanding payments is tied more to the risks of fraud and weak internal oversight in 
an environment where the accessibility of agencies is not always certain. 
 
But largely, the efficacy and suitability of microfinance in a conflict and post-conflict zone has 
been deemed an appropriate assumption- largely within a discussion of how to implement 
programs, rather than whether or not to do so (Jacobsen, 2005; ILO, 1998; Nagarajan and 
McNulty, 2004). In a well-documented series of workshops and workshop reports, ILO and 
UNHCR brought the issue of microfinance in conflict-affected areas to the forefront of 
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discussions on social finance from 1996-1999. Adjunct researcher Geeta Nagarajan was 
brought on board, who subsequently worked in collaboration with USAID on the Accelerated 
Microfinance Advancement Project in 2004. Her theories, which included the stratification of 
the effect of conflict on a nation’s economy at the macro, meso and micro level (1997), 
concluded that main lessons to date that can be agreed upon by practitioners include that credit 
led microfinance can be initiated with very few environmental requirements, yet it is only one 
tool amongst many for economic development- and cannot be a primary vehicle for peace 
building. In suggesting ways forward, Nagarajan (2004:16) points out the limitations of research 
so far, including the understanding of when to offer microfinance services apart from credit in 
post-conflict areas, and how informal operators work, among other unexplored areas of 
research, stating clearly that the role of informal arrangements, money-lending, and self-help 
associations are seldom examined carefully. In her earlier consultancy as an external advisor for 
a three year, DFID funded project on Post-Conflict Microfinance, Nagarajan also emphasizes 
that: 
 
● Microentreprenuers are highly resilient and become very active at the post-conflict 
stage, creating a market for microfinancial services. 
● Pre- and post-conflict environment matters in deciding the type of intervention. 
● After the immediate post-conflict stage, a conflict-affected with few recurrent conflicts 
country is like a normal country, only with war memories. Therefore, building of 
sustainable financial institutions require facilitating conditions similar to any normal 
developing country. 
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● Best practices apply and work in post-conflict situations with reasonable stability after 
the immediate post-conflict stage. There are several lessons from normal developing 
countries that apply to post-conflict countries. 
● There is no “one size fits all methodology” for implementing microfinance programmes 
in post-conflict situations (Nagarajan, 1999:14). 
 
Conceptually, however, a “country-affected with few recurrent conflicts” should probably still 
be seen as variant from a country which has been historically peaceful, as Collier (1999) has 
already pointed out. Anna Ohanyan’s 2008 Book “NGOs, IGOs, and the Network Mechanisms 
of Post-Conflict Global Governance in Microfinance” began further answering questions 
related to the governance and sphere of influence of NGOs in post-conflict microfinance. 
Ohanyan, whose work investigates how the structures of transnational policy networks bolster 
or undermine organisations, donor and grassroots accountability in post-conflict states, 
presents several key findings on network mechanisms in post-conflict microfinance 
governance. These include the development of a strong appreciation for local contexts within 
the international community, which has emerged over the last decade. Departing from a state-
centred approach which treats NGOs and political institutions as working in isolation, Ohanyan 
proposes a network-based framework that more accurately captures the dynamics between 
NGOs, donors, and their strategic approaches to global governance and policy making.  In 
doing so, she reveals how “Bureaucratic universalism, perpetuated by organisational efforts to 
cut costs and exercise economies of scale in global policymaking, has produced a pattern of 
network formation by default. (2008: 224)”, which microfinance institutions are uniquely 
positioned to influence as a key network actor. Her lessons presented are significant in their 
implications for microfinance actors to play a key role in influencing policies in the power 
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vacuum that is often present following periods of intense conflict. These findings, however, 
lack statistical power, empirically robust findings, and an explicit link to development outcomes.  
 
Kathy Guis, a portfolio manager for Kiva’s portfolio in Francophone and North Africa, has 
added her inputs on the modifications necessary to take the realities of conflict affected 
microfinance into account when designing financial programmes, through a more specific take 
on operationalization than the more academic writings of Nagarajan and Ohanyan. Field 
partners in conflict affected offices, she noticed, adopted a variety of safeguards to preserve 
their organisational integrity. First of all, in the event of a violent event occurring near a branch, 
partners will immediately revise their loan loss provisions to provide for businesses that may 
have been affected by the event. Secondly, she notes, partners in more violent areas will invest 
in heavier safes in order to keep their branch offices as fortified as possible. Thirdly, Guis 
remarks on the social discord that may be present in a war zone- and on the psychological stress 
and trauma which even staff deal with which easily erupts into conflict- and on the trainings 
some microfinance providers offer to staff as well as, sometimes, clients. Fourthly, Guis notes 
the need to balance accessing remote areas with the need to protect the organisation’s 
resources- noting that, in instances where staff may travel and be exposed to risk of robbery, 
they may also have an easier opportunity to conduct fraud themselves. Fifthly Guis mentions 
the issue of inflation and hyperinflation, and the need to increase staff’s salaries according- and 
occasionally raise interest rates in order to cover expanding administrative costs. She also 
remarks on difficulty in repaying apex funding (i.e. the creditors of microfinance institutions, 
when these exist). And finally, Guis commends the partners that are flexible enough to open 
operations again ‘as soon as the dust settles’, noting the operating mode of a Kivutian 
microfinancier as an example: 
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HEKIMA Microfinance, in Goma, DRC is a great example of this. HEKIMA was 
forced to shut their doors to keep their staff safe when M23 invaded Goma in 2012. So 
did all other banks in the town -- commercial banks and MFIs alike. But after just a few 
days, when the dust had barely settled, HEKIMA was one of the first financial 
institutions to open its doors again. They did this out of a commitment to not only 
serve their clients, but also out of a need to keep their clients loyal so that repayments 
would continue to flow in, and be able to be lent back out to more borrowers in need. 
(Guis, n.d.)  
 
Other researchers have also started to examine post-conflict microfinance’s operational and 
strategic considerations. Several studies (Kuehnhast, 2001; Matabisi, 2011; Barr 2005), for 
example, have indicated the potential of microfinance as a tool for reconstruction in post-
conflict contexts. The Post Conflict Microfinance Periodical (PCMF, 2002.)16, for instance, 
describes, in its fifth issue, how post-conflict microfinance often suffers from a clash of cultures 
between humanitarian oriented workers and business-oriented workers, stating: 
 
What the research found in research case study countries was that there was often a 
first wave of microfinance activities which suffered from high delinquency rates, 
chronic inefficiencies and were unsustainable. After a learning curve or a collapse, the 
microfinance industry in the post conflict country adopts more conventional ‘best 
practices’ and restructures. 
 
                                                          
16 A product of the 3 year DFID project on post-conflict microfinance, mentioned earlier 
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Meanwhile, the SEEP network (Doyle, 1998) identifies a number of prerequisites before 
implementing microcredit programmes in contexts of conflict. Remarking on fluctuations in 
uptake and use, they remark that:  
 
The demand post-crisis clients place on programs fluctuates, with demand being 
dampened, not unexpectedly, immediately after the termination of hostilities or a 
resurgence of violence. Although it is difficult to determine levels of demand a priori, 
in most instances there is evidence that demand usually reaches very high levels during 
periods of reconstruction, and is responsive to the stimulus of credit availability.  
 
However, the research method employed in this publication was largely key informant 
interviews, combined with a literature review- leaving the evidential basis ofr these claims 
questionable. The assumption that demand for credit post-conflict will decrease is seen in other 
locations, an assumption largely validated only through its repetition. For instance, one of the 
articles published in the “Disasters and Conflict” topic series of the Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poorest (CGAP), the CGAP interviewer asks the CEO of Oxus Development 
Network, which promotes microfinance in conflict zones: 
 
Uncertain socio-political circumstances and a lack of security generally make people 
reluctant to borrow money, thus changing the nature of supply and demand…. what 
types of financial products and services are people in conflict areas looking for? 
(Knaute, as quoted by CGAP, 2014)  
 
To which the Oxus CEO responds, not questioning this assumption, that:  
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Overall, we can say that demand for SME financing is more fragile in countries where 
insecurity is greatest…so Oxus, which is specifically involved in country contexts of 
chronic conflict, will target the small economy, the bottom of the pyramid, mainly 
through productive credit, since demand for consumer goods is weaker than in 
intermediate or emerging economies. Parallel to this, even if it applies more to Africa 
than to Asia, one finds strong demands for savings, since the banking system is largely 
undeveloped in this type of country. 
 
This feeling of the irrelevance of borrowing during wartime is even echoed by the Central Bank 
of Yemen. Mansour Rageh, the acting Manager for Islamic and specialist Banks, the Central 
Bank of Yemen, suggests that microfinance providers should ask themselves “is your financial 
product war proof?” 
 
In Yemen, we’ve found our wartime financial needs are definitely different from what 
we wanted before the war.  For example, microfinance institutions did a great job during 
peace time but they haven’t been able to survive this conflict. What people want now 
is somewhere to exchange their money. (2014)  
 
In sum, then, the current state of the literature posits the formal microfinance sector as a key 
player in financial service provision, with the potential to provide clients with a range of material 
and non-material outcomes. Practitioner-oriented observations remark on temporarily 
weakened and then strengthened institutions (PCMF, 2002; Guiss, n.d.) and dampened, 
lowered, or non-existent demand for credit in the immediate post-conflict period (Doyle, 1998; 
CGAP, 2014, Rageh, 2014). What the literature does not provide is a concrete, empirical 
analysis of the operating changes made by microfinance programmes throughout and following 
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periods of intense civil, political, or ethnic conflict. Neither does it narrate the transaction costs 
incurred through the adaptive and reflexive changes made to microfinance programmes in the 
face of high-risk contexts. And finally, surprisingly, there is the absence of a thorough study of 
coping mechanisms of microfinance users, or micro-economic evidence to support claims 
about borrowing patterns, in a conflict-affected context.  
 
 
1.4 Microfinance Practitioners 
 
Outside the field of conflict and development, the best resource to understand the dynamics 
of microeconomics may be the non-conflict, general microfinance literature. In order to 
understand the necessary vocabulary, relationships, and previously established correlations for 
their relevance in conflict zones, it is useful to introduce some of the cutting-edge studies 
currently published by leading experts in the larger field. The theories of change behind 
microfinance have, arguably, inspired a generation of policies favouring the bottom-up 
approach- and as the global microfinance sector grows, so has the venture capital funds 
available to the sector. The Microfinance Barometer 2013, a yearly report which analyses data 
available from the MIXMarket, a global dataset on microfinance institutions worldwide, 
estimates the current size of the formal microfinance sector’s global portfolio at 78 billion USD, 
and having reached 94 million borrowers in 2011, the latest year for which statistics are 
available. And as financing for microfinance operations and research has increased, so too has 
the sophistication for studying and evaluating the outcomes of microfinance.  
 
Over the last four decades, feminist discourse, anthropological, economic and behavioural 
sciences have started to converge in their understanding of the household unit and its activities. 
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Cohen, Dunn and Chen (1996), for instance, identify three main shifts in the ideological 
approaches used to development evaluation tools for microfinance service. The first major 
development they note is the shift away from believing that household relationships are 
unilaterally altruistic and cooperative, and may include negotiation, bargaining and conflict.  The 
second notable shift has been from viewing a household as a fixed unit towards viewing it as 
permeable- and embedded within wider networks (ibid).  Finally, although quite broad, the 
authors identify a third development in the literature to recognize the "enormous variability in 
household composition and structure, both between and within societies as well as over time." 
 
Cohen, Dunn and Chen (1996) build a conceptual model to incorporate these diverse 
arrangements of allocating time, resources and decision-making power in a model referred to 
as the Household Economic Portfolio Model (HEPM). While economists look at households 
based on their more quantifiable related activities, such as investment, ownership, collective 
production and consumption, anthropologists point to the overlapping and contradictory 
results from this, suggesting instead to use consumption, or define households as “hearthholds” 
(where the primary demarcation of the household lies around the group which eats from the 
same ‘hearth’) (ibid). However, as pointed out in the HEPM paper, while this unit of analysis 
may be comparable across societies, it poses exclusionary problems for the understanding of 
suprahousehold networks- which have much to do with determining the functions of 
households. According to Jane Guyer (1981), the suprahousehold network is the set of wider 
social systems in which households are embedded, “each represented by a complicated system 
of rights, duties, sanctions, and consequences”. Since social systems and cultural factors which 
are both endogenous and exogenous to the household often influence the activities within a 
household, namely, production and consumption, the HEPM recognizes and incorporates this. 
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The HEPM also chooses a specific set of economic assumptions for the building of their model. 
For instance, in neo-classical economic theory, the functions of production and consumption 
are typically treated as separate. Theories of consumption, based on an individual as a unit of 
analysis, point to a decision maker’s objective to increase utility through attempting to reach an 
optimal balance between goods and leisure. The amount an individual or household can 
consume is determined by its income level, which is in turn determined by its amount of labour. 
In production theory, firms meanwhile seek to maximize profits through selecting an optimal 
combination of production (which is costly) versus output (which is profitable). Yet the authors 
highlight the work of Becker's "new home economics", which integrates the two functions of 
the household. Secondly, they note the important of allowing for market conditions "consistent 
with the actual conditions faced by the households in the study areas".  
 
When combining these concepts, of households, suprahouseholds, and production theories17- 
the introduction of externally supported credit becomes a logical “input” that will allow a variety 
of household models to increase, in one way or another, either their output, their leisure time, 
their consumption levels, their bargaining power, or a combination of these, assuming that 
credit is fungible, that is, that it can be allocated where the user chooses. Notably, generally 
accepted theory posits that depending on the size of the available credit, consumption may be 
                                                          
17 The first integrated model of household decision making, the Chayanov model (1920, as developed 
by Sen, 1966), combines utility maximization from consumption theory with the productive function 
from production theory. It suggests that, if a household has access to a perfectly competitive wage 
market, then a household’s work efforts will be determined by existing wage rates. In 1964, Becket 
refined the household decision making model to introduce the concept of “Z” goods, or goods that 
combine time and human capital with purchased goods to create home commodities. Since then, a 
range of household decision making models have been developed.  
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lowered in the period immediately after accessing a loan, or it may (if the credit size is larger) 
go up in both periods. As Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman (2015) put it, “potential [microfinance] 
borrowers have a lumpy expenditure opportunity that would generate benefits both in the 
present and the future. Additional credit facilitates that investment because otherwise, the cut 
in present consumption to finance the investment may be unacceptably large.”   
 
Yet, as an important caveat, and as will be seen in Chapters 3-7, the suprahousehold networks 
of some societies-that is, the extended affiliated social networks of households- may mean that 
credit may have more impact in some societies than in others. And in some cases, the collateral 
damages incurred to households from conflict related events will mean an increased reliance 
on, and linkages with, the suprahousehold network. 
 
Cohen, Dunn, and Chen (1996) term this process, or how households arrange and "rearrange 
their resources, labour and activities to cope with changing economic and social objectives or 
contingencies" the portfolio system. In the HEPM paper, it is modelled as a circular flow. The 
main point of contribution of this model to the literature and to this thesis lies within the ability 
to distinguish between competing preferences, constraints, and resources at the individual level. 
The authors fully acknowledge, even highlighting, that since individuals may cooperate in some 
areas and not cooperate in others, both conflict and cooperation can exist in the same 
household. Finally, the authors note that "the strategies of individual members reflect 
differences in their bargaining power which, in turn, reflect differences in their access to 
resources (both physical and social) and in their socially defined roles and relationships 
(1996:36)" 
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FIGURE 2 THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC PORTFOLIO MODEL 
 
The HEPM paper briefly acknowledges risk environments and risk aversion, leaving the subject 
to be further explained in another series paper (Dunn, Kalaitzandonakes and Valdivia, 1996).  
 
The HEPM has been criticized by Hayyan Alia (2015) for being too complex. To overcome 
this, modifications suggested include clear assessment units and efficient measurement tools. 
However, more than anything, the timing of these modifications, proposed 19 years after the 
original HEP paper was published, indicate the lasting validity of the HEP model until now 
and its relevance as a framework to understand credit choices. Yet the emphasis on 
measurement issues as its critical improvement (Alia, 2015) is also indicative of a wider trend 
in microfinance: establishing quantitative and empirically verifiable relationships between the 
injection of credit and household benefits, in addition to conceptual ones. 
 
Various quantitative studies point to the beneficial economic and social impacts of 
microfinance services (Holcombe, 1995; Hossain, 1988; Khandker, 1998; Otero and; Remenyi, 
1991 and Schuler et al., 1997). In Due Diligence: An Impertinent Inquiry into Microfinance, 
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Roodman (2012), points out three types of “successes” often accrued to microfinance agencies: 
the first and foremost being a measurable impact on the reduction of indicators of poverty for 
clients, the second having to do with the increasing amount of civil liberty and autonomy of 
individuals ‘empowered’ with financial services, and the third having to do with the positive 
impact of job creation which microfinance may contribute to in an economy. A typical case 
study highlighting the potential of microfinance, specifically in a post-war context, is that of 
“Awham’, a featured profile of a Women for Women beneficiary: 
 
Awham remembers the year the war started in Iraq, and the additional hardships 
she faced after her husband fell ill and lost his job. “I was left to care for my 
four children with no income. My father had pulled me out of school to arrange 
my marriage, and I had no skills to start any type of work that could support 
my family.” Through a friend, Awham heard about Women for Women 
International. “I wanted to visit the centre before enrolling in the programme. 
When I saw it I thought, ‘This is the open door I was waiting for…. I learned a 
lot from the training on health.… After graduating, I started my own small 
business at home using the tailoring skills I learned to provide services to my 
neighbors and family members. Through this, I managed to provide enough 
income for my family. 
 
Researchers have been able to highlight, in addition to changes in income and consumption, 
social impact following microfinance interventions including, but not limited to, nutritional 
intake, schooling levels, use of contraceptives and reduced family size, and a range of indicators 
of empowerment and social consciousness (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010).  
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A growing body of evaluative work, however, has pointed to biases in clear cut assertions of 
the impact of microfinance programmes.  Roodman (2012), for example, contests the clear link 
between microfinance services and a reduction of poverty, noting, that asides from serving as 
a useful service to the poor, many biases undermine the credibility of such studies, including 
unmeasurable variances in client vulnerability at the intake stage, unquantifiable differences in 
the work ethic of successful clients, high rates of drop-out for struggling clients, and a tendency 
for microfinance programmes to favour operations in more economically prosperous regions. 
Others (Hulme and Mosley, 1996 and Mosley and Hulme, 1998) corroborate Roodman’s 
findings, suggesting that benefits are unevenly distributed-and are perhaps not inclusive of the 
poorest18.  
 
Critics of microfinance (Adams and von Pischke, 1992; Buckley, 1997; Montgomery, 1996; 
Rogaly, 1996 and Wood and Sharrif, 1997) have gone so far as to highlight the net negative 
impact that microfinance programming can have on local communities19, including high interest 
rates and high debt burdens- which became a ghostly echo of the United States’ subprime 
mortgage crisis and a fixture of international news in 2010 during ‘India’s Microfinance Suicide 
Epidemic’ in Andra Pradesh. Armendariz remarks on the potential bias of anecdotal impact 
evidence in her book, the Economics of Microfinance (2010), pointing out that:  
 
Anecdotes are culled to show the potential of microfinance, while the statistical analyses 
are designed to show typical impacts across the board. Inevitably, some customers will 
                                                          
18 This thesis not only acknowledges all of the raised points, but actively seeks to include cases of clients 
who have dropped out or become inactive, and institutions which operate in less prosperous areas. 
19 Paraphrased from Hulme, 2009: 198 
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thrive, others will be unchanged, and some may slip backwards. One study of Bolivia’s 
BancoSol, for example, reports that staff estimated that in any given cohort roughly 25 
percent showed spectacular gains to borrowing, 60–65 percent stayed about the same, 
and 10–15 percent went bankrupt (Mosley 1996b) (p199-200).   
 
In these regards, Roodman advises microfinance institutions to de-emphasize their claims to 
poverty alleviation, and instead focus on their provision of a wide range of useful services. In 
doing this, he urges programmes to focus less on credit and more on the additional programmes 
of microfinance which are more commonly required by a population with a low penetration of 
banking services, such as savings deposits, insurance, and money transfers. Indeed, in order to 
appropriately assess the “impact” of microfinance services, some form of randomization will 
be necessary in order to avoid biases that might exclude struggling clients.   
 
In a similar vein, some leading researchers in microfinance call for methodologically robust, 
randomized evaluations in evaluating the impact of microfinance programmes, comparing the 
research approach needed for microfinance to that of health interventions (Banerjee and Duflo, 
E., 2011; Duflo, A. 2013). Annie Duflo, executive director of the research centre Innovations 
for Poverty Action, in an interview with The Global, highlights this association, explaining:  
 
The method we use to achieve our mission is grounded in randomized evaluations of 
interventions and approaches.  It’s the same method used in the medical field to 
evaluate the effect of a particular medicine. The only way to find out what effect a 
programme has is to estimate what would have happened if the programme had not 
happened. (Duflo, A. as quoted by Israel, 2013) 
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Here, it can be seen that the argument present in Lijphart’s (1971) paper for experimentation 
as an ideal method for scientific conclusions, but as he notes, “unfortunately it can only rarely 
be used in political sciences because of practical and ethical impediments” (p683-684). 
Although the introduction of credit can be the “stimulus” used in the experimental method, it 
is only recently that deliberate randomization and external control groups have been introduced 
in evaluation studies, leaving the majority of microfinance studies reliant on the statistical 
method- an imperfect approximations of the experimental method.20  
 
Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo took these questions further, in the publication in 2015 of 
six extensive, randomized evaluations of the impact of microlending services offered by MFIs 
in six different countries. Convening a conference at the World Bank to talk about the findings, 
the research teams presented each study individually. In aggregate terms, this well-picked 
representation of microfinance institutions across the globe showed “lack of evidence of 
transformative effects on the average borrower.” Banerjee, while speaking, was asked whether 
the research teams had incorporated the fact that non-microfinance users still had access to 
other financial services- that is, how the study design had accounted for the informal sector in 
the control groups, to which he responded: 
 
Possibly, this might be exactly what they are doing. What’s interesting, is that if informal 
credit is about 60% [of what constitutes people’s credit lines] and formal credit is 20% 
[of what constitutes people’s credit lines] … why isn’t this showing up in the studies? 
                                                          
20 See Dean Karlan’s 2001 paper on “the perils of using new members as a control group in Microfinance 
Impact” 
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And if this may be contributing to the lack of impact, it’s possible…. I suspect that 
there are these people and you have to find them…  
 
We will return to this important omitted variable at various points throughout this work, 
including in chapters 5 and 6. For now, these evaluations found a few tentative conclusions: 
starting with, as mentioned, a lack of substantial improvements in living standards or poverty. 
However, scattered statistical tests do find positive effects on the size of businesses, 
occupational choice, consumption choices, female decision-making powers, and improved risk 
management (Banerjee et al in Duflo, 2015: p14).  
 
The coordinators of the studies also make the case that, “if microcredit’s promise was increasing 
freedom of choice, it would be closer on delivering on it. (Banerjee et al, 2015)”, with Dean 
Karlan, in a nod to Daniel Roodman, insisting that “reliable financial services are extremely 
important for the poor, even more so than the non-poor. Saying we might be seeing the death 
of [the microfinance industry] is ridiculous. It’s like saying we are seeing the death of healthcare 
for the poor.”  Esther Duflo, the editor of the volume, remarked that, “It does matter that 
microcredit has reached so many people, because even if the impact is modest, it has reached 
so many people.”   
 
A way to reconcile the intentions and promises of microcredit products with their insignificant 
aggregate outcomes is to acknowledge the heterogeneity of treatment effects on potential 
borrowers.  We know, for instance, from previous statistical studies of microfinance impact 
that it is the middle-income range of clients (i.e. those who already have businesses) who may 
pose the least risk for microfinance programming, and that the ultra-poor are considered as 
high-risk investments (Rahman and Razzaque, 2000; Halder et al, 1998; Hashemi, 1997). This 
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is usually because of a combination of self-preservation and a lack of confidence in clients 
without existing businesses. In such cases, the accrued interest is not worth the associated risks, 
though this depends on the mandate and vision of the organisation (and their capacity to grow 
independent of interest-related profits).  
 
Additionally, in regards to balancing the delicate question of becoming financially sufficient 
without imposing exploitative interest rates, Armendariz (2010) illustrates how several 
microfinance providers have chosen not to charge high interest rates in order to be more 
inclusive of lower income clients. Using the principle of diminishing marginal returns on capital, 
she demonstrates how it is clear that profits per dollar invested by larger scale entrepreneurs 
will be larger than profits per dollar generated by smaller scale entrepreneurs. Charging interest 
rates that assume a high return on capital, therefore, excludes many of the lowest income clients 
who would otherwise be interested and creates a “credit-related poverty trap”, which many 
microfinance institutions intentionally counter by reducing interest rates across the board. Yet 
these decisions often come at a cost. They often require institutions to rely on subsidies past 
their initial start-up phase- as is the case currently for the Grameen Bank, for example, which 
still takes advantages of subsidies even 25 years after its start-up (Armendariz, 2010: 34) or face 
pressure to raise interest rates in order to cover administrative costs. Yet these decisions should 
increase impact, even if efficiency is compromised- and the fact that they may not still provide 
robust ameliorations of situations of poverty indicate the fallibility of microfinance as the 
“magic bullet” of the development world.  
 
Theoretical Approaches to The Informal Sector 
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It is in this sense-either because formal services exclude clients without formal businesses or 
because adverse security situations make drive microfinance services to more accessible areas- 
that informal moneylenders may become ‘monopolists’ of a credit market in the absence of 
competition. However, even informal providers might as well favour more economically 
advantaged entrepreneurs, or in situations of conflict, more trusted clients. If we look at the 
lending strategies of informal moneylenders:  
 
In the case of credit markets, [moneylenders] can charge interest rates well above their 
marginal cost of capital (which we will assume is still 20 cents per dollar per year). So 
rather than charging an interest rate of 20 percent (as a competitive bank would charge), 
moneylenders might restrict the quantity lent and charge all borrowers, say, one dollar 
for each dollar that is lent (a 100 percent annual interest rate); the remaining 80 cents 
per dollar goes into the moneylender’s pocket. When this is the case, only the 
exceedingly productive villagers can afford to borrow to finance their investments; a 
wide range of otherwise worthy investment projects will go unfunded. (Armendariz, 
2010: 34) 
 
Various econometricians have shown how this may be a necessary business model, however, 
in countering default rates of, occasionally, over 50% by poor borrowers. Common (localized) 
strategies to subvert the usuriously high interest rates of moneylenders include, in many 
countries, localized rotating or accumulated savings and credit schemes, which charge members 
little to no interest (Armendariz, 2010). Other common informal financial mechanisms globally 
include machinery banks, hire/purchase stores, moneylenders, pawn shops, trade finance, 
cheque cashing outlets, and loans among family and friends.  
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Perceptions of informal financial services, or financial services based on social capital rather 
than formal contractual means, meanwhile, are heterogeneous in their analytical approaches, 
terminology, and pronouncements. Social capital can be understood, in World Bank terms 
(Woolcock, 1998), as intra-community ties (bonding and integrating social capital), and extra-
community networks (bridging and linking). On one end of the spectrum, Ringmar and 
Fernando (2005: 85) discursively paint a picture of how championing the positive qualities of 
social capital might dangerously justify, morally and economically, the independent operations 
of informal institutions, unburdening the state of certain key responsibilities- which certainly 
deserves further investigation in light of conflict zones in sparsely populated, ethnically 
heterogeneous societies such as the DRC. On the other end, proponents of a range of localized, 
community centred programmes consistently advocate use of social capital to reduce 
programme vulnerabilities and strengthen impact (Siebel and Massing, 1974; Gow and Vansant, 
1983; Seibel, 2006).  
 
Whereas efficiency will vary on the context, preliminary work on nominal indicators of 
resilience, however, indicate that the informal sector enjoys some structural strengths. A study 
conducted by New York University, for instance, surveyed 283 microfinance institutions in 65 
developing countries and compared this with 112 commercial banks based in 33 countries, 
finding that MFI’s were more resilient in the face of economic shocks compared to commercial 
banks (Sundaseran, 2008: 41). Schreiner, in 2001, highlights some of the operational aspects of 
informal financial arrangements as meaningful models for formal arrangements to learn from, 
including “slashed transaction costs, the supply of not just loans but also savings and implicit 
insurance, services sensitive to constraints faced by women, substitution of confidence in 
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character for physical collateral, socially enforced and/or self-enforced contracts, and 
sequences of repeated transactions.” 
 
Economic models further illustrate some of the competitive advantages of informal financial 
service providers, indicating that there are less information asymmetries (or imbalances of 
power based on one or more parties having more or better information regarding a transaction) 
in more localized contexts. Additional problems assumed to be less severe in informal financial 
arrangements include the problem of adverse selection- the tendency to choose riskier clients 
than would be optimal- and moral hazard- both ex ante and ex post- which expose an institution 
to a financial liability (due to the other party taking a risk while knowing that the other party 
will bear the cost of the risk.)  It should be noted, however, that formal microfinance agencies 
may consciously make decisions based on a familiarity with such concepts (i.e. restrict individual 
loans to exclusively high-performing clients), while informal microfinance providers may 
unknowingly make decisions based on such concepts (i.e. restrict the loan amount to an amount 
that can reasonably be defaulted on). In contexts of conflict, these decisions may be even more 
affected by ex post and ex ante moral hazards and information symmetries, discouraging all but 
the most capable service providers from functioning.  
 
The key point here is that the demand for such informal arrangements will not necessarily 
correlate to their quality- and we need to in fact determine which programme vulnerabilities 
may be a result of adverse conditions, either political, economic, or social, and which 
shortcomings may be in fact be improved through a process of formalization. Additionally, 
variations in financial service provisions have tried to counter-and sometimes exploit- perceived 
and real risks in order to expand services at a sustainable rate; which can lead to the exclusive 
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nature of service provision in more economically vulnerable areas. That is to say, a general 
observed trend, highlighted and acknowledged by the literature on microfinance impact studies, 
is that formal microfinance programmes preserve organisational integrity by avoiding high-risk 
portfolio investments, sticking to urban and established businesses. Meanwhile, informal 
financial service providers may charge five time as high interest rates, yet can (and do) remain 
in business due to some contextually critically competitive advantages.  
 
Key among these, of course, are borrower preferences, a topic that we have not yet touched 
upon. Yet logically, decisions by consumers about where, when, and how much to borrow will 
be exactly what drives supply-side interest rates and operations. Specifically, in contexts of 
conflict, what does individual utility maximization look like? In order to answer this, a brief 
look at existing studies of individual utility maximization in non-conflict affected contexts is 
required, since to the best of my knowledge, one situated in an armed conflict context- apart 
from a study conducted by Callen, Isaqzadeh, Long, and Sprenger (2014), discussed in the 
following - has not been conducted yet.  
 
1.5 Microeconomic Empiricists and Behavioural Economics 
 
In its accompanying paper on the impact of risk on the HEPM (Dunn, Kalaltzandonakes and 
Valdivia, 1996), risk is defined in six categories: market, natural, technological, strategic, 
political, and personal. Looking at how the availability of microenterprise services affects 
households' ability to deal with risk, and vice versa how the risk attitudes and the available risk 
management strategies within households have an impact on microenterprise services, the 
writers follow the work of Corbett (1988), who identifies three stages of coping strategies. They 
also make a key distinction between ex-ante, or risk reduction and income smoothing strategies 
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such as building insurance mechanisms, and ex-post, or loss management strategies, which can 
also be called consumption smoothing strategies. 
 
In a first stage of risk, households, they posit, tend to turn towards insurance mechanisms they 
have previously established, such as borrowing, turning to nonmarket mechanisms, and 
reducing consumption. The nonmarket mechanisms they choose to highlight include marriage 
(with migration), family remittances and inheritances, and interhousehold income transfers. A 
number of studies, conducted in South India and the Andean region, are compared, finding 
that social safety nets and reciprocity relations provide important income smoothing benefits 
for newly married couples and in the case of land disputes. In stage two (as risk intensifies), 
according to Corbett (1988), the household disposes of its productive assets or may borrow at 
exorbitantly high interest rates. Selling assets at less than market value represents a sub-optimal 
coping strategy, and the nature of the assets sold at this point, such as land, tools or equipment, 
reduce the ability of the household to provide for its welfare. Stage three, Corbett says, signals 
the end of the loss management strategies relied on in stages one and two, and is hallmarked 
by the destitution of the family. It typically causes families to rely on charity, break up the 
household, or enter into 'distress migration''. As a conclusion, the paper posit that 
microenterprise services can improve households’ income smoothing and consumption 
smoothing opportunities, or both ex ante and ex post risks. However, as a caveat, the writers 
note that: "microenterprise services will have lower impacts for households that have higher 
levels of risk aversion and fewer loss management alternatives, thus possibly perpetuating the 
poverty trap. (Dunn, Kalaltzandonakes and Valdivia, 1996: 30)" 
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In showing that processes of risk aversion are conditioned by and constitutive of a larger market 
environment, and that households employ a number of variant strategies in temporally distinct 
periods, the paper insightfully captures the relationships between risk and microfinance uptake. 
Yet the issue of armed conflict is touched on superficially. “Political risk” is arguably too broad, 
encompassing “riots, wars, or unfavourable acts by the state or its officials”. Terms such as 
“confiscation” by the police or municipal authorities”, “the exercise of power within a 
community or household” are implied to be interchangeable with “war”. This produces a lack 
of conceptual clarity, and furthermore these political risks are considered only categorically 
different than strategic, or personal risks. Together, this creates a study of risk where the 
operational variables are problematically divergent. 
 
Entering into commitment devices 
 
Choosing a financial agreement to enter into indicates a range of considerations by an 
individual. Several models offer explanations for how individuals enter into decisions to commit 
to financial and nonfinancial goals, grouped by Bryan, Karlan and Nelson (2010) as 
commitment devices. Such a device, they argue, can be characterized by the following rough 
definition: 
 
An arrangement entered into by an agent which restricts his or her future choice set 
by making certain choices more expensive, perhaps infinitely expensive, while also 
satisfying two conditions: (a) the agent would, on the margin, pay something in the 
present to make those choices more expensive, even if he or she received no other 
benefit for the payment; and (b) the arrangement does not have a strategic purpose 
with respect to others (Bryan, Karlan and Nelson, 2010:3) 
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Everyday examples offered of commitment devices include, for instance, buying long term gym 
memberships rather than paying by the day, or taking fixed amounts of cash when going out 
for an evening (Bryan, Karlan and Nelson, 2010). Such a view on human behaviour has been 
remarked on in the literature, through a variety of commitment models based on utility 
maximization theory. 
 
Strotz (1956), for example, asserted that an individual's intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitution would depend on the which time period a decision is made, leading to a preference 
for commitment devices, or attempts to mitigate the future negative consequences of current 
decisions, since individuals naturally value current consumption more heavily than future 
consumption. Strotz’s original model demonstrated perfectly time consistent choices, however, 
such that marginal rates of substitution would become exponentially larger relative to the time 
period (time-consistent exponential discounting). Yet Stroltz himself remarked that time 
inconsistent choices were more naturally likely. 
 
Phelps and Pollack (1968) and Laibson (1997) accounted for this human tendency (e.g., that 
different time period’s ‘decision makers’ would vary in their course of action/ assessment of 
future prospects) in what became known as the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, 
expressed as  
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where U is a one-period utility function, D(k) is any discount function, and t is the decision-
maker at a point in time.  
 
A series of social scientists and economists have since worked to make progress in 
understanding how commitment devices may underlie some of the decisions of the poor, and 
perhaps explain preferences to work with informal savings and loan arrangements work 
(Gugerty, 2007; Ambec and Treich, 2007; Basu, 2008; Kast and Pomeranz, 2009). Basu(2008), 
for instance, found that both time consistent and time-inconsistent, or hyperbolic, savers 
benefit from the structure of indigenous savings and loan mechanisms called Rotating Savings 
and Credit Associations21, which feature regular deposits and a certain amount of illiquidity 
compared to formal banking. Thus, we would benefit to understand user preferences to enter 
into informal moneylending and saving arrangements as a type of commitment device. As a 
corollary, the greater the time inconsistency of the user, or the higher the likelihood that the 
current user is likely to value current consumption different than future consumption, the 
higher the incentive of the user to enter into a commitment -device intended to prevent poor 
or costly decision making later.  
 
Temptations 
Yet the quasi-hyperbolic model cannot account for the temptation of competing choices, a 
factor that Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004) bring up as a salient variable. In their model, the 
utility of choosing something- at any point in time, even if the present self will differ from the 
future self by overvaluing current consumption- is weighed against the temptation of choosing 
                                                          
21 ROSCA’s, similar to ASCA’s, are found throughout eastern Congo and are referred to as “mutualites” in 
French, or “likilimbas” in Swahili 
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something the user knows the future user should be denied22. In the Gul and Pesendorfer 
model, if the temptation outweighs the utility of the commitment device, the logic of the 
commitment device may falter, and even if followed, the user suffers a temptation cost.  The 
introduction of this model, it is argued (Bryan, Karlan and Nelson, 2010), allows for the 
consensus in psychology that the human psyche consists of two competing selves, oftentimes 
viewed as a long run self and a short run self, whereby commitment devices will benefit the 
long-run self by restricting choices available to a short term self.  
 
Banerjee and Mullainathan (2009) look at how hyperbolic discounting may be contributing to 
poverty traps through a variation on the hyperbolic discounting model that incorporates this 
idea of dual selves. Making the rather large assumption that income spent on temptation goods 
decreases as income increases, they show that as income increases, less income spent on 
temptation goods leads to a polarization of income. This finding is used to demonstrate why 
the poor benefit from commitment devices, yet the assumption of disproportionate spending 
on temptation goods by the poor indicates, perhaps, a function of psychology as much as 
economy. 
 
Certainty Premiums 
Callen, Isaqzadeh, Long, and Sprenger (2014) also note that psychology offers some useful 
examples of investigating the relationships between trauma and risk attitudes. They combine 
some tools from psychology and economics to analyse risk preference and traumatic 
experiences in Afghanistan in what is a highly relevant paper for this thesis. Similar to the 
                                                          
22 In their model, the example is being given a menu with both fish and steak offered, where the user 
knows the fish should be ordered for, presumably, health reasons 
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commitment devices described by Biran, Karlan and Nelson, the findings of Callen, Isaqzadeh, 
Long and Sprenger defy the expectation that risk tolerance increases in contexts of armed 
conflict, contradicting expected utility. In fact, findings from a survey of 1,127 Afghan civilians 
finds that with exposure to violence, individuals become more likely to pay a certainty premium, 
or engage in less risky activities. 
 
1.6 Conclusions  
 
This chapter has presented a sectoral literature review of conflict economics and microfinance, 
and explores the current limitations and recommendations posed by leading experts in each 
sector. If we are to summarize the literature, it will be justifiable to present, then, several main, 
broad arguments which appear to be substantiated at the time of writing.  
 
Political Background 
In conflict economics, the methodologies for estimating the empirical costs of conflict are in 
continual development. Measuring the aggregate costs of conflict, some scholars aggregate unit 
costs interacted with country figures, while others attempt synthetic control methods. There is 
widespread agreement that cost estimates for factors that cause or precipitate civil war or armed 
conflict would also be useful, yet these have largely not been attempted. The existing data 
related on factors related to armed conflict mainly centre on questions of the persistence of 
impact, however, and generally point to negative impacts on generic factors of production. 
Collier has built upon this with a sectoral analysis of war vulnerable and war invulnerable 
sectors, using Uganda as a case study, and has pointed to capital and transaction intensive 
sectors (i.e. finance) to be hardest hit, and sometimes even experiencing a war-overhang effect. 
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The lens of these studies, however, rarely focuses on factors more specific, a shortcoming 
addressed only by a few. 
 
 
Practice Background 
Practitioners in conflict zones, meanwhile, corroborate feelings that the destruction of human 
capital impedes the implementation of development-through-financial-services, although there 
is, similarly, disagreement about the duration of the effect. Leading organisations in the field of 
post-war reconstruction and microfinance have remarked on the difficulty of microfinance in 
volatile and post-conflict settings, indicating a preference for capital intensive investments in 
communities which bear less risk to both lenders and borrowers. Recent attempts to redefine 
suitability and methodological considerations for microfinance programming in post-conflict 
contexts have indicated that, among other findings, there is indeed a market for microfinance 
services after the immediate post-conflict stage, that many “best practices” of microfinance will 
still apply, that there may be a need to train staff in conflict resolution, as Kiva has noted; and 
that a balance must be found between reaching into ‘tough’ areas and maintaining strong 
internal controls. Repeated practitioner remarks also highlight a decrease in demand for 
financial services following conflict, a remark that is anecdotal rather than established.  The 
literature does not present a significant undertaking as of yet in defining and mapping the 
typologies, relevance and impact of the informal financial market during and after conflict. - 
and it generalizes, it seems, on the capacity of financial services to recover from the effects of 
conflict. 
 
Microfinance  
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The Household Economic Portfolio Model is introduced as a circular flow of household 
activities which allows for cooperation and conflict within the same household in addition to a 
link to the suprahousehold network, each of which could be influenced by the introduction of 
financial services. It is necessary to have a conceptual framework which allows for the 
fungibility of credit, since microfinance institutions have a variety of definitions of success for 
themselves. Poverty alleviation as an outcome is commonly claimed, yet empirical studies to 
determine the validity of correlation have identified major biases that undermine the credibility 
of such arguments. While formal microfinance has been highlighted as a high impact 
intervention in international development efforts, anecdotal evidence tends to highlight high 
performing clients while using a combination of techniques (loan loss provisioning, joint-
liability loans, exclusionary lending or joining criteria, or blacklisting) in order to encourage high 
repayment rates and exclude likely losses. Recent, randomized controlled trial style studies also 
show a null result for questions of straightforward impact, leaving leading experts asking which 
questions should have perhaps been asked instead.  
 
When subsidized, microfinance programmes may offer a low-cost product to clients, severely 
undercutting informal interest rates which may be up to 100% of the original loan cost. Yet 
continued programme subsidization (through grants) of some of the most internationally 
acclaimed programmes reveals a key (undermining) component in the sustainability of such 
programmes.  
 
Meanwhile, informal moneylenders on average charge staggeringly high annual interest rates in 
comparison, yet these are usually more realistic approximations of the rate needed to cover 
defaults in areas of high client vulnerability. Furthermore, their continued operations indicate 
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an extant demand for financial services- and a manageable, if somewhat exploitative burden for 
clients willing to initiate microcredit services.  
 
 
 
Behavioural Economics 
Factor analysis for why clients would enter informal financial services is therefore useful to 
establish the current state of the art on the issue. Within the SEEP/AIMs project, a related 
paper on risk estimates that, based on the literature, risk aversion will adversely affect a 
household's ability to be impacted by microfinance services, and that a risky environment will 
cause risk aversion. Bryan, Karlan and Nelson, as well as Callen, Isaqzadeh, Long and Spencer 
identify a tendency of individuals to engage in occasionally inefficient behaviour which is not 
utility maximizing, due to either attempting to affect their future actions (Bryan, Karlan and 
Nelson, 2010) or because their exposure to traumatic events increases risk aversion and creates 
a willingness to pay a "certainty premium” (Callen, Isaqzadeh, Long and Spencer, 2014). 
 
These micro-level studies are helpful in understanding some of the demand-side mechanics at 
work in financial markets. Taking the different sectors together, then, one can begin to have an 
understanding of the implications of past research for current research. Indeed, savings as a 
factor in neoclassical growth functions has not yet been examined in contexts of conflict, nor 
has informal finance, especially as a repository of savings. The impact to institutions responsible 
for managing the economic consequences of conflict has also escaped close scrutiny by 
empiricists, although practitioners agree that such impact is high, and detrimental. And demand 
for financial services- although reported to be low- has not been studied at length. Bringing 
microfinance and behavioural economic literature in to fill these gaps, one can expect to see 
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the flourishing of inefficient practices- such as borrowing at higher interest rates, in return for 
certain guarantees of certainty. As a corollary, the rate of savings would also go down (as more 
resources are directed to the informal sector), delaying a country’s return to normal. In the 
following chapters, these conjectures can be rephrased as questions, and answered partially by 
the thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
Regional and Local Conflict Developments 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will introduce the areas and related conflict affecting the two locations used for 
case studies (Beni and Butembo) in the remainder of the thesis. It examines the international 
developments which are considered key turning points in the conflict. This is consistent with 
mainstream accounts of the DRC, since foreign actors typically receive the bulk of attention 
from international media, including a number of accounts that largely see the conflict as the 
result of strategic abuses by unfriendly neighbours. Specifically, the involvement of Rwandan 
and Ugandan-origin conflict actors is considered of paramount importance, since the area of 
interest here is the manifestation of conflict in North Kivu, and the account of Gerald Prunier 
is reviewed as the foremost historical account of the events that would unfold into Africa’s 
First World War due to his extensive interviews conducted with both conflict actors and 
politicians. Since the thesis is interested more in citizen responses to the conflict than to the 
specific causes of the conflict, careful attention is paid both to the aftermath and consequences, 
including current security risks and types of incidents, posed by the conflict actors today.  
 
Ultimately, although international meddling provided the impetus for the onset of conflict, it is 
also the interactions at the local level between conflict actors, civilians, and the government’s 
army which have determined the course and cost of the conflict in the DRC for the average 
citizen. For example, localized rebel activities- particularly those of the Mai-Mai - continue to 
pose threats to enterprises in North Kivu which are dependent on long-distance trade. As 
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Prunier and Autessere both independently point out, the international community would do 
well to understand that “the recurring and apparently intractable character of the [DRC] 
violence [is] considerably more problematic because it pre-existed the war, had been made 
worse by the war, and would not stop even if the war stopped (Prunier, 2009: 320)”. However, 
I follow the logic of Stathis Kalyvas most closely in guiding the following understanding of the 
conflict, whose theory of selective violence posits that violence is: 
 
Jointly produced by political actors seeking information and individual civilians trying 
to avoid the worst but also grabbing what opportunities their predicament affords them. 
Violence is not a simple reflection of the optimal strategy of its users; its profoundly 
interactive character defeats simple maximization logics while producing surprising 
outcomes, such as relative nonviolence in the 'frontlines' of civil war. (Kalyvas, 2006:i) 
 
Kalyvas (2006:75) offers an analytical critique of Prunier and Austessere’s thesis, pointing to 
inference biases mistakenly attributing civil war violence to pre-war polarization due to 
overlooking other possible causes. In addition, Kalyvas contests the pre-war polarization 
causation thesis through pointing to processes by which polarization or violence are 
endogenous or exacerbated by conflict, so although cleavages may be mirrored in local level 
violence, they may have been innocuous prior to the conflict, and hardened through a process 
of endogenous polarization.  
 
Both viewpoints can be brought to bear on this thesis, since the research is interested in the 
decisions made by providers as well as citizens in maximizing their resources, and how and if 
conflict affects these decisions. Also of interest are any anomalies such as those mentioned by 
Kalyva’s “surprising outcomes, such as relative nonviolence in the ‘frontlines’[i]”, which could 
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be either explained by behavioural economics or present new directions for research, and less 
interested in the polarization produced (or hardened, according to Kalyvas [p75]), since this 
research is limited to a fairly homogenous sample. Specifically, this research looks at Banande 
(interchangeably known as Nande) communities in particular, which have been documented 
previously by Patience Kabamba in his book Business of Civil War: New forms of Life in the 
Debris of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It has been well documented how social 
networks in the Kivus have produced alternative, reciprocal arrangements which have provided 
privatized public goods and the means of capital accumulation despite the fragile political 
context. Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004:62) for example, assess that: 
 
Notwithstanding high levels of poverty, cars and other luxury products are flown in on 
a weekly basis from Dubai (United Arab Emirates) and the Far East, both places where 
Nande traders have developed a lucrative trading business over the years... It is generally 
acknowledged that three characteristics have contributed to the emergence of this 
‘island of prosperity’:   strong bonds of ethnic kinship, a favourable climate, and the 
proximity of borders…together with the possibilities of accumulating wealth in the 
informal economy, these characteristics have provided a significant platform for the 
development of a Nande commercial class. 
 
Kabamba usefully notes, however, that: “It would be misleading to hold up the Nande model 
as a cheerful neoliberal one, whereas its purportedly self-governing network forms of 
organisation, pursues its own interests and magically produces the greatest good for the greatest 
number.(Kabamba, 2013:5)” Indeed, the mentioned “New Forms of Life” fuelling the 
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economies of the eastern provinces has arisen not out of perfect market conditions, but out of 
imperfect, sub-optimal and inequality enhancing relations.  
 
Since this thesis leads towards an analytical understanding of engagement with microfinance 
services during conflict, a conflict analysis that engages with the leading experts on the area will 
do well, then, to highlight the individual factors that have contributed to social behavioural 
change. A simple greed-or grievance approach is of limited use, since following MacCartan 
Humphreys (2005; 11-12), multiple mechanisms can be at work in a context of armed conflict, 
even having opposing effects.  As such, historical context is introduced, followed by a site-
specific analysis of conflict drivers, leading to a discussion of mechanisms and impact. In using 
such an approach some of the questions raised in Chapter 1 are answered as to which 
determinants of the impact of civil war merit further analysis, and the categorical risks 
significant today for ordinary Congolese.  
 
2.2 Thugs Without Borders23 
 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have advanced empirical work that points to the susceptibility of 
resource-rich countries to violent conflict, compared to contexts with little natural resources 
and similar levels of social marginalization. This has helped them advance a popular narrative 
of what they term “greed” as a root cause of violent conflict. Yet qualitative work also points 
to the salience of social and cultural factors, known in the conflict literature as “grievances”. In 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, I could analyse texts to argue either 
position. In favour of the grievances camp, for instance, citizenship laws and land and property 
                                                          
23 Prunier, 2009:321 
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disputes have been manipulated by elites in a manner which have been a direct justification of 
violence in the DRC since the 1980s. Legislative amendments and the constitution of 1964 did 
essentially widen splits between indigenous Congolese and Congolese of Rwandan descent, 
laying the foundation for the traditional, administrative, and economic exclusion of Congolese 
of Rwandan descent (Prunier, 2009, Autessere, 2010). This in turn set the scene for the 
unpredictable national and regional events which were to lead to large scale violence throughout 
the 1990s, necessitating the continued “protection” of Tutsis and Rwandan sovereignty by 
Rwanda’s ministry of defence (MoD) (UN Security Council, 2013). Using proxy-militias in 
Congo (FDLR, M23) to achieve these aims, various Mai-Mai groups thus also began to see 
protecting their Congolese communities as a casus belli, in light of the limited government 
protection provided. Finally, though not exhaustive, the political aspirations of marginalized 
and militarized Islamic extremists in the specific area studied, the Allied Democratic Forces and 
the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda, can be considered a further marginalized 
group seeking a redress of substantial grievances through violent conflict.  
 
Yet to argue a grievances based analysis of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
is, while objectively justifiable, intuitively undermined at almost every angle by the underlying 
economic payoffs of the actions taken to redress said grievances. Ultimately, both empirical 
and localized expert analysis of the Congo point to the war profiteering being practiced by every 
illegitimate armed group in the Congo, and there is evidence to suggest that legitimate actors 
are implicated as well. 
 
Resource pillage has been well-documented in the Congolese wars as a self-financing 
mechanism, and a strategy to maintain a profitable siphon of resource rents and raw materials 
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to Uganda and Rwanda (Renner, 2002, Reno, 1999). Yet how salient is greed for resource 
appropriation for the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? Many argue it is 
paramount, even works of fiction, who declare, “Congo’s been bleeding to death for five 
centuries” (Le Carre, as quoted by Kabamba, 2013:1). Prunier (2009:361) indicates the weight 
of the economic orientation in the Congolese case in favour of the greed theory: 
 
Why do we have such a process? Because of economics. The poverty is so massive, so 
grinding, that anybody with a minimum of perception can be relied upon to activate his 
or her identity segments into some kind of a militant pseudo-globality if it brings 
economic rewards. This is why it is always easier to recruit militias in towns and in cities 
than in the countryside: city people know they are poor because they have the means 
(radios, TVs, cinemas, newspapers) and the references (rich people, foreigners) that tell 
them about their poverty…. The international community usually does not know how 
to react to such crude prejudices, and tries to keep the situation in a polite limbo, where 
the myth of a possible future consensus can be entertained. The economic distress and 
instinctive exclusion of the competitors are often the unspoken background of the 
outwardly polite “peace negotiations” This is often explained off the record as “ethnic 
hatred”, as if ethnicity were a structurally given fact, like a geological structure, and not 
the product of dynamic historical interaction. 
 
The most significant challenge to examining empirically the salience of the greed thesis is the 
quality of data available on the Congo. Accounts and the testimony of experts conform with 
the illegal exploitation of minerals in all sectors in the DRC. However, opinions cannot argue 
with the evidence provided by physical events, so I constructed a dataset of all recorded armed 
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conflict incidents at the subdistrict for a 10-year period, as well as the location of all mining 
concessions, active and inactive oil concessions, and timber concessions.  
 
Regressions were run with a series of covariates, including an interacted price index constructed 
of international prices for each commodity good, the summary of which is presented below24. 
Interestingly, this exploratory research could not distinguish a positive correlation between the 
location of granted concessions in the oil and timber sectors, although a significant and positive 
correlation between violence and the location of mining concessions was evident, as expected. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Total conflicts per month 
 
(1) Minerals (2) Oil (3) Timber 
 
Constant 
.073*** 
[.022] 
.051** 
[.023] 
-.679*** 
[.057] 
.366*** -.592*** -1.199*** 
Concessions [.027] [.032] [.063] 
2.314E-5*** 
[.000] 
.005*** 
[.000] 
.002*** 
[.000] 
Interaction term 
 
Unfriendly Neighbour 
 
Rainfall 
-.159*** 
[.040] 
-.004 
-.109** 
[.046] 
-.037*** 
-.089** 
[.037] 
-.019 
[.014] [.014] [.013] 
 18471 18480 19800 
N 54.844 
 
121.462 95.210 
F 54.844 
 
121.462 95.210 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Levels of statistical 
significance indicated by asterisks: * 90 percent, ** 95 percent, *** 99 
percent 
                                                          
24 Work conducted as part of a research collaboration with the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. See 
Smith, J. 2016.  Resource Endowments and Territory-Related Conflict: Evidence from the DRC (unpublished 
research collaboration) 
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TABLE 4 ACCOUNTING FOR VIOLENCE THROUGH PRICE VARIATIONS IN RESOURCES, 
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT UNFRIENDLY NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES 
 
The negative relationship observed, meanwhile, between the geo-referenced location of oil and 
timber concessions with the geo-referenced location of violent events reflected, in my 
interpretation, the fact that concessions indicate the anomic good governance, or international 
governance, of a location under the control of an international company with international 
staff, in relation to the lack of control or international involvement in other areas. Mining 
concessions, however, did not follow this pattern because the mining sector was nationalized 
in 1970, and international companies were only allowed to start mining in 2002 through joint 
ventures with Congolese owned-parastatals.  
 
Thus, from the actual spatial distribution of recorded conflict, there is little to be learned if 
anything about the underlying motivations or lines between behind the territorial capture and 
practices of armed combat. If anything, what the figures seem to depict include a wide variance 
in practices related to the protection and capture of raw minerals, which seems to be linked to 
a variance in the granting of concessions to international versus national companies. Rather 
than trying to establish the relative greater significance of greed relative to grievance, then, an 
examination of mechanisms at work linking causes to outcomes- specifically, how these can 
explain the relationship between opportunities or the lack of, war onset, and duration- might 
be more instructive. And, if these can be identified, they may provide a more satisfying 
underlying logic to explain the variant outcomes above, or point to some context-specific 
“surprising outcomes” worth examining further.  
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MacCartan Humphreys (2005) identifies six possible mechanisms for the greed argument alone, 
including the popular greedy rebels mechanism, whereby local groups either engage in illicit 
behaviour in order to find revenue apart from those offered by the state, or the mere presence 
of natural resources increases the perceived value of capturing the contested area (the “booty 
future” mechanism). In another mechanism, (similar to the second variant), the perceived 
wealth of a region encourages rebels to believe that a secession could be in the best interests of 
the seceding region. Alternatively, or concurrently (and this is what Humphreys postulates that 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo typifies), a greedy outsiders mechanism appears, in 
contexts where third parties- here meaning states and corporations- are incentivized to promote 
civil conflict for their own interests. Where his mention of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo points to, however, are outside the remit of this thesis25. In addition to these three types 
of greedy-rebel mechanisms, Macartan Humphrey also identifies a feasibility mechanism (i.e. 
where natural resrouces allow for the continuation of a rebellion that was started for other 
reasons), a weak states mechanism (i.e. where governments reliant on taxation don’t have a 
compulsion to create responsive institutions), and a sparse networks mechanism (where the 
absence of dense trade networks increases conflict risks).   
 
It is therefore useful to introduce an alternative historical account of the conflict, which will 
allow for a re-evaluation of the Congolese conflict in terms of mechanisms. In constructing 
one, Macartan Humphrey’s typologies of mechanisms should indicate which one(s) may be at 
work in the context of the area studied. In fact, it will be critical to understand the mechanisms 
                                                          
25 In addition to a generalization of neighbours seeking raw materials, he points to the bid 
made in Katanga for secession which was possibly instigated by (and certainly fortified by) the 
Belgian firm Union Miniere du Haut Katanga). Humphrey’s also mentions the French oil 
company ELF’s involvement in the neighbouring Republic of the Congo, which is not  
dealt with  in this thesis. 
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at work in order to separate the effects of conflict on microfinance from the effects of 
microfinance on conflict, if any. And, if by identifying specific mechanisms it will be possible 
to understand which institutions may be responsible for their governance, then this approach 
will have contributed important early support for the thesis. 
 
2.3 Historical Background 
 
A first major event in the upset of the social fabric in Eastern Congo, the assassination of 
Burundian president Melchoir Ndadaye in 1993, prompted a first wave of approximately 
300,000 Hutu rebels to flee to the Democratic Republic of Congo. This event was soon 
overshadowed by the further arrival of 1.2 million refugees from Rwanda fleeing from the 
Rwandan genocide. As the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front emerged as a victorious counter-
coup, Interhamwe militia members as well as escaping refugees flooded into the Kivus, in what 
was to become a major shifting point in military and political strategies for Kinshasa, Kigali and 
the international community.  
 
The literature on the Congo largely agrees that the influx of refugees and the spillage of the 
Interhamwe into Eastern DRC was only another tipping point for a country riddled with 
political competition from centuries of aggravated land mismanagement. Historically, foreign 
involvement in the politics of the DRC have led to a hybrid mix of policies favouring some and 
marginalizing other tribes. With over 365 smaller tribes present (Prunier, 2009) at the start of 
Belgian colonization, the Kivus was one geographic area of the Congo which escaped new 
categorizations, or ‘synthetic groupings’. As tax gathering practices by the Belgian colonial 
administration began to systematically identify the previously (largely) unconnected groups in 
the Congo, in the west, the Ntandu, Ndibu, BesiNgombe, Yombe, and Salongo came to be 
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known collectively as Bakongo, and in the north, the Bali, Mongelima, Topoke, Bango, Doko 
and Lobala identifed as Bangala (Prunier, 2009). However, in the Kivus, groups largely retained 
their individual identities.  
 
Prunier offers several plausible explanations for the relative neglect of the Kivus by the 
Belgians: the first being the geography of the Kivus. They are, unlike the rest of the country, 
mountainous and therefore difficult to access from neighbouring areas, not to mention more 
isolated inter-communally as well. A secondary cause for the allowed heterogeneity in tribal unit 
grouping, he suggests, was the lack of large scale population movements that were commonly 
forced in mining-intensive areas. Thirdly, cultural influences from the neighbouring Great 
Lakes Kingdoms gave rise to monarchic, micro-kingships which Belgian authorities, in a pursuit 
of the path of least resistance, tended to work through as administrative bailiffs instead of 
recreating as they had in other regions of the Congo. (However, these may have tended to 
reinforce structural inequalities; which in turn manifested in armed reprisal attacks by 
marginalized minorities).  
 
Following 1918 and Belgium’s role in the defeat  of Germany in World War One, the League 
of Nations granted the country a portion of Dutch East Africa (present day Rwanda). This new 
territory wasoverpopulated enough to justify the initiative for population movement of over 
80,000 Banyarwandans to work in the Kivu’s growing plantations- followed by an estimated 
110,000 voluntary migrants. Political instability in Rwanda around the era of its independence 
caused further vintages of refugees to the Kivus in 1959-1960, 1963-1964, and 1973.  
 
As Prunier describes it, the ease in which these refugees integrated with local Congolese in the 
Kivus was deceptive. A dominant tribe (the Banande) frequently allocated land through local 
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chiefs’ discretion, which was easily persuaded. Meanwhile, the fact that this attribution had 
never represented a permanent form of landholding by the Banande was looked over by the 
Banyarwandan, but not by minority Congolese tribes, who resented the new arrangements.  
These “integrations” by the Banande, as well as the granting to local leaders the authority to 
make such decisions, would play key roles in later years of the Congolese conflicts in the ability 
of towns to negotiate with armed forces originating from Uganda.  
 
In summation, within the Kivus, the influence of monarchic style ruling from their geographic 
position adjacent to the Great Lakes kingdom afforded them administrative capacity that 
colonial authorities worked through, rather than trying to create from scratch. However, in 
retaining distinct tribal identities, a sense of marginalization by smaller tribes contributed to 
simmering tensions inter-communally. At the same time, the geographic isolation of the area 
can also be said to contribute to a sense of disconnection and autonomy from networks in 
Kinshasa and those of central authorities, further reinforced by closer cultural ties with 
neighbouring countries than with the administrative bodies of central DRC.  
 
North Kivu 
When the Congo civil war from 1960-1965 degraded existing power structures, a small-scale 
conflict broke out between local tribes and the Banyarwandan of Rwandan origin- known as 
the Kanyarwandan war - to try to establish claims over contested land. Drawing the attention 
of Mobutu, who had long been plagued by rebel uprisings based in the East, the “embattled 
Banyarwandan were a good bet for political support (Prunier, 2001)”. Mobutu drew this group 
close through political appointments and legal concessions. With Mobutu’s favour, the period 
from 1967-1977 became somewhat of a golden age for the Kivutian Banyarwandan. In 1972, 
the granting of Congolese/Zairian citizenship to the previously estranged immigrant group 
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solidified their rights to landholding- and participation in land acquisitions following the 
departure of the Belgian colonists. In the period of the 1970s and 1980s, various Banyarwandan 
even became main suppliers of fresh produce to Kinshasa and Rwanda.  
 
But in 1981, a reverse tide of political appointments abrogated the citizenship law of 1972. The 
same appointments attempted to oust Banyarwandan appointees of local administrative 
positions and reverse the commercial and political success enjoyed by the Banyarwandan in the 
previous decade. The 1993 Ntoto market massacre (in Walikale, North Kivu) of March 20 
triggered outright fighting between the groups, highlighting a recent cleavage between Rwanda-
origin Tutsi and Rwandan-origin Hutu in addition to the Rwandan-origin and Congolese-origin 
Kivutians. Political fomentation in neighbouring Rwanda started to spread to Congo as well. 
With the deployment of Mobutu’s troops to Goma in addition to traditional mediation, a truce 
was reached between the groups in February 1994. But this was soon  tested by the further 
influx of 1.2 million refugees. In short, although the integration of immigrants of Rwandan 
origin in North Kivu was legally enforced in 1972, distrust and xenophobia from Congolese 
tribes in North Kivu resurfaced repeatedly prior to the 1994 Goma Crisis, highlighting 
longstanding political and class grievances.  
 
South Kivu 
A key difference in the Kivutian conflicts between the provinces is the relatively lower 
population density in South Kivu and lower proportional influx of Rwandan migrants 
(comprising around four % of the population, compared to 40% in North Kivu [Prunier, 
2009]), which severely reduced the competition over available land. Another key difference is 
that Banyarwandan in South Kivu (nicknamed Banyarmulenge) are predominantly Tutsi, and 
migrated from Rwanda in the 19th century to a previously uninhabited plateau. Staying neutral 
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during the civil war from 1960-1965, the pastoralist community was soon besieged by hungry 
and defeated rebels who cattle raided the herds of the Banyarmulenge. The victorious Mobutu 
decided to arm the Banyarmulenge, who subsequently defended their cattle and maintained 
their autonomy, yet were afterwards seen as traitorous foreigners, complicit with Kinshasa, who 
had fought against the ‘local boys’. In a sense, then, neither North nor South Kivu’s tribes 
welcomed the historical settlement or integration of Rwandan-origin workers or herders, 
preferring instead to practice a mix of fear and mistrust towards those perceived as Rwandan-
origin.  
 
The Goma Crisis  
When 1.2 million Rwandan Refugees starting pouring into the country during the Rwandan 
Genocide and RPF take-over, xenophobia against Rwandans reached an all-time high. 
Meanwhile, President Mobutu sought to take advantage of the available options to him. 
Cooperating with an ex-Forces Armees Rwandaise (FAR) general, Mobutu turned a blind eye 
to the plans to install a “Hutuland” in the land now heavily populated by Rwandans on the 
Congolese side of the Rwandese-Congolese border. (Prunier suggest that, by being open to the 
possibility of Hutu forces re-attacking Rwanda, Mobutu planned to postpone the possibility of 
the looming 1997 democratic elections in Congo [2009]).  
 
Thus, Rwandan Hutus began attacking Rwandan Tutsis and Congolese Tutsis of Rwandan 
origin. In addition, Hutus began appropriating land belonging to Congolese autochthones, 
attacking local Bahunde and Banyanga communities. Those fleeing the attacks of the 
resurfacing militias into Rwanda, as well as a retaliating attack by autochthones on the 
Banyarmulenge cattle herders, raised the alarm bells of the new administration in Kigali. In the 
name of protecting Tutsis now perceivably at risk for further massacre, it also provided the 
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logic for an RPF intervention, led by General Paul Kagame of Rwanda, into the Northern 
Congo.  
  
The long march to Kinshasa, led by Laurent Kabila created, in its wake, a defeated dictator, a 
new president, and the absence of the rule of law. Local autochthones had sided with the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front’s first attacks against the Hutu refugees in North Kivu in 1996, 
sympathizing that the disruptive elements of the Hutu militias ought to be wiped out. But by 
1997, alliances shifted into antagonisms towards Rwandan Forces, as the threat of constant 
cross border incursions from Rwanda by meddlers from Kigali became clearer.  
 
Local self-defense or Mai-Mai militias started organizing as a kind of minutemen response. The 
Mai-Mai originally were militarily weak, and heavily touted superstitious ritual practices to claim 
invincibility but, by 1998, had gained momentum as a powerful political movement against 
foreigners, with broad based support from a range of socio-economic classes. They had existed 
since colonial times in order to defend, as Van Acker and Vlassenroot describe (2001), 
“traditional rural order” from colonial encroachment26, since land access was continually being 
restricted by colonial powers.  Land has always been an important institution for the native 
population’s survival and relationship networks. However, as Autessere (2010) and the 
International Crisis Group describe (as quoted by Autessere, 2010), the group quickly became 
a groups who practiced “ ‘A mix of self defence and profit secured from pillage and cattle 
rustling,’ and who ultimately terrorized the communities they had set out to protect.” 
 
                                                          
26 Belgian colonizers declared all uncultivated property  of the state in order to distribute it to colonial 
families, sell it, or transform it into parks  
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The new president, President Joseph Kabila, facing considerable pressure to democratize the 
country, decided instead to wage war with his former allies, and found within the Mai Mai in 
North Kivu a considerable ally. From 1998 until today, the alliance between the central 
government, ex-Hutu militants, and Mai Mai has been an evolving and tenuous one- as has the 
internal coherence and organisation of the opposing, militant movement for democracy, the 
expeditionary forces originating from Rwanda, and lingering militias originating from Burundi 
and Uganda.  
 
Prunier (2009) describes how stabilization efforts in the Kivus have therefore been affected by 
a variety of factors, including:27  
 
A delinquent central government which, instead of trying to stabilise the situation, 
cynically exploited it in the hope of shoring up an exhausted authoritarian regime… 
signifying a total vacuum from the point of view of the basic social and administrative 
services which a normal government is supposed to provide (p155).  
 
Thus, one can see today how a historical neglect of the Kivus, punctuated by the occasional 
attempt to use them as a strategic outpost by leaders looking to extend their influence through 
infighting, has contributed to an entrenched feeling of lack of state reach or capacity, and 
mistrust of the government’s intentions. The Mai-Mai, who claim to be nationalists- and with 
nothing to do with the Rwandan genocide- have nonetheless attacked, on numerous occasions, 
the Banyarwandan and Banyarmulenge in both Kivus, seeing them as allies and beneficiaries of 
                                                          
27 And here, he indicates that this extends through the thirty-one years that Mobutu was in power 
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the foreign Rwandan forces.  By 2000, the claim that Rwandan forces were safeguarding the 
national security of Rwanda was seen as laughable by those living in North and South Kivu.  
 
Indeed, continued incursions against Ugandan forces revealed, Kivutians felt, the false pretence 
of the Rwandan forces- and led to several armed skirmishes between Mai Mai, the Rwandese 
Army, and the RCD, the militant movement for democracy.  Such fighting had disastrous 
effects on the locations where skirmishes happened. They prompted hundreds of thousands of 
people to flee their villages and abandon ongoing agricultural efforts and others related to food 
production. Armed men, supposedly guerrilla fighters, became a fixture of several areas, acting 
as a cross between bandits and false security forces.  
 
However, everyone against the Banyarwandans was not the only division. Historically 
marginalized indigenous demographic and ethnic groups took advantage of the call to arms to 
assert a higher position held during peaceful times. Disenfranchised youth, for example, having 
taken the opportunity to join Mai Mai militias, reportedly denied the return of some traditional 
authorities to their home villages in Katanga, the two Kivus, and Ituri Provinces (Autessere, 
2010:152-153). Following internal displacement, they threatened their previous elders with 
secondary displacement. And pygmies, who under traditional law were disentitled to land, 
villages, and the right to select a customary chief, were easily drafted by Rwandan Hutus. The 
pygmies, who had been relegated to live attached to bantu villages, were regarded as 
“somewhere in between animals and men (Autessere, 2010:147)” and had historically been used 
for cheap labour.  
 
Whereas the Hutu’s drafted the Pygmies as semi-slaves, the Pygmies easily adopted the role in 
anticipation of the arms, supplies, and the chance to take revenge on their former oppressors 
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that was then offered. And indeed, exacted. Autessere (2010:147) notes how “All armed groups 
repeatedly subjected the population to massive human rights violations, including forced 
displacement, gang rape, killings, massacres, torture, and burning of villages”. Autessere notes 
how, “The interaction with regional and national cleavages during the war thus reinforced local 
hostilities. It induced a series of new local cleavages, enhanced decentralized violence in places 
where it existed prior to the generalized fighting, and transformed latent antagonisms into open 
conflicts in places where tensions had previously been contained.” 
 
The Emergence of the ADF Nalu in Beni 
Until now, this chapter has focused on the better-known splits between Hutu and Tutsi 
ethnicities and Rwandan and Congolese origin nationalities, their implications for grassroots 
militias and marginalized groups, and the creation of a general situation of transforming latent 
antagonisms over land into manifested ones. These conflict dynamics, combined with a huge 
landmass spanning more than 2000 kilometers and a centralized government, meant that armed 
Government fighters sent by the central government to the Kivus were also seen as close to 
foreign, sometimes speaking Lingala28 and also seen as predatory. These terrible infrastructural 
situations led to what Prunier described as “Sinking into the Quagmire”. They also allowed for 
the emergence of an almost completely unrelated conflict that happened to be superimposed 
in the same geographical region, that is, a proxy war fought between Sudan and Uganda. 
 
In 1989, the Muslim brothers came to power in Sudan through the NIF, and represented a 
hardening of hostile attitudes towards Uganda and its leader Yoweri Museveni, who was seen 
                                                          
28 In the eastern cities of Beni and Butembo, and indeed in much of North Kivu, Swahili is the dominant 
language, and Lingala, spoken in the western provinces, is nicknamed “the language of soldiers” 
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as a US ally and an obstacle in the Islamisization the NIF hoped would spread through the 
African Continent (Prunier, 2009; 81). Khartoum began supporting armed incursions against 
the Museveni government, including assistance to the Acholi -origin Lords Resistance Army, 
led by Joseph Kony, in exchange for symbolic overtures to Islam (some of his fighters reported 
pretended to convert to Islam and took on Muslim names). This support and training took 
place in Sudan, but heralded a trend in supporting proxy militias antagonistic to the Museveni 
Regime.  
 
Apart from the Acholi, Museveni had his hands full of beleaguered minorities who harboured 
historical resentments for perceived marginalization. In fact, the Banande tribe mentioned 
throughout the earlier part of this chapter populates not only the North Eastern part of Congo, 
but also spread into the Western part of Uganda, and are known as Bakonzo in Uganda. The 
Ugandan Bakonzo are famous for their rebellion against the British in the 1950s due to a denied 
claim for autonomy from their subjugation by another British Ally, the Tooro. The guerrilla 
movement became named “Rwenzururu” after the Rwenzori Mountain, considered the 
homeland of the Bakonzo/Banande, and Mobutu was sympathetic to the guerrillas given the 
sizeable population of Banandes in Congo.  
 
Although a peace treaty was in place since 1982 between the Rwenzururu and the then Ugandan 
Government, a businessman named Amon Bazira convinced Mobutu to revive the Rwenzururu 
movement in light of the installation of Yoweri Museveni. Supported financially by Mobutu 
(Prunier, 2009:83), the Rwenzururu were renamed the National Army for the Liberation of 
Uganda (NALU), although Bazira was assassinated shortly afterward. In retaliation against 
Mobutu’s support for NALU, Museveni formed an alliance with an anti-Mobutu coalition of 
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Congolese rebels who called themselves the Parti de Liberation Congolaise, funding them and 
helping to recruit better leadership who could be proxies for himself.  
 
In 1995, a new claim- for a separate kingdom for the Baganda tribe in Uganda- started spreading 
rhetoric aimed at increasing hostility towards Yoweri Museveni by the Baganda Muslim 
community, from a group calling themselves the Ugandan Muslim Liberation Army (UMLA)29. 
Although Museveni capitulated and restored the Buganda kingdom for Bagandas in 1993, he 
did not grant it political power, which led to the breakaway group, the Allied Democratic 
Movement (ADM). These two groups, the UMLA and ADM, began recruiting followers from 
a range of backgrounds, including, on ADM’s side, ordinary Baganda who were mostly 
Christian, and on UMLA’s side, any Muslims, not necessarily Bagandan. This broad-based 
opposition group reportedly promised their fighters a lump sum financial reward for fighting 
(on a steeply unequal pay scale), and appealed to rural unemployed persons as well as city street 
kids (Prunier, 2009;86). 
 
Owing to their lack of unified or shared ideologies, motivations, or ethnicity; and limited 
fighting experience, the UMLA and ADM were easily pushed out of Uganda into Congo. But 
in Congo, they found an ally in the Sudanese Army Security forces, which, as explained earlier, 
were hostile to Museveni, found an ally in Mobutu, and who wanted to create an international, 
fundamentalist network. The Sudanese sponsored the regrouping of the defeated UMLA and 
ADM into the new Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), as well as encouraging the incorporation 
                                                          
29 This is pointed out as ironic since Museveni had received early support from the same community 
(Prunier, 2009: 84). 
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of the Bakonzo independence movement who had found their way to the area as well, the old 
Rwensururu/now NALU movement.   
 
Peace Agreements 
In the wake of the number of violence multipliers across the country (an analysis of Burundian, 
Namibian, Zimbabwean and Angolan involvement is considered outside the remit of this 
chapter), a number of peace accords sought to disentangle, appease, and transition the country 
from one of chaos to relative peace. After more than a decade of projecting individual pursuits 
in the battlefields of the Congo, however, a number of armed groups were in a period of decline 
anyway and were able to save face through the opportunities offered by the series of peace 
accords.  
 
Increasingly. international pressure (e.g.the UN Panel of experts on the Illegal Exploitation of 
Congolese resources, for instance, the leverage of Heavily Indebted Poor Country status, and 
promises of economic aid or its withholding) started to deter the outright involvement of 
Uganda and Rwanda in Congolese politics. However, Rwanda preferred to stay engaged 
discreetly through a number of paramilitary militias it could officially distance itself from. 
Although meetings with African leaders slowly but surely solicited the agreement of non-
involvement, local actors reacted in a range of different ways. As Beneduce at al (2006) 
describes:  
 
Dispersed armed groups continue to profit from the extortion of agriculture, trade 
and exploitation activities which in turn provide the main mean of living for eastern 
Congo’s impoverished populations. In other words, the present peace process risks 
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bringing peace to the urban populations while leaving the rural populations in the 
midst of an unending low-intensity conflict. 
 
According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset’s (ACLED) country report for 
DRC in December 2013, “Since 2011, violence levels have increased significantly in this 
beleaguered country, primarily due to a sharp rise in conflict in the Kivu regions”.  More than 
half of these conflict events occurred in the eastern Kivus.  Below, the ACLED conflict event 
mapping (of conflict events due to CPND and M23) shows a tendency for events to be 
clustered in the South of North Kivu.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, the Democratic Republic of Congo shows as the first in the Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research’s 2013 Conflict Barometer’s “Top 10 Dangerous Wars in the 
World”, and appears as the second most violent country in the ACLED dataset for 2013.  How 
is it possible that such a scale of conflict has continued? Prunier writes, in 2009 (p322), that: 
 
FIGURE  3 CONFLICT EVENTS ATTRIBUTED TO CPND AND M23 
130 
 
The ADF…are-rightly-perceived in Kampala…as carryovers from the past rather than 
dangers for the future. This nevertheless leaves the Congo forced to deal with what are 
actually, for all practical purposes, bandits. 
 
Since the time of Prunier’s major publication, however, the Congo has seen the rise of several 
major armed groups resistant to demilitarization efforts, including the FDLR (whom Prunier 
does identify as a threat) and the M23. Both have suffered major strategic defeats, and have 
also had major portions of their fighters integrated into mixed-unit brigades in the Congolese 
national army as part of peace processes. Yet the FDLR in particular remains a major threat to 
populations living in the Eastern Congo, and the ADF have seen increasing numbers of recruits 
swell their rank, including forced recruits and defectors from M23. In 2014, the ADF suffered 
a major military loss, and as Chris Kasali puts it (email, November 7, 2016): 
 
The ADF appears to have split into smaller parts, since the group may have lost up to 
80% of its troops in 2014, according to the UN… It is in this context that the so-called 
ADF, potentially in complicity with local actors, have regrouped to massacre hundreds 
of civilians over the past two years and destabilized the region. 
 
In addition, Mai-Mai are extremely difficult to demobilize: on the one hand, because of the 
perceived inaction of the central government to defend the local population, and on the other 
hand, due to the economic opportunities afforded by joining the resistance movement. 
Valssenroot and Raeymaekers (from 2004: 51) suggest that: 
 
Many groups who have been marginalized at the local (or sometimes national) level, 
have concluded that rebellion provides them with a means of achieving some form of 
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immediate redress against, or revenge for, their grievances. As a result, the number of 
armed actors involved in the Congolese war was seen to expand dramatically  
 
Most manifestations of this low-intensity conflict in 2014 are fought between foreign militias 
and the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC). A quick glance at the headlines collected by the 
ACLED team (2014), for instance, read: 
 
1 FARDC killed and 1 policeman injured in a clash with armed bandits30 at the Mzee 
Laurent Désiré Kabila marketplace in Kananga. 
 
ADF-NALU clashed with FARDC in Kamango. 1 killed and FARDC pushed back the 
rebels into the forest. MONUSCO intervened, firing shots from a helicopter. 
 
Armed men attacked security police in Kibati in the Virunga National Park and a clash 
ensued. 3 bandits killed & 1 injured. 1 policeman killed & 2 injured. 
 
There are also reports of militias deliberately targeting civilians: 
 
FNL kidnapped a civilian from Kalazi, near Kagogo in Uvira. 
 
Mai Mai Militia (Raia Mutomboki) shot a child in the leg and demanded a ransom of a 
goat for the life of another young man. 
 
                                                          
30 Bandit usually refers to unidentified criminals in DRC, they may also be militia members  
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Mai Mai Militia attacked civilians and set alight huts in four villages in Kizabi, leaving 
600 without a home. 
 
And even of civilians engaging in acts (though, notably, the majority of which are nonviolent):  
 
Youths rioted in Beni over the killing of Colonel Mamadou Ndala earlier that week. 
 
Wives protested in Lubumbashi against the arrest of their husbands, accused of 
associating with the Mai Mai Militia Bakata Katanga. 
 
An unidentified armed mob attacked a policeman at his home, mistaking him for a thief 
and conducting mob justice. 
 
Headlines illustrates that most armed violence results from clashes between the Armed Forces 
of the DRC (FARDC) soldiers and militia members. However, many noted events are actually 
the militias targeting civilians as prey.31 With the origin of militias being complex and often 
misunderstood, it will be useful to define the type of conflict experienced in each of the cities 
chosen for this research.  
 
 
Butembo 
Butembo, a large commercial town, is 90% populated by the Banande (Kabamba, 2013; 5), an 
ethnic group present in both Uganda and Congo.  It has an estimated population of 670,285, 
                                                          
31 These have largely gone underreported- indeed the main source for these headlines is Radio Okapi, 
which is a national radio station and thus limited in its reach. 
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according to a 2014 statistics bulletin (Provincial Government of North Kivu, 2014).  The city 
did not escape the violence engulfing the region. Located on a strategic trading route and 
owning its own airfield, Butembo became a target for a number of armed groups who would 
have benefited from access to the transportation network controlled by the city.  In 1996, the 
town was looted and abandoned by FAZ (national army troops at the time) and then occupied 
by both the Ugandan-backed UPDF and ADF for a period; and in 1998, became overtaken by 
the Rassemblement des Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD). It subsequently became, along 
with Beni, the seat of the Kisangani Movement for Liberation, a newly formed faction of the 
RCD (RCD-K/ML)32 (Jobbins, 2008). At the same time, Mai-Mai in the area began targeting 
the RCD-K/ML due to their perceived sympathies with foreign militias and disputes over 
taxation, leading to the public rebuke of the more violent allies of the RCD-K/ML by Bishop 
Paluku of Butembo, which drew international attention (ibid). This in turn led to the first 
peacefire signed between Mai-Mai forces and RDC (under heavy pressure from civil society 
groups, the bishop, and local leaders). The peacefire agreement, ironically, was regarded as a 
“betrayal” by top Mai-Mai leaders and by RCD in South Kivu, but was an important first step 
in bridging Mai-Mai and RCD differences in Butembo(Ibid). Indeed, Jobbins (2008:17) claims 
that:  
 
Governance in wartime Butembo revolved around three sets of closely intertwined 
institutions: the Catholic Church, the business community, and the various armed 
actors in the town. However, as Timothy Raeymaker observes, the armed groups (Mai 
Mai, RCD-ML, and governmental troops) were the least effective of these institutions. 
                                                          
32 The movement, led by the son of a Nande politician who was assassinated by Mobutu, actually enjoyed 
broad popular support  
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By and large, the RCD-ML and Government authorities “hovered” above local 
leadership, which was the primary vehicle for organizing the community and 
population. The Mai Mai, on the other hand, relied on local leaders for arms and 
guidance, and were closely intertwined with Church and business interests. 
 
Today, Butembo is in fact home to an estimated 12 millionaires in USD (Kabamba, 2013), and 
hosts a number of retail establishments selling imports from Jakarta, Dubai, and other foreign 
manufacturers. A quick glance at conflict figures (ACLED, 2014) confirms that, in the first six 
months of 2014, there have been zero conflict events reported in Butembo. Whether the 
absence of violence in Butembo is evidence of a negative or positive peace is another question.  
 
One observer notes, “these traders make the law, they decide who leads the rebellion, who leads 
the police. Those who go against their wishes will find troubling obstacles.” (Jobbins, 2008).  
Kabamba (2007), during a presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Centre at Princeton University, 
gives an anecdote of a foreign investor in hydro-electric power in the area who was kidnapped 
and released by MaiMai fighters. The kidnapping followed a business-meeting where repayment 
terms had been disputed between the investor and local businessmen, indicating the kind of 
“troubling obstacles” Jobbins described.   
 
A respondent for this research told me how (confidential, personal communication, November 
20 2015): 
 
Kidnappings in Butembo are becoming increasingly common. There’s one story that 
people have been talking about. This wealthy businessman had a son, and the son was 
kidnapped. The bandits called his father and said, give us 10,000 dollars or we’ll kill 
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your son. The father said, “ok, so go ahead.” A few days later, the son was released 
unharmed. The next week, the father was kidnapped. The bandits called his wife and 
said, “Give us 10,000 dollars, or we’ll kill the old man.” This time, the father told his 
wife, “Go and bring them the money.” So now, people are saying the son was actually 
working with the rebels because his father wasn’t giving him any money, and he wanted 
a way to get his father’s money. 
 
Yet what both these anecdotes tell us is more indicative of the deep connections and origin of 
the Mai-Mai in relation to Butembo, than actual political importance in terms of regime threats 
posed today by the unofficial accounts of violence available.  
 
Since the military defeat of M23 in November of 2013, Butembo’s main political and security 
challenges are associated with the two issues: the provincial threats of radicalized ADF and 
ADF-NALU fighters to the north of the city, primarily based around the town of Beni 50 
kilometres away; and secondly, the involvement of Butembo-born Nande youth in local militias. 
In conclusion, I can classify Butembo as post-conflict- and, although the peace experienced by 
the city may be a negative one, with zero officially recorded armed conflicts it will be treated as 
our constant- and incorporated into our model as a counterfactual.  
 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers echo this assessment, albeit in 2004 (67), stating that “One might 
say that Beni-Lubero [whose territory includes Butembo] evolved from a situation of a 
“smouldering” low-intensity conflict to a violent and very unstable peace during the discussed 
period”. From a review of official and unofficial sources, the situation can be said to have 
mainly remained so in Butembo to date, while events in Beni have caused further instability. 
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Below, Table 5 identifies some of the key conflict drivers that characterize the vulnerability of 
Butembo to future violence, and its current negative peace.  
 
Butembo 
Conflict 
Drivers33 
Type 
(structural34, 
proximate35, 
trigger) 
Actors Consequences 
Categorical 
inequalities 
 
Structural DRC 
Government 
  
Business 
community 
● Vulnerable populations 
● Low youth engagement 
● Limited employment 
opportunities 
Geographic 
Aspects 
DRC 
Government 
● Close to neighbouring 
(unfriendly countries) with 
porous borders  
● Unpaved roads and lack of 
electricity 
 
Increased 
presence of 
Increasingly 
Radicalized 
Militias 
 
Proximate ADF 
 
Mai Mai 
 
DRC 
Government 
● Insecurity for trades in cross-
border activities 
● Frequent crime, kidnappings, 
and robbery 
 
TABLE 5 STATUS OF CONFLICT AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE IN BUTEMBO: 2014 
 
Beni 
Beni, thought to be 80% populated by the Nande tribe (Kavyavu, personal communication, 
August 15 2013), and 50 kilometers to the North of Butembo (see Figure 13 below), has 
                                                          
33 Here, a conflict driver is defined as a “dynamic or element, without which the conflict would not 
exist, or would be completely different” 
34 Here, a structural cause is defined as “long standing factors that may have been latent for a long 
period but are critical to address systemic violence” 
35 Here, a proximate cause is “those issues that can trigger or further escalate violence” 
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experienced much more insecurity from 2006 onwards. It is of comparable size to Butembo, 
having an estimated population of 500,000 in 2014 (AFP and M&G Africa Reporter, 2014). 
 
The Allied Democratic Force (ADF), as introduced earlier in the chapter, have been located in 
the Beni territory since 1995, from which time they have unsuccessfully promoted the creation 
of an Islamist State in Central East Africa (Raeymakers, 2014). Their original demands - more 
autonomy for the Bakonzo/Banande tribe and the creation of an Islamic state in Uganda - have 
become increasingly unrealistic, and their activities have become increasingly brutal36, giving 
them the reputation of a terrorist organisation and raising suspicions of linkages with Al-
Shabaab in Somalia. However, a 2015 UN Group of Experts report, written after collecting 
testimonies from several ex-combatants and recruits, could not establish this link (p7). 
 
The ADF’s tactics have reportedly become much more organized since the M23 defeat in 
November 2013, representing the biggest threat in Eastern Congo today after the FDLR to the 
armed forces of Congo (Raeymakers, 2014). A lack of integrated networks, including 
technological ones, has exacerbated the feeling of government neglect in solving the crisis. A 
border management technical specialist, for instance, said  in Amman, Jordan in 2013 that he 
had personally installed automated Personal Identification and Recognition System equipment 
in all of the border crossing points in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during his tenure 
with the African Capacity Building Centre in Tanzania. Yet, when I asked him about Bwera, 
the border town closest to Beni, he replied that “We never reached North Kivu, the situation 
                                                          
36 Infamously known for the burning of 80 schoolchildren in 1990s, and the decapitation of 20 men, women 
and children with machetes in 2013 
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was too dangerous there” (confidential, personal communication, April 2013), leaving 
immigration records entirely handwritten and immigration paperwork easily falsifiable.  
 
The lack of information management capacity has serious consequences for trust and 
cooperation. Indeed, the accountant for a major international bank in Beni (who is originally 
from Beni), confided that “I myself am a Muslim, recognized by the state. But the ADF-Nalu 
are not Muslim, the leaders are. They recruit everyone- even Christians. And when you’re 
recruited, you have to convert to Islam, because those who are training you are Muslim. But 
most of the ADF Nalu come from Bwera. There is no natural border between Bwera and 
Congo so people go freely between the border without any difficulties (confidential, personal 
communication, 20 March 2015).” Other sources indicated a link between the ADF members 
and the regular residents of Beni, saying “Right before a massacre, you can see that the locals 
purchase a lot of machetes in the main market. These are not for farming! So they are working 
together” (confidential, personal communication, 10 March 2015). Neither is MONUSCO, 
who is present in Beni, seen as particularly effective. “We don’t know what they’re doing. We 
see them flying around, but we just don’t know” (confidential, personal communication, 
September 5 2014).  
 
Currently numbering from 1,500-2000, the ADF’s continued presence in the Watalingi area, 
which includes the city of Beni, has caused the displacement of thousands of rural inhabitants 
to the perceived safety of the city. In 2005, CARE noted growing tension between refugees and 
their hosts, which are usually extended family members or friends (Raeymkers, 2014). Tensions 
are usually over the competition between hosts and the refugees for access to farming land 
needed to maintain livelihoods, since farmers who remain in their original villages are often 
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prey to abductions (800 abductions in the area were recorded as of January 2014) (Ibid). 
Timothy Raemakers (2014) describes, in his blog, how those living close to and around Beni 
have adapted:  
 
The presence of these displaced on the limits of the Virunga Park furthermore fuels 
new conflicts. While the park continues to cover around 10 percent of North Kivu’s 
territory, Kivus’ mobile populations are obliged to make living from temporary jobs in 
the cross-border economy as well as emerging urban centres. Or they work as 
agriculturalists for local landowners. Their jobs range from sorting coffee and cocoa 
beans, to crushing palm nuts and selling the residue as cooking oil. Some younger IDP’s 
drive their chukudu’s (wooden bikes) to transport goods on local markets. The reward 
for such work is often poor and discomforting. 
 
Indeed, a brief analysis of ACDEL’s conflict events from February-July 2014 show 28 recorded 
events out of a total of 557 for the DRC happened in and around Beni. The majority of these 
are clashes between military forced and ADF forces. Below, in Table 5, a similar analysis of 
conflict drivers summarizes some of the more acute issues borne by residents of Beni.  
 
Beni 
Conflict Drivers Type 
(structural, 
proximate, 
trigger) 
Actors Consequences 
Categorical 
inequalities 
 
Structural Business 
community 
 
● Vulnerable populations 
● Low youth engagement 
● Limited employment 
opportunities 
Increased 
presence of 
Increasingly 
Proximate ADF 
 
Mai Mai 
 
● Use of child soldiers abducted 
from the area 
● Sexual violence including rape 
and abduction of combat wives 
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Radicalized 
Militias 
 
DRC 
Government 
● Civilian targeting for violent 
displays of territorial takeover 
● Skirmishes and armed combat 
with government forces 
resulting in deaths 
 
Displaced 
Populations 
DRC 
Government 
● Close to Neighbouring 
(unfriendly countries) with 
porous borders  
● Unpaved roads and lack of 
electricity 
 
TABLE 6 STATUS OF CONFLICT AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE IN BENI: SUMMARY 
 
Developments from 2014 Onwards 
From October to December of 2014, a sharp rise in attacks contributed to a three-month period 
of intense violence. Conflict event reporting from the previous six months at the time of visiting 
(March 2015) show, for the period surveyed, a sharp peak in events in October and November 
in Beni, with a small spillover in Butembo. Below, both conflict events and fatalities are charted.  
 
Figure 4 Conflict Events in Beni and Butembo, 2014-15 
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Figure 5 Conflict Fatalities in Beni and Butembo, 2014-15 
 
Chris Kasali, an NGO worker with Mavuno, says how (email, November 7, 2016) “With all the 
military offensives against the assailants that commenced at the end of December 2014, armed 
groups were able to successfully shift movements further into the forest and use mobile 
strategies to attack communities.” Thus, one can re-assess visually from the reported conflict 
events of the two cities (Beni and Butembo) that the two cities are not comparable in the level 
of violence experienced at the time of surveying.  
 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004:54) summarized the effects of the conflict on human 
capital in 2004 in bleak terms: 
 
Most households have no other option than to adopt risk minimizing strategies and, 
therefore, retreat into a de-monetised and subsistence economy. The range of individual 
risks cannot be pooled via traditional coping mechanisms such as labour exchange, 
lending or borrowing of individual assets, ‘likelemba’ (joint savings groups) etc. because 
there remains very little to pool. Furthermore, the social climate itself leads to the 
erosion of the asset base of most households (the killing of farm animals, the 
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destruction of crop and seed stocks…). When capital and labour cannot be pooled, and 
people cannot or do not want to become displaced as refugees, then they must resort 
to the mobilization of their labour as the last asset available. In these circumstances, the 
options are limited and people (especially young men) had the choice between one of 
three courses of action: actively join the system of militarized predation by becoming 
an operative Mai-Mai, join any of the different standing armies as ‘Kadogo’, or work in 
a setting and a market controlled by militarized forces, such as the different mines and 
quarries.  
 
The problem of capital accumulation is clearly felt in both locations, as respondents frequently 
pass over capital intensive activities in favour of diverse portfolios. This has in turn led to a lack 
of value added goods production, in favour of selling already finished products, with lower 
marginal returns. A respondent once bemoaned, for instance, that “We Nande don’t know 
anything besides business. Buying and selling. A lot of Nande don’t even finish school. If you 
have a good idea for business, you will make more money dropping out of school and pursuing 
that business (confidential, personal communication, 25 March 2015)”.   
 
Defecting from local employment opportunities to join mining companies also remains a 
popular livelihood strategy, despite its obvious inconveniences for quality of family life. A 
starting monthly salary at Kibali Gold Mine in 2016, for instance, can be 800 to 1000 USD 
(confidential, personal communication, March 18 2016), in addition to the provision of 
company covered housing, travel, medical care and transportation (a far cry higher than the 
income of the sample of persons surveyed in Butembo, for instance, who average 197 USD a 
month), in conformity with Vlassenroot and Raeymaeker’s statement.  
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In addition to the coping mechanisms mentioned above, individuals who used to trade across 
territories which became havens of rebels have been forced to change their travel patterns, 
opening new lines of distribution through border towns such as Kasindi, and abandoning 
others which cross combat frontiers, particularly the route between Goma and Beni/Butembo. 
Those who continue to risk travel between Goma and Butembo or Beni by road, meanwhile, 
prefer not to carry lootable products, conforming to the “hot potato” phenomenon of conflict 
economics, or an unwillingness to have processed goods in possession which might become a 
target for banditry. A respondent to the surveying in Beni, who owns one of the only petrol 
stations in Beni, shared how known involvement in lucrative goods could be grounds for 
targeting:  
 
Do you know that our country faces aggression from foreign countries? But here... I 
saved normally.... I wasn't forced to stop working anytime last year, no, though my 
daughter was arrested in Kinshasa for complicity with ADF and accused of giving fuel 
to the rebels... [Regarding crime experienced in the last year], people wanted to kill my 
son. They shot guns at him, but only his car was damaged and he was safe (confidential, 
personal communication, April 12 2015). 
 
Facing such personal risks in the form of targeted family members, it becomes reasonable and 
plausible that even successful businesspersons in Beni may be unwilling to invest in high-return 
ventures; especially those requiring significant travel between ADF-populated areas. In 2008, 
the worldwide economic recession further dampened economic conditions and reached the 
already struggling economy of the Kivus. A savings and credit cooperative manager told me 
how, “The problems we have known are those linked to the financial crisis of 2008 and linked 
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to the aggressions/war imposed by our neighbouring countries. These two events have 
generated fear in these periods for our members, who have seen several cooperatives and IMF 
suffering and closing. It makes them prefer to keep their money at home. (confidential, personal 
communication, 10 April 2015)”  
 
A lack of government oversight due to the instability in the region, combined with the housing 
crisis fallout in the US, had further reaching consequences than anyone could have predicted. 
In 2008, it led to catastrophic outcomes for thousands who saved with cooperatives in North 
Kivu that claimed bankruptcy. A former manager of one cooperative that closed in 2008 shared 
how: 
 
A financial institution shouldn’t only work with members’ savings, they also have to 
have their own capital to work. So we had problems for a number of reasons. For one, 
in a small town like Beni, we engaged people and we had charges. So we started to take 
the savings of members for administrative charges. So the shareholders disputed, and 
each shareholder started to withdraw their shares, and the only money that was left was 
the members’ money. And [the cooperative] gave many loans, and things didn’t go well, 
because there was zero shareholders’ money, and when they gave so many loans, when 
a person asked for their shares they couldn't give them their savings. And then, we had 
a problem with our own staff. We would do a transfer to our branch in Kasindi, let’s 
say 10,000 dollars, and we would put it in a safe here and it would be paid out by the 
branch in Kasindi, and their reserves would go down by 10,000. And because the 
shareholders had withdrawn their money, the staff knew the institution was weak, and 
our staff started to do fake transfers. They would write a paper, for instance, saying that 
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their friend’s balance was 70,000 USD, when it was only 10,000, and give the friend the 
paperwork, and person would be able to withdraw the money in Kasindi. A member 
could give themselves 30,000 or 20,000 USD like this…We had many agencies, our 
headquarters were in Goma. And we used to send reports to headquarters, but there 
was a problem. If Beni has 5,000 and Butembo’s agency asks Beni to send it 3,000, then 
Beni couldn’t serve members who came to withdraw their savings. So people started to 
come, more and more…there was a rush on savings (confidential, personal 
communication, 26 March 2015).  
 
The rush on savings was catastrophic for the organization. It was forced to close, unable to 
repay member’s savings, and was one of three that I documented that ran into similar problems 
in 2008. Whether fiscal mismanagement, or the poor economic outlook caused by the global 
recession, or a combination of both were responsible; businesspersons, traders, and financial 
service users from all backgrounds lost thousands of dollars in accumulated savings overnight.   
 
2.5 Mechanisms 
 
Having identified some of the relevant conflict actors in the areas of interest for this thesis, 
several findings become immediately obvious. For one, the problem of porous borders 
encouraging, or at least permitting, the movement of foreign militias in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo is a real one. Furthermore, it has had devastating consequences for the 
citizens of the areas visited and ignited passionate responses as a mixture of self-defence and 
fear. In short, the limited presence of the government, except in the form of financial support 
to allied governments and the deployment of troops that also, often, prey on local populations, 
has created a feeling that the eastern provinces in the DRC are a “no-man’s land”, where the 
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government has no vested interest in local development. As a consequence, local populations 
have responded by either arming themselves, negotiating ceasefires themselves (as in the case 
of Butembo), or simply trying to cope with poor governance and exploitation as best they can.  
 
Secondly, actors involved in the politics of Rwanda and actors involved in the politics of 
Uganda have different motivations- both declared and practiced- for their past and present 
presence in the Kivus, which affect their current activities. Rwanda’s president has claimed the 
urgent need to protect Tutsi’s from further massacres by Hutus, yet allegedly has exercised 
proxy control over a range of profitable resources through aggressive territorial capture by 
Rwandan-origin Tutsi rebels. At the same time, there are Hutu, Rwandan-origin rebels who 
continue to eke out a living through exploitation and self-preservation activities (providing the 
said justification for the continuation of the Rwandan president’s activities), although many of 
these have been integrated into the Armed Forces of the DRC. Ugandan-origin fighters in 
Congo, meanwhile, tend to have no association with the Ugandan government, and seek to 
expand fundamentalist, religious practices, a fact that makes them both less likely to target 
difficult and politically strategic targets (as they lack the support of a foreign government), yet 
also less likely to participate in demobilization programmes. 
 
Thirdly, the creation of such a context has led to not one, but several, mechanisms that explain 
the correlation between the stories of rebels with the economic outcomes and consequences 
witnessed in the Congo. In addition to from the greedy outsiders’ mechanism, a weak state is 
certainly at play through the absence of effective national security policies or strong borders. 
In addition, the sparse networks mechanism (introduced by Macartan Humphreys as "the 
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fragmentation of an economy into independent enclaves of production [2005;6]”) has 
exacerbated the economic outcomes in the Congo, and prevented a return to normal.  
 
In terms of the first mechanism, the greedy outsiders’ mechanism has already been suggested 
by MaCartan Humphreys, in addition to others (Dashwood 2000; Meldrum 2000; Willum 
2001). I could further explore this through analysing resource market values (if export quantities 
in countries involved in the conflict are greater than production quantities, I can assume that 
illicit importation from the Democratic Republic of the Congo is occurring). The quite 
straightforward empirical literature on this subject has already established that this mechanism 
is at work. Yet, with such a high level of assumption, the mechanism can be overgeneralized, 
without specific attention to the translation of this to acts of violence, or its relationship to 
regular or irregular violence at a local level.  
 
The weak states mechanism, meanwhile, is arguably applicable to the majority of wars. As a 
mechanism linking the opportunity to capture resources to the onset or duration of a war, a 
weak state is particularly salient in the DRC given the peculiarly long duration of the conflict. 
However, I can even go further and suggest that the mechanism through which a weak state 
facilitates the onset and duration of conflict for the purpose of the exploitation of opportunities 
is variant.  
 
The sparse networks mechanism, which arguably should be a variant of the weak states 
mechanism, is one that takes a traditional view of economics and applies it to contexts of 
conflict. Framed by Humphreys as the absence of dense, internal trading networks (2005:6), 
the obvious empirical limitation of the hypothesis would be endogeneity concerns, since 
formulating the sparse networks mechanism as a testable hypothesis will place the absence of 
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trade as a cause of conflict, rather than an outcome. For example, in the case introduced in the 
chapter of the failed credit cooperative, the lack of efficient cooperation between cooperative 
branches is likely due to poor road infrastructure and electricity limitations imposed by poor 
investment due to the conflict, and is more of an outcome than a cause. At the same time, staff 
were able to bankrupt the reserves of the cooperative due to the same phenomenon, 
representing a micro-representation of the macro hypothesis that opportunities facilitate 
conflict through the prominence of sparse networks in the DRC.  
 
Testing a selective theory of individual utility maximization against the historical background 
presented, then, I will consider the existence of sparse networks as the paramount mechanism 
for the characterization of local-level violence. The advantage of this approach is that it allows 
us to categorically characterize the activities of both rebels and civilians in terms conforming 
with mainstream economics, and allows for the assumption that the lack of opportunities for 
capital accumulation through well-integrated production can create conflict. Special attention 
to the reverse correlation of the same family of characteristics, or that conflict can create a 
dearth of opportunities for civilians through the disintegration of the manufacturing sector- is 
a defining logic followed throughout the thesis, and the adjudication between the two causal 
directions is expected to highlight a cyclical and compounding process. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
Two distinct theoretical approaches. greed vs. grievance, and mechanism specification, have 
been examined in light of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, shaping an 
understanding of the links between the conflict, resources, and opportunities and weaknesses 
of the country context. The account given of the encroachment of Rwandan origin and 
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Ugandan origin militias serves to answer to the motivations and background of the conflict 
experienced, and their transformation over time from destabilizing political risks, to less 
powerful, quotidian aggressors whose incendiary massacres continue to evade elimination.  
 
Civilian coping, as a by-product and consequence of the conflict, has different manifestations 
depending on the individuals’ original status of power or wealth. For those with capital to work 
with, it has generally led to a decrease in value added goods, an avoidance of capital intensive 
production, and a preference to trade in goods across routes that are less likely to invite 
banditry. For those without capital, distress migration- to mining sites and other countries as 
discussed- has redefined family networks, as well as paving the way for the increasing market 
for imports through said networks. And for those left without capital and unwilling to migrate, 
problems of capital accumulation, limited oversight, and poor investor confidence, confounded 
by not only the armed conflict but the global economic recession, have delivered the occasional 
catastrophic blow to efforts of capital accumulation, and encouraged even more people than 
normal to reconsider saving in the first place. 
 
With so many processes at play, it is not clear how processes meant to address one mechanism, 
such as elections to combat the weak state, will be a panacea.  In fact, stronger states, denser 
networks, and effective protection against greedy outsiders may be a more appropriate response 
to the ongoing insecurity in the Kivus. In the meantime, business as usual- by which I mean 
risk minimization, de-monetization, and military commercialism, remains the order of the day. 
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Chapter 3 
A Patchwork of Financial Coping Mechanisms 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, a narrative of the studied conflict has been constructed, and sparse 
networks suggested as a mechanism through which conflict is facilitated. In such an 
environment, the solution to sparse networks would be the appropriate integration and 
regulation of such networks; and the provision of adequate resources to ensure the operations 
and overhead for such networks. And indeed, the international community’s involvement has 
acted as an injection of capital in the eastern region since the Goma peace accords. But despite 
some positive efforts in building civil society by organizations such as International Alert, the 
Search for Common Ground, and UN Civil Affairs, the literature has suggested (Severine 
Autesserre; 2010) that the international community- at least in terms of its peacekeeping 
operations- has overemphasized elections, state authority, and other centralized power 
structures in a top-down approach. This chapter extends the narrative of network 
fragmentation, informalization, and civilian responses into the realm of economic 
organizations. As Kate Meagher (2010:171) points out,  
 
The problem of network failure lies less in the primordial dysfunction of African social 
institutions than in the disadvantageous way in which these social arrangements have 
been embedded in formal political and economic structures…explaining the problem 
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of network failure in Africa demands a clear assessment of the organizational imitations 
as well as the organizational strengths of indigenous economic networks 
 
This chapter thus seeks to provide exactly such an assessment. In the following chapter, the 
discussion is focused on the point of view of institutional stewards- managers, bookkeepers, 
and accountants that work hard to provide financial services, often at great risk. The chapter 
provides some insight on the prevailing attitude and reach of the state in these aspects, before 
introducing a series of typologies and case studies.  It introduces and begins to analyse a survey 
that was conducted of financial service providers in two Eastern towns, spanning three field 
visits from 2013-2015, in order to understand both the scope and nature of informal economic 
organizations present in the area studied, and the nature with which the government an 
international community have engaged with such organizations.  The goal is to emphasize the 
imperfect decisions made by some institutions, the motivations behind the operations of some 
institutions, and most importantly, to try to group the opinions and views expressed by the 
institutions along various axes of traditional interpretations of performance, before conflict is 
introduced as an independent variable in chapters 4-6.   
 
The analysis indicates that such an assessment of institutions is not only possible, but the 
quantification of responses is in fact necessary. In providing one, I disentangle competing 
accounts of the performance of different types of providers to provide a better understanding 
of their impact relative to each other. In doing so, I contribute to the research aims presented 
at the beginning of this thesis (Oversimplification misses opportunities to copy innovative 
successes) and hypothesis 1, related to the relative performance of the informal and formal 
sector.  
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3.2 Red Tape and its Consequences 
 
Currently, regulatory policies in the financial sector are better known for attracting predatory 
government oversight than providing pathways to prosperity. Current programming strategies, 
in addition, do little to reinforce state reach, tacitly acknowledging, instead, that the state could 
at best develop partnerships with some of its more far-flung regions. The project documents 
for UNDP and UNCDF’s multi-year programme (UNCDF, 201137), for example, state the 
following five objectives: 
 
1. Create the best legal and financial conditions for the implementation of the process 
of decentralization;  
2. Develop, disseminate, and sustain participatory local planning instruments and 
management tools;  
3. Strengthen the dialogue between government and the technical and financial partners 
for the implementation of decentralization and local development;  
4. Provide opportunities for investment and capacity building at all areas in two 
provinces of the DRC;  
5. Develop the citizens' participation in the management of local affairs.  
 
While these objectives do address key issues, they notably devolve authority away from the state 
to citizen actors, mimicking the already large reliance on social capital in “the management of 
                                                          
37 Unofficial translation 
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local affairs”. Situational realities may do much to explain why. The central bank currently 
requires a range of preconditions for the licensing of microfinance providers, and institutions 
requesting to take savings deposits are required to have at least $250,000 in equity (set to further 
increase to $350,000 by 2017). The issue here, and not found to be addressed by the UNDP 
programme strategy, is that in many regions, technical and financial partners would be happy 
to receive equity investments, but have difficulty securing the confidence of private investors, 
let alone the limited attention of any federal financial institution. In short, available funds usually 
go to the few licensed institutions, leaving unlicensed institutions participants in a capital scarce 
environment fulfilling the majority of needs (with a minority of resources). 
 
Indeed, overemphasis by the international community on the role the central government could 
play seems optimistic. In another publication, the World Bank acknowledges the critical role of 
national authorities, and basically calls for increased attention to investing in infrastructure: 
“World Bank estimates confirm that the support strategy for investments in large-scale 
infrastructure projects, led by the authorities, could significantly drive growth, provided that 
priority is accorded to high-return projects (transport, electricity) (World Bank, 2016)”. Yet, the 
selected pictures below illustrate the scale of the challenges facing the transportation and 
electricity infrastructure in Butembo as of 2015: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Chukwudu and drivers near the central market                                                   
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Figure 7 Neighbours’ homemade electric wire from generators  
(de Heredia, 2013) 
 
So while the current policies and programmes constructive may be meant to be effective for 
the protection of people and their interests, and contributory towards macroeconomic health, 
they could also be implicated as catch-all policies which further shift the burden of good  
financial management to those least equipped to provide it. Dominique Pestre, a historian at 
the School for Advances Studies in the Social Sciences in France, has actually partnered with 
Franco Moretti of the Stanford Literary Lab to run a computer analysis of the reporting 
available through the World Bank. The researchers found, through analysing 65 years of the 
World Bank's annual reports, a "sharp decline in factual precision, replaced by... management 
discourse, a bureaucratic gobbledygook whose meaning is hard to decipher (as quoted by 
Cohen, 2016)". This includes verbs turning into nouns, the use of temporal adverbs like "now" 
and "later" disappearing, and superlatives increasing. Pestre notes that most international 
organisations involved in business conform to the trend, using language that is intentionally 
meant to obscure or be ambiguous. 
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Given the proliferation of informal finance, its current competition with formal finance, and 
the presence of a vibrant NGO network, striking an appropriate balance between centralization 
and delegation in ‘contemporary post-conflict global governance’ (Ohanyan, 2008: 19) as 
recommended has been far from realized in Eastern Congo’s financial markets.   
 
This is no exception in microfinance regulation. In trying to approximate the nature and 
outreach of financial service providers, savings patterns indicate a range of uncaptured, 
unregistered providers. 2013 observations observed a range of informal financial service 
providers not registered with the central bank, with 32% of surveyed financial cooperative 
clients participating in more than one unregistered informal financial savings associations. This 
underscores a combination of evasion and opportunism by these actors. An executive director 
of an organisation told me about one experience with registration: 
 
In Kinshasa, I met with …. the Director of RIFIDEC (A platform of MFIs and 
Financial Cooperatives in DRC), … the Manager of COODEFI Kinshasa a local 
financial cooperative. I also met Mr … who works at The BCC (Central Bank of Congo) 
in the department that analyses the applications of new MFIs and Financial 
Cooperatives. I also talked to Mr. …. on the phone who is the Manager of CECREAM 
a financial Cooperative based in Goma.…. All of these Microfinance practitioners 
recommended that we register [our savings and credit programme] in DRC as a financial 
cooperative rather than an MFI. Among the major reasons is the fact that in DRC MFIs 
are considered like Mini Banks thus have to comply to all the rules and regulations of 
Commercial Banks including a decree signed by the president. Else, if we register as an 
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NGO, we won’t be allowed to conduct such activities of financial nature. (Kavyavu, 
personal communication, October 7 2010).38 
 
Here, one can even see representatives of the central government pushing for the type of 
structures that require less oversight, possibly intensifying the divide between informal and 
formal- and acknowledging the cumbersome bureaucracy of the processes intended to promote 
good financial management.  
 
In an illustrative example, one cooperative, started when the capital requirement was USD 
100,000, had been waiting for the review of materials since 2014. Yet, by the time their 
documents were reviewed in 2016, the capital requirement had increased to USD 350,000. Not 
being able to raise the additional 250,000 in a three-month turnaround time provided by the 
central bank, the cooperative requested an extension to raise funds from investors.  
 
Instead, the central bank representatives chose to reject the request for an extension and the 
original license, and have reportedly begun visiting the location of the cooperative to extract 
bribes, knowing the position of vulnerability caused by operating without a license. Here, again, 
there is an intensifying divide between the formal and the informal sectors, creating a situation 
where the regulatory frameworks intended to promote good governance have, ironically, been 
used for exclusion, followed by exploitation.  
 
For the majority of the population in Eastern Congo, and in the words of Anastase Nzeza 
Bilakila (2004:23), “poverty is psychologically transformed into despair solidarity”. Inventive 
                                                          
38 Financial cooperatives are not allowed to hold savings deposits 
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supply strategies, changes in coping strategies, and cooperative associations mirror the popular 
“debroille-vous” philosophy used by numerous anthropologists to describe Kinshasa-specific 
coping mechanisms (De Boeck 1996, Mac Gaffey 1986, 1991a, Marysse and De Herdte 1996, 
as quoted by Bilakila, 2004)39. The state is still seen by civilians as a constraint, rather than 
facilitator of trade (Tollens, 2005:53), and the majority of public entitlements in all sectors of 
the country are foreign funded.  
 
Resistance to state authority, explored by Iniguez de Heredia (2011), is widely practiced in the 
Kivus, a symptom of the unsuitability of such policies or in retaliation to the attitude noted 
above. According to Heredia, Eastern Congolese widely practice direct forms of resisting 
governance reform, such as tax evasion, and more indirectly, reciprocity and solidarity-based 
forms of resistance, such as wasting time at the workplace or “borrowing” items from the 
workplace. As Heredia puts it (p28): 
 
Survival strategies in the DRC, which are generally undertaken following relations of 
proximity and based on an ethic of reciprocity, not only provide ways to mitigate 
poverty and the deteriorating conditions of a militarised context, they simultaneously 
enact alternative forms of social organisation and political authority. 
 
Foreign aid, more so than federal allocations, have been key in substituting resources normally 
provided by a government. In the words of Gerard Prunier (2009), 
 
                                                          
39 Described by Anastase Nzeza Bilakila as including “corruption, theft, extortion, collusion, embellishment, 
fraud, counterfeiting and prostitution” 
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With an insufficient tax base and a negative balance of trade, public finances still rely 
heavily (over 40%) on aid. Whatever is not in the peasant self-produced and nearly 
nonmonetary sector of the country is under direct foreign perfusion. The only services 
available to the people are foreign created, foreign run, and foreign financed. The UN 
and NGOs together spend $3 billion a year running hospitals, providing transport, 
paying the army, and supporting the school system. 
 
Apart from foreign-funded services, it is largely local and social organizations that provide the 
remaining services that citizens require, such as financial ones. The DRC is not unique in this 
aspect. Otto Hospes has documented how women’s differential use of Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ROSCA’s) in Indonesia reflect changes in the local economy and society 
(In Burman and Ardener, 1995:143). And Shirley Ardneer has documented how ROSCAs 
developed in Ethiopia in the devastation following war with Italy in response to the pressing 
reconstruction needs facing families (1995:5).  Ernest Aryeetey and Ellen Boortei-Doku, 
meanwhile, have conducted a study of rotating susu (a type of ROSCA) clubs in Accra and 
Kadjebi, Ghana, noting that: 
 
Essentially the clubs are simple organisations directly tailored to the skills and resources 
of the members. As they set the short-term goal of completing one rotation at a time, 
members are free to join or leave the clubs whenever they are no longer able to join in 
the next rotation. Founding members are motivated by a need to overcome frequent 
shortage of cash in their business activities and in crisis situations. They team up with 
others whom they have observed to have similar problems (in Burman and Ardener, 
1995, 81-82). 
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But the presentations of these member-owned or member-run organisations in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo are varied. A current, cursory look at the eastern Congolese informal 
economy in the context of state collapse, uncovers the proliferation of a variety of formations 
that meet the financial needs of citizens. In fact, financial services, both formal and informal, 
can be divided into four major categories (1. Banque Lamberts or moneylenders; 2. Bwakisa 
Cartes and Likelimbas 3. Savings and Credit Cooperatives and 4. Banks), whose impact and 
efficiency are not linearly related. In what follows, I present a narrative description of each, 
followed by at attempt to point out some of the relative strong points of each.  
 
A total of 21 institutions/providers were visited and surveyed, although participants were 
allowed to provide as many null answers as they wished, creating some limitations for 
aggregation. 
 
 
Type of Institution Number Beni Butembo 
Banque Lambert 3 1 2 
Bwakisa Carte, Likelimba, or 
Unregistered Cooperative 
5 3 2 
Registered Savings and Credit 
Cooperative 
8 4 4 
Microfinance Society or Bank 5 3 2 
TABLE 7 DISTRIBUTION OF INSTITUTIONS AMONG THE SAMPLE 
 
● The Banque Lambert/ Moneylenders: refers to a variety of high-interest, informal credit 
providers. The defining aspect of Banque Lambert loans are that they are from unofficial 
channels with exorbitant (i.e. 6% per month, which would reach 72% APR) interest rates. These 
include shop owners, known in their communities to have substantial business capital; or co-
workers, employers, or well-known businessmen. Being the hardest to identify, Banque 
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Lambert respondents to this research included a cellphone credit vender, a shop owner, and a 
small payday loan business.    
 
● The Bwakisa Carte (Daily Card Savings): This type of programme is characterized by the daily 
collection or deposit of a small amount of cash with a collector or treasurer. A box on a small 
cardboard marking sheet is ticked for each daily payment made to the daily card and at the end 
of the month the participant can request the sum total to be returned to them or they can start 
a new card/month. In return for the service of safeguarding the participant’s savings, the card 
collector (or the institution they work for) keeps one of the monthly payments for themselves. 
Several formal savings and credit cooperatives, it should be mentioned, are adopting this as one 
of their programmes, intended to promote the opening of savings accounts of clients who 
cannot leave their workplace on a daily basis. Bwakisa carte collectors hired by formal savings 
and credit cooperatives split the commission fee they gain from the one payment a month with 
the financial institution, and thus are obliged to seek a high volume of participants in order to 
cover their wages. Ironically, savers are actually paying money for the service, but report that 
“We don’t make a lot. So, it’s important to guard what we do make well. So we really appreciate 
the ability to manage our earnings. (confidential, personal communication, March 10 2015)” 
 
● Likilimbas/mutualities: identified in the financial literature as Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations, are usually organized by neighbourhood level associations, such as churches or 
professional associations. Deposits are made daily or weekly. Deposits are the same size as all 
members of the likilimba. At the end of the month, one member of the likilimba can receive 
the group sum. After their turn, the participants continue to make their deposits for the rest of 
the time period. Many community based organisations also incorporate elements of likilimbas 
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into their activities, without much formalization. For example, the group Union 
Tuyiwatikanaye, a solidarity group formed by the parent organisation Center for Training and 
Animating Inclusive Development (CEFADES), says that part of their groups purpose is to 
“look after the recovery of the rural lending system by controlling credit repayments”, while 
another solidarity group, the Butembo Consortium of Urban Agriculture (AUB), echoes these 
goals by claiming to promote: “sustainable development of the population by granting 
microcredits”. However, when I pressed for more details, the Butembo Consortium of Urban 
Agriculture’s representative I talked to admitted that the loan fund had dwindled, and they were 
no longer making loans (they are not included in the discussed sample).  
 
● Savings and Credit Cooperatives (Coopecs): are run similarly to likilimbas, except that members 
can choose how much to receive when, as well as how much to consistently put in. There is no 
end to the savings period. Coopecs tend to be larger and therefore have several officers in 
charge of making decisions on the disbursement of credit and tracking payments40. In Beni and 
Butembo, some of the more well-known savings and credit cooperatives include MECRECO 
and COODEFI, in addition to others. Here, the language of cooperatives can become 
confusing, as some are registered at the level of the Central Bank of Congo, whereas others 
prefer to operate without official status, although this distinction can even be a point of 
sensitivity as a researcher. Two unregistered cooperatives were interviewed, in strict 
confidentiality, and it was decided to group them with the mutuality/likelimba category for 
aggregation purposes given their lack of rigidity.  The remainder of the savings and credit 
                                                          
40 This section borrows heavily from Smith’s 2010 paper, “Use the Head and the Body Will Not Suffer”, as 
the nature and structure of some schemes observed in Kivu were similar to those practiced in Liberia 
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cooperative visited were, it seemed, the main financial services used by citizens, and constituted 
by shareholders who saw themselves as part owners.  
 
● Banks: In Butembo and Beni, a number of Congolese as well as international banks manage 
corporate, retail, and small and medium enterprise business banking. Trust Merchant bank, Raw 
bank, and the International Bank of Africa (BIAC), for instance, are present in both Beni and 
Butembo, although all three are headquartered (at the country level) in Kinshasa. A mentionable 
feature of these accounts is that formal bank accounts charge up to five dollars a month in 
order to maintain an account open, which arguably discourages those with less wages from 
saving in such an account (relative to savings and credit cooperatives which typically charge an 
approximately dollars, one time, account opening fee). However, one bank has found a 
competitive advantage in, ironically, peddling Islamic compliant savings account to non-
Muslims, which they market as Le Compte d’epargne TAWFIR. Their accountant, himself a 
Muslim, explained that: “People know that it’s a privileged account and they can’t be charged 
interest. Normally the other accounts charge $5 a month. But with the Islamic account, you 
also can’t take a loan. So, if you’re not a businessman, and don’t want your money taken by 
[our bank], you can open an Islamic account. (confidential, personal communication, 26 March 
2015)”. 
 
3.3 Typologies of Financial Institutions 
 
In addition to the five-cell typology presented above (Banque Lambert, Bwakisa Carte, 
Likelimba, Savings and Credit Cooperative, and Banks), other financial typologies can be 
introduced in a study of financial institution adaptation: Efficient institutions and impactful 
institutions.  
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Efficient Institutions 
An efficient institution, it is argued, would be achieved by assigning values to two dimensions 
of financial institutions: operating costs, such as administrative costs, and transaction amounts, 
such as the number of clients served in a defined period. By situating both dimensions related 
to efficiency in a property space, four institution types are indicated:  
 
A) Impermanent institutions are those institutions, or perhaps individuals, who are not 
constantly in business, but offer services when needed and incur little to no costs. Impermanent 
institutions include, for instance, Banque Lambert services and Bwakisa Carte programmes, and 
may use existing infrastructure for their financial operations without investing in any further 
resources.   
B) Efficient institutions manage a consistent, high level of transactions and also incur less costs, 
relative to other financial services. High performing savings and credit cooperatives, for 
example, should be efficient institutions.  
C) Uneconomical institutions are those which run high costs with little profitably activity. They 
may be experiencing a temporary decline, or may be practicing poor management, bolstered 
only by external financial support. 
D) Bustling institutions, finally, have high fixed costs and manage many (or few, but the few 
that are managed are profitable) transactions. A commercial bank, for instance, would be a 
likely example of a bustling institution.  
 
The basic importance of these trends and typologies is reflected in the testing of the first 
hypothesis of the thesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: While informal institutions may be more efficient, resilient, or effective in 
conflict-affected contexts in the short run (), formal financial institutions are, ultimately, more 
efficient and impactful in the long run. 
   
Transactions 
High 
 
Efficient Institutions 
 
Bustling Institutions 
Low 
 
Impermanent Institutions 
 
Uneconomical Institutions 
  Low High 
Costs 
TABLE 8 EFFICIENT INSTITUTION TYPES 
  
A snapshot look at costs and transactions in Butembo and Beni during the period of surveying 
reveals the following image (no bank shared their administrative expenses with me, 
unfortunately). Institutions who responded to questions of costs and transactions are 
represented by circles, whose size is determined by the magnitude of an average loan of the 
institution, in an effort to demonstrate their share of the market.  
 
The spatial distribution of costs versus transactions shows that while less formal structures like 
moneylenders incur less costs, their relatively lower rates of lending do not necessarily make 
them highly efficient either. In fact, it is the registered savings and credit cooperatives, which I 
have previously denominated as “formal institutions” that dominate both the “efficient” and 
“uneconomical” quadrants of the model.  
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FIGURE 8 EFFICIENT INSTITUTIONS 
 
Impactful Institutions 
The Impactful institutions model, presented in Figure 9, is constituted, meanwhile, by 
approximating two levels of impact to the dimensions of operations practiced by financial 
institutions (low impact or high impact). For example, the level to which the institution is 
accessible, can provide credit when asked, and can provide the size of loans needed by users, 
will necessarily be reflected by the number of members they have reached, in addition to the 
size of loans made. With the arrangement of these two continuums in a similar property space 
as efficient institutions, four additional typologies can be identified. 
 
A). Limited impact institutions are manifested in many of the temporary institutions discussed 
earlier, or in institutions experiencing a decline in usage due to lack of accessibility.  
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B.) Charitable institutions, meanwhile, may espouse the view that they exist for the wellbeing 
of their users, yet offer little in terms of sizeable financial help, or charge interest considered 
usurious in other contexts.  
C). Commercial institutions may exist for profit-driven incentives, yet provide higher loan 
amounts, better quality services, or quicker turnaround times. 
D). Impactful Institutions are those which consider their mission and values aligned with their 
activities, and offer a high quality of services.   
 
The relevance of this model is the illustration of the multi-dimensionality of microfinance’s 
impact, separate from efficiency. And in fact, these categories are not mutually exclusive. In the 
following section, aggregates by type of institution are provided which highlight these nuances.  
Depth  
High 
 
Commercial Institutions 
 
High-Impact Institutions 
Low 
 
Limited Impact Institutions 
 
Charitable Institutions 
  Low High 
Breadth 
FIGURE 9 IMPACTFUL INSTITUTION TYPES 
 
To map the data from my sample against this model required choosing a suitable proxy for 
breadth- I chose to proxy this with the number of members of a financial institution, and for 
depth, I took the value of the average size of one loan.  Again, institutions are represented by 
circles- the circles size, meanwhile, is determined by the average number of borrowers per 
month.  
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FIGURE 10 IMPACTFUL INSTITUTIONS 
 
The main pattern that emerges from a comparison of the two models is that, despite wide 
variance, it can be seen that moneylenders and mutualities, the most informal categories, do 
not map into quadrants associated with high efficiency or high impact, compared with savings 
and credit cooperatives. In fact, in the sample, no single type of financial institution qualified 
as a high impact institution (having both a large membership base and providing large loans). 
Banks demonstrated the most depth of outreach, while registered savings and credit 
cooperative demonstrated the most breadth of outreach. 
 
The data suggest the following patterns across the four dimensions of efficiency and impact. 
First, there may be an inherent contradiction in the mission and values espoused by 
likelimbas/mutualities and their actual capacity, since they see themselves as providing key 
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emotional and financial support to their members, yet clearly fall short when measured against 
performance indicators relative to other institutional formats.  
 
Second, there is not a linearly independent relationship between the dimensions, apart from a 
clustering of informal providers on the lower end of captured performance indicators. 
Registered savings and credit cooperatives qualified as efficient institutions, according to the 
proposed definition, yet also qualified as uneconomical institutions in another case with the 
same criteria, making it difficult to qualify all registered savings and credit cooperatives as 
efficient. Thus, it is erroneous to say that greater membership levels will necessarily enable 
larger loans, for instance, or that more transactions will translate directly into higher 
administrative expenses. In contrast, with an even distribution of providers across most of the 
quadrants in both models, it is safe to assume different operating priorities across the sector, 
with divergence, for instance, in the processes pursued by banks and cooperatives in outreach 
activities. 
 
3.4 Methods, Practices, and Processes: Research by Observation 
 
Given the concerns about gatekeeper reliability mentioned in the introduction, I leveraged my 
integration into one cooperative for further research as an observer. Researching through 
observation allowed not only to see key factors contributing to the discrepancies between 
sectors mentioned in the preceding parts of this chapter, but also to see the distinction between 
practices which were due to cultural/tribal/network related causes, and those potentially caused 
by or aggravated by the ongoing political conflict. These observations were codified, following 
the pilot period, as a series of questions interspersed with the original questions used as 
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surveying tools, and thus allowed for the systematic verification of practices within the sample 
of institutions in this study.  
 
Research through observation found, across both conflict and non-conflict affected 
institutions, stronger performance in more formalized institutions, better outcomes, and 
quicker corrective actions taken. For example, there was a strong positive correlation between 
the formalization of a financial organisation and the depth of the cash-flow analysis completed 
prior to approving a loan disbursement. Neither an unregulated cooperative, a mutuality 
(likilimba), not a moneylender conducted any sort of cash flow analysis, for example. Instead 
of questions related to income and capacity, these organizations chose instead to rely on the 
strength of either a moral (in the mutuality’s case) or financial guarantees offered by clients 
before entering into loan agreements. However, some older, registered and formalized 
cooperatives were found to be conducting quantifiable assessments of client’s cash flow 
capacities (yet these were, notably, a small minority).  
 
Collateral collected, on the other hand, was almost uniform in their collection, yet 
disproportionate in their relevance. For instance, one credit cooperative collected an original 
property deed for any loan exceeding the value of 100 USD. This is ironic, since property costs 
from 12,000 to 15,000 USD per plot in the area. One can see how this would severely restrict 
the ability of a financial institution to apply pressure in case of a late credit. It would be seen as 
morally unjust to force someone to forfeit a property worth 12,000 USD in order to repay a 
200 USD loan. However, in many instances, this was precisely the situation facing the 
cooperative, and contributing to a high Portfolio at Risk (a ratio of loans that are late in at least 
one payment to the total amount in loans). Motorbikes, televisions, and cars- items which may 
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have been more proportionately appropriate to record as collateral- were deemed as 
inappropriate due to their depreciative values. Fixed value assets were thus considered a gold-
standard by all agencies- although hardly ever forcefully collected. Another explanation for this 
practice, explained by one cooperative manager (confidential, personal communication, 
September 6 2013) that it prevented borrowers from engaging in multiple loan contracts at the 
same time- after all, if each source of credit requires an original mortgage, the borrower will 
only be able to apply the mortgage as collateral against one loan. 
 
After a period of time all financial institutions, even a moneylender, conceded that a judicial 
tribunal is the last option for late credit settlements. However, even though this was listed as a 
procedure, it was rarely followed, if ever. One respondent clarified, saying, “Here, everyone 
knows each other. If you go to the tribunal and make a person sell his property or home after 
he can’t repay credit, you’ll be known as the man who sold that other man’s house” 
(confidential, personal communication August 15 2014). Another respondent echoed a similar 
sentiment reflecting low faith in the judicial proceedings, saying:  
 
The tribunals here follow where the money is. If you show up to prosecute someone 
for not repaying a credit, they will say “oh, this person lends money, so they must have 
some’; and in the end the tribunal makes the organisation pay something to them and 
the person who’s late gets off (confidential, personal communication August 18 2014).  
 
Finally, and most tellingly, the more informal the institution, the less likely they were to 
provision for loan losses- that is, to consider it their responsibility to cover poor lending 
decisions as a loss in profits. Loans made since 2011, in some cases, appeared as pending loans 
for repayment years later, rather than being cancelled as per national guidelines.  Indicatively, 
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in some cases delayed credit accumulated interest for each month in delay as well as providing, 
as one moneylender reported, his subsistence income from clients. In other cases, institutions 
chose to do nothing with expired credit, simply assured that by continuing to hold the mortgage 
document of indebted clients, the credit was still recoverable. “We have hundreds of mortgage 
documents in our filing cabinets”, as said one director of a cooperative-proudly- to me 
(confidential, personal communication, September 10 2013), to my great consternation.    
 
3.5 Aggregate Findings  
 
As a result of the above observed trends, portfolio at risk was calculated (without writing off 
old loans) and averaged significantly higher for informal financial institutions than formal.  
 
FIGURE 11 PORTFOLIO AT RISK BY TYPE 
 
Several cooperatives were even identified to have closed their doors due to having a high 
portfolio at risk, leading to the disappearance of their clients’ savings altogether. One 
respondent recalled “I remember when one cooperative folded. Myself and other teachers all 
had their savings there. I lost approximately 300 USD. It made people lose trust in cooperatives 
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and believe that they’re going to steal their money (confidential, personal communication 
August 25 2013)”.  
 
With such a high risk for bankruptcy, inefficient practices, and inordinately high demands for 
collateral, it is sometimes a wonder than anyone uses the more informal sources of credit or 
unregistered cooperatives at all. Institutions were asked what their interest rates were, in the 
hopes that this would explain some of the distribution in usage. Below, averages for the 
response to this question contradict expected incentive structures- informal structures 
conformed, in fact, to the theoretical prediction that interest rates would be higher. 
 
 
FIGURE 
12 
AVERAGE MONTHLY INTEREST RATE BY TYPE 
 
However, it was noted that interest rates were also most flexible – a metric difficult to capture- 
in the informal sector. For example, a moneylender shared how: 
 
The interest rate also depends on the relationship with the person. If it’s a close friend, 
or someone I know, it can be without interest, but it can also depend on the length and 
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I can charge 5% or 10%. So if it’s for one month, it can be like 10% (confidential, 
personal communication, March 18 2015).  
 
High rates of informal sources be some providers overshadowed the very lack of interest other 
informal sources prided themselves on. The president of one mutuality told me that:  
 
[No, we] don’t do a cash flow analysis, we have the objective to help people, we don’t 
have a need to ask those kind of questions. We don't ask for interest. We use the biblical 
principle that says, if you borrow 20 you repay 20.  
(confidential, personal communication, April 22 2015). 
 
However, instances of no required interest were rare. It was also found that the above 
cooperative paid a monthly stipend, albeit a small one, to five different members of their 
organisation, frequently gave charitable sums, and had recently withdrawn 600 USD from 
member savings to invest in a parcel of land- indicating a more entrepreneurial than custodial 
approach to their members’ contributions than they initially presented.  
 
Yet participation in these mutualities often represents more than a desire for financial efficiency 
or personal capital accumulation, serving as in the case of the above as a kind of informal 
insurance. Raj Mohini Sethi notes how, in India, “Apart from their economic value, ROSCAs 
are often socially relevant… urbanites have developed new support structures based more on 
neighbourhood and friendship than on kinship… solidarity is manifested in the moral, 
monetary or other support mutually given by members. (Ardener and Bureman, 1995; 175-
176)”. Mandeep Kaur, meanwhile, points to how 65% of ROSCA subscribers not only 
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established new social networks through their ROSCAs, but became engaged in other social 
and cultural occasions pertaining to their ROSCA members (Ardener and Burman, 1995; 175). 
 
In chapter 6, the research will return to push and pull factors that may be influencing individual 
level behaviours. From the institutional side, however, widely disparate differences in operating 
protocol emphasised severe shortcomings in, particularly, more informal institutions, which 
make me question if overconfidence in these practices were creating more “bubbles” than they 
were helping clients.  
  
3.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has provided an original contribution to the understanding of informal financial 
practices through the recorded description of a series of financial service providers in the 
research. It has also situated these against the current operating environment for financial 
service institutions in the DRC, in addition to creating typologies across institutions types 
related to concepts of effectiveness and efficiency. In light of the information gathered from 
the gatekeepers of financial information during the course of Part 1 of fieldwork, various 
patterns were found in the practices performed by institutions regardless of geographic 
location.  
 
First of all, formalization was important, and significant, in terms of the number of members 
reached, the size of loans, and the number of loans provided. Interest rates actually fell as the 
source of a loan became more formal, and portfolio at risk decreased in the more formal 
financial sector. The reasons for this divergence included poor cash flow analysis, excessive 
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collateral requirements, a lack of faith in the judicial system as a tool for loan recollection, and, 
in one observed case, poor bookkeeping which was incorrectly inflating the portfolio at risk. 
 
As a result, returning to hypothesis 1 of the thesis, I can actually begin, using the evidence from 
the survey, to refute the charge that informal institutions are more efficient or effective, 
assuming the metrics employed in this chapter capture the dimensions hoped for. Indeed, this 
conforms with other sources, i.e. the GDRC (Gonzaled-Vega, n.d.), who say that “informal 
finance is not socially "efficient" and cannot contribute to economic growth as much as formal 
finance (wider in scope) could contribute if it is made available. Informal finance leaves too 
many opportunities to improve resource allocations untouched.” However, although 
technically inefficient, reasons for choosing to participate in the most informal financial 
typologies in the sample may have more to do with social, cultural and moral aspirations than 
necessarily financial ones. By introducing conflict as the main independent variable of interest 
in the following chapters, the institutions described in this chapter will be used as a point of 
reference to explore financial service engagement, in a way that also includes the informal 
sector. In the following chapter, resilience as a multi-dimensional aspect of performance and 
impact will be explored, as well as why the perception- or preferences- of citizens in favour of 
informal institutions persist. 
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Chapter 4 
Conflict and Financial Institution Performance: 
A Collective Inquiry, including the Informal Sector  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, organisations, practitioners (Bartsch, 2004; 
Bruett, 2004; Doyle, 1998; Guiss, n.d.; 1999; Larson et al, 2001; Nagarajan, 1997; Nagarajan 
and McNulty, 2004; Kuenhast, 2001), and academics (Ohanyan, 2008; Jacobsen, 2005; Lautze, 
1997; Matabisi, 2011) have deliberated on the inherent difficulties in providing financial services 
in conflict zones.  These include dampened demand for credit (Doyle, 1998), a breakdown in 
social capital, the destruction of physical assets, and threats to the security of programme staff. 
The findings in the literature suggest a drop in performance indicators during periods of 
conflict, which can be empirically tested.  
 
This chapter examines the conditions under which conflict becomes economically salient, 
through looking at the operations and activities of financial service providers. A subnational 
and comparative research design was adopted, whichcapitalizes on a natural experiment 
afforded by a mountain range between two culturally similar cities, Butembo and Beni, whose 
variance in exposure to conflict during the time of surveying was discussed in Chapter 2. While 
the cultural and political landscape of both cities are identical, it is argued that the impact and 
efficiency of financial services experienced by each city is different. I argue that this variance 
stems from the ongoing political violence experienced by residents of Beni and not by residents 
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of Butembo. In Beni, continued insurgent activities limit the ability of the local population to 
invest, save, and repay credit. 
 
The analysis indicates that the economic salience of intensifying conflict depends not on, for 
example, the presence or lack thereof of formal or informal financial service providers, but on 
the average age of financial institutions, the number of active members, and the level of formal 
integration of the financial institutions. Conflict, it will be shown, when interacted with whether 
institutions are formal or not, has a variant effect on formal institutions compared to informal 
institutions, indicating a rationale for increased scrutiny of international development 
objectives, particularly in terms of institutional capacity building for inclusive financial sectors.  
 
When further examining performance indicators using monthly figures in an expanded panel 
data model, there is one particularly important finding: conflict has a small but significant 
impact on active membership, including on the taking of loans. In contrast to a hypothesis that 
would purport that conflict greatly decreases the demand for financial services, then, the lack 
of evidence to suggest such prompts me to expand the categorical groupings of my financial 
services, and in doing so reveals a profound shift toward the less formalized services in the 
conflict affected area. 
 
The findings contribute to an explanation that conflict is transforming the citizen-level 
engagement with financial services, and not the actual services themselves. But given the 
evidence in the preceding chapter that informal institutions are neither as efficient nor impactful 
as more formal financial institutions, increased reliance on these structures may have 
consequences for economic growth and recovery. This chapter tests the hypothesis 2, as set 
out in the introduction, that: The decline in microfinance demand noted by the literature during 
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and after conflict will be due to portfolio diversion to more liquid and private asset choices, 
including informal finance. This is due in part to the increase in depreciation due to insecure 
property rights, the documented attractiveness of liquid assets during civil war (Collier, 1998; 
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), low levels of trust, and hyperbolic discounting.  
 
Ultimately, the increased active membership and supply of loans identified indicate a broader 
shift by citizens into the more informal sector of the financial market, and that financial market 
microstructures remain virtually intact even given the imposition of costly violence, which can 
affect clients in a location such as Beni. The chapter uses the dataset described in Part 1 of the 
methodology, laid out at the onset of the thesis, “Groundwork, institutional data collection, 
and comparison: A collective inquiry into comparative efficiency”. In doing so, the research 
explores several important themes- including the comparability of diverse informal coping 
mechanisms, the suitability of western terminology to create a framework for operational 
efficiency, and perhaps most importantly, the relevance of the original motivation behind 
financial services as both an operational strength and weakness.  
 
4.2 A Natural Experiment? 
 
As a finding of the fieldwork, banks, savings and credit cooperatives, and informal financial 
service providers are quick to acknowledge the negative impact of surrounding conflicts if 
directly asked, yet they will usually only refer to the difficulties encountered by their clients- as 
one of many factors in their increasing difficulty to enforce loan nonrepayment measures. This 
presents, for research purposes, the unanswered question of: what indirect consequences does 
conflict have for financial operations? That is, is it possible to isolate the causal underpinnings 
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of the current performance across a wide range of institutions, and would this be more or less 
affected by conflict than directly reported?  
 
To answer the question, the chapter takes the “natural experiment” written up by Posner (2004) 
as a framework in the construction of a model aimed at the scientific explanation, which as 
Lijphart (1971) explains consists of two elements:  
 
1. The establishment of general empirical relationships among two or more variables, 
while 
2. All other variables are controlled, that is, held constant. 
 
By natural experiment, I mean a study where the exposure of individual to experimental and 
control conditions are determined by nature, or factors considered outside the control of the 
investigators. Posner (2004:530) takes advantage of the Zambia-Malawi boundary created by 
the watershed of a set of low hills, artificially created for administrative purposes and delineating 
a partition where none would normally exist. Following the work of Asiwaju (1985,) Laitin 
(1986), Miles (1994), and Miles and Rochefort (1991), Posner departs from previous work in 
that the national boundary is used not to study how members of the same community react to 
various social and political variances, but rather looks at the variance of inter-group relations 
on each side of the border. This chapter adapts this method of examining how members of the 
same community react to variances in political development. The study hence draws on new 
data to answer the research question, attempting to untangle the causal mechanisms behind 
conflict and poor institutional performance in conflict zones. 
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4.3 Beni and Butembo: Data Collection 
 
Beni and Butembo, both major trading hubs of approximately 600,000 (Province du Nord 
Kivu, 2014; AFP and M&G Africa Reporter, 2014) majority (80-90%) Banande Congolese, lie 
only approximately 50 kilometres apart. Yet, separated by the treacherous and poorly 
maintained mountain road, travel between the two cities can take anywhere from an hour and 
a half to two days, depending on road conditions. 
 
FIGURE 13 MAP OF BENI AND BUTEMBO (GOOGLE MAPS, 2016) 
 
The choice of Beni and Butembo was motivated by design concerns, specifically point two of 
Lipjhart’s recommendation, that all other variables are held constant41, and in line with a “most 
                                                          
41 A third city, Bunia, was visited during piloting, but eventually categorized as less relevant for the research 
aims. Bunia is ethnically heterogeneous, and has experienced significant levels of violence during the war, 
and it was felt that the multiplicity of variables would create regression dilution. 
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similar” case selection strategy. This allows us to develop some intuitive regressions from very 
few cases. As Neilson (2014:5-6) justifies,  
 
The paired cases serve as mutual counterfactuals, answering the question "what might 
have happened under different circumstances?" By comparing very similar cases, 
qualitative methodologists have argued that they can approximate the logic of a 
randomized experiment (Tarrow, 2010; Lieberman 2003, 8). Assuming that plausible 
'natural experiments' can be identified, the resulting similarity between cases "controls" 
for potential confounding of the relationship of theoretical interest. Any remaining 
correlation between a variable of interest and the outcome is causal. 
 
Conveniently, Beni and Butembo are equidistant from the Ugandan border, a main factor that 
would probably bear significance in regression design given the dynamics of conflict; yet 
Butembo has been spared the greater impact of recent spikes in armed conflict due to its 
position on the other side of a major river (the Semliki, one source of the Nile). Running its 
course through and around Butembo, to the best of my knowledge the only way to get to 
Butembo from Uganda (apart from going to Beni, and from Beni to Butembo) is to cross the 
river on a ferry made of several towboats tied together, which act as a raft for around half a 
dozen cars and up to 20 passengers at a time (both docks for this ferry are heavily guarded). 
This natural barrier has buffered the city against the encroachment by ADF that has occurred 
in Beni. It has also made it harder for them to prey on the local population- providing the 
geographical determination of a control group highly similar in other aspects. The same river, 
it should be noted, is not used for business or transportation purposes, nor does it provide any 
kind of lifeline to Butembo in terms of access to markets.   
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In other ways, the two cities are referred to interchangeably in literature, even (and perhaps 
especially) in literature with an economic focus. Janet MacGaffey, for instance, writes in The 
Real Economy of Zaire that: 
 
Charges levied, according to current practice in the area, are, for example, 1 million 
zaires at the border post for a trailor truck loaded with goods from East Africa. On 
arrival in Beni or Butembo, as it unloads, it is again subject to dues levied by unit by the 
local [government] office. p56 
 
Blomme, Piet van Asten, and Bernard Vanlauwe (2013) also refer to the similar economic 
landscape in passing with this sentence (p49): “The average price of a 30 kg bunch of plantains 
in 2011 in Beni, Butembo and Mutwanga was US $6.00. In contrast, the average price of a 30 
kg bunch of AAA-EA cooking bananas was US 3.00 in 2011, while the price for a 30kg bunch 
of AAA-EA brewing bananas was only US $1.50.” These scattered mentions in the area studies 
from the region are the main, to the best of my knowledge, account of the economies of both 
towns. They both indicate an interchangeable economic landscape and indicative profit margins 
for business. However, as both accounts could be considered out of date, at the same time this 
research constructed its own indices of profit margins and employment to further ensure 
comparability, discussed in the next section.  
 
 
Empirical strategy 
 
Sekhon and Titiunik (2012) have pointed out what they view as the main inferential and 
conceptual problems that can arise in natural experiments, including that either comparable 
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groups may be difficult to find, or that the comparison may estimate another causal effect than 
the one hoped for.  
 
Additional issues in estimating the impact of conflict on financial services include issues of 
conditional confoundedness, endogeneity in conflict variance, and omission. These become 
especially salient, if, for example, inherently riskier financial service users are more likely to 
reside in a riskier business environment (conditional confoundedness), which is quite possible. 
In addition, the research needs to consider whether the environmental conditions (low lying 
and accessible terrain extremely close to Uganda) attracting conflict to Beni, and drive any of 
the aspects of the financial landscape and credit culture (endogeneity in conflict variance). 
Finally, it should consider if, for instance, the close of the financial year might be driving 
divergent financial service strategies, or the targeting of Beni is based on some attractive 
prospect or other overlooked factor (omission).  
 
Therefore, the survey specifically collected data in regards to the savings level of respondents, 
as well as each respondent’s average monthly income from primary and secondary income-
generating activities, expenditures, and household consumption. These indicators, typically 
judged on a loan application, are likely to lead to a loan application’s success or rejection. While 
all these possibilities are considered, evidence suggests that no effects are significant enough to 
undermine the validity of the results. The survey found little difference in conditional mean 
differences at a significant level between Beni and Butembo samples, indicating that there was 
no a-priori significant difference between the two sample groups in terms of borrowing 
potential.  Furthermore, while the accessibility of Uganda to Beni may attract more 
tradespersons to the Beni sample, this was corrected for in the balancing of the sample 
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according to the breakdown of the cooperative’s membership. Below, summary statistics with 
conditional means are provided.  
 
Summary Statistics and Tests of Balance 
 Assigned Control Assigned  
Treatment-Control 
 Mean 
(1) 
SD 
(2) 
Coefficient 
(3) 
p-value 
(4) 
Household composition     
Number of members 7.85 3.218 .329 .491 
Number of Adults (≥ 18 
years old) 
3.8 4.19 -.599 .313 
Number of children (<18 
years old) 
3.64 2.202 .475 .204 
     
Income Generating 
Activities 
    
Revenue/month from 
primary business 
199.41 892.299 47.47 .619 
Revenue/month from 
secondary business 
61.19 84.912 -101.101 .033** 
Employment (employees) 2.38 5.847 -1.016 .390 
Notes: Data from 2013 and 2015 survey. Sample size is n= 208, of which 103 are assigned to 
the control and 105 are assigned to the treatment sample. Columns 1 and 2 report statistics 
for households in the control area, Butembo. Column 3 shows the difference between the 
mean for households in areas assigned to the treatment sample (based in Beni). Column 4 
shows p-values for Satterthwaite-corrected t-tests for equality of means. Levels of statistical 
significance are indicated by asterisks: * 90 percent, ** 95 percent, *** 99 percent 
 
TABLE 9 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF USER SAMPLE FROM BOTH CITIES 
 
Exogenous treatment 
Finally, the selection of Beni as a target for the ADF could potentially be biased if the targeting 
is based on strategic location-specific prospects, such as mineral deposits, which are non-
random and also bear on the economy and financial sector of a town. Yet Butembo and Beni 
share comparable levels of economic development. The presence of formal and informal credit 
operators is on par in each city (most cooperatives that have a branch in Beni have one in 
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Butembo, for instance, including PAIDEK, MECRECO, BDG, and COOEDFI, to name a 
few), and the risks and rewards of starting a business, for each town, are approximately the 
same as seen by the balance in revenues. These factors are not sufficiently varied between the 
two towns to merit one at greater risk for targeted attacks. With such high levels of similarity, 
attacks cannot be said to be targeted based on variance in economic capture values, or the 
perceived difference in monetary gains from attacking Butembo as Beni.  
 
The actions of the ADF, in fact, are “designed to traumatize the local population so that a 
nascent new rebellion could emerge and style itself as a liberation force (Vircoulon, as quoted 
by Bangre, 2014)”. They have been most consistent in one striking aspect alone, which is a 
terrifying level of unpredictability-and deadliness. ADF are not active, for instance, compared 
with groups like FDLR and M23, in the extraction of mineral resources, and have not been 
implicated in the conflict mineral scandals associated with the country. As Thierry Vircoulon, 
ICG’s central African director, attests "ADF has always been very brutal and non-
communicative. Previously, they used to establish a security perimeter around their area by 
terror, including killing villagers who did not respect the perimeter, and displaying their bodies 
on the roads. (Bangre, 2014)” Whatever territorial intentions they do have, their preference for 
ostentatious, brute force, rather than on a sustainable relationship with local populations in 
order to control, tax (or trade “security” for bribes) in resource-rich areas distinctly 
characterizes the ADF. This in turn suggests that any rural area is just as vulnerable as any other.   
 
As Sekhon and Titiunuk (2012) point out, another challenge arises in natural experiment design 
due to the fact that the naturally occurring intervention generates some subjects who receive 
treatment and other subjects who do not, creating, possibly, a number of different treatment 
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and control groups from the same intervention, only some of whom are similar and thus valid 
to compare. They therefore urge researchers to consider two additional questions (p23): 
 
(1) Is the proposed treatment-control comparison guaranteed to be valid by the assumed 
randomization?  
(2) If not, what is the comparison that is guaranteed by the randomization, and how does this 
comparison relate to the comparison the researcher wishes to make?  
 
Question (1): Is the comparison of Butembo's institutions and Beni's institutions guaranteed to 
be valid if we assume that the city of Beni is targeted for violence randomly? It is simple to 
show that across categories, they may not be, since a neighbourhood moneylender in Beni 
cannot be compared validly with the International Bank of Africa's branch office in Butembo.  
This leads naturally to Question (2): What is the comparison that is guaranteed to be valid if it 
is assumed that the violence that is surrounding Beni is random? As the discussion of typologies 
in the previous chapter demonstrated, in our instance is becomes clear that only matching cases 
are really comparable, and that it is necessary to compare, for example, informal institutions in 
Butembo with informal institutions in Beni, and formal institutions in Butembo with formal 
institutions in Beni. 
 
4.4 Research collection 
 
Constructing the indices needed to answer the key research questions related to efficiency, 
impact, and performance required an assemblage of primary source data. Research was initiated 
by visiting local representatives, where possible, of the national government. This included, in 
Butembo, the representative of the Central Bank of Congo, who gave verbal approval of the 
research project. Secondly, visits were made to financial institutions in order to introduce the 
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scope and nature of the research being conducted, using an Ordre de Mission, an official letter 
from the University of York describing my status as a PhD student. I began my search for 
cooperatives and mutualities using a list of approximately 25 “peasant associations” found as 
an appendix at the end of a Graben University library paper, while my search for more formal 
financial institutions used a snowballing approach.  
 
Once approved by the manager, surveys were conducted either with the manager or their 
designated staff member (s). This lengthy process of formality required, in most cases, a 
minimum of three visits- and in some cases, up to seven visits in order to seek follow-up 
information and missing figures. At the time, the process used critical amounts of time on 
securing permission and authorizations for the release of information- this investment of time, 
however, proved essential for the full or partial completion of most questions.  
 
In total, 59 questions were asked to a total of 27 financial service providers, from 21 financial 
institutions - in order to determine, for each provider, the indicators elaborated in the 
introduction of this thesis. These were namely age, number of borrowers per month, total loan 
portfolio outstanding, portfolio at risk, write-off ratio, average loan balance, depth of outreach, 
administrative expenses, average staff salary, staff productivity, and cost per borrower. 
 
In addition to the lengthy, open-ended questionnaire, which provided a rich amount of 
qualitative as well as quantitative data, a collection of time-series for several highly significant 
indicators was taken from each institution, where possible. These time series charted the 
comparative levels of the indicators over a six-month period, during which Beni experienced 
spikes in violent incidents. These indicators include savings, members or number of accounts, 
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non-active members, loan demands per month, loans given per month, loan portfolio size and 
portfolio at risk.  
 
4.5 The model of the conflict/efficiency nexus 
 
In the case of financial services, measurement of the portfolio quality, the efficiency, 
productivity, and formal integration of service providers is fairly quantifiable (the last of these, 
for the purpose of the dataset, is a dummy variable). On the basis of the data collected, an OLS 
regression model for a conflict/efficiency model can be estimated, conditional on the average 
figures for each institution.  
 
Data is available for September 2014 to February 2015, for most institutions, with some 
institutions providing trimestral rather than monthly figures.  
 
A composite variable for efficiency was computed, adding together the standardized values of 
the above performance indicators (and reversing the rank, where necessary, of the factor 
variables).  
 
Efficiency= ZMembers+ZBorrowers+ZSavings+ZLoan Portfolio+ZPortfolio at 
Risk+ZLoan Size+ZDepth of Outreach+ZAdministrative Expenses+ZCost per Borrower + 
ZStaff salary + Zproductivity 
 
This results in a composite variable with a low n, of 11 cases, which is worth highlighting here 
to emphasize the exploratory nature of the following models- and the use of a lower threshold 
for significance readings (.1). In the first model, in column 1, the OLS regression is used to 
189 
 
regress the composite variable, efficiency on the independent variable, conflict. Here, conflict 
is a dummy variable taken from the setup of the natural experiment, where location in the 
control city (Butembo)=0 and location in the treatment city (Beni)=1. 
 
As the robustness of the model does not suggest an overall relationship between the conflict 
exposure vis-a-vis the location of the institution and the performance of the institution, a series 
of covariates was introduced. In the second column, there is a control for a dummy variable of 
whether the institution is informal or not, based on the discussion in the introduction 
(registered with the Central Bank of Congo= 1, unregistered with the Central Bank of 
Congo=0).  In the third column, the addition of the age of the institution results in an 
estimation of a significant difference in efficiency outcomes for institutions that are, first, older, 
and also, registered. Finally, in the fourth column, an interaction term for the dummy coded 
variables conflict and formality is added, which will be referred to as a Formalization Index. 
This index allows us to examine whether the comparison between informal and formal 
institutions is different when conflict is present.  
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Institutional Efficiency as a Composite 
Indicator 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
Conflict exposure -2.444 -.841 2.679 3.539 
[4.043] [3.909] [2.201] 
 
[3.251] 
Formality 
 
 
Age 
 
  6.013 
[3.909] 
 
4.918** 
[2.080] 
5.734 
  .051*** 
[.011] 
.051*** 
[.012] 
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Conflict*Formalization    -1.700 
[4.445] 
 
Adj. R2 -.068 .073 .741 .705 
N 11 11 11 11 
F .366 
 
1.394 10.531 6.971 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance 
indicated by asterisks: * 90 percent, ** 95 percent, *** 99 percent 
 
TABLE 10 INSTITUTIONAL EFFICIENCY AS A FUNCTION OF CONFLICT EXPOSURE 
 
Controlling for the age and level of formalization, conflict does not have a high confidence 
level, yet the three variables combined have, at highest in the model in column 3, an adjusted 
r2 of 74%. Taken together, in summation, the diagnostic statistics suggest that the regression is 
statistically robust, if merely due to the addition of considerations of age and formalization.  
But if conflict is not statistically significant for a composite variable of institutional efficiency, 
is it statistically significant for any aspect of performance? For this question, factor analysis is 
called for to break down the individual components of the composite variable, “efficiency”.  
  
 
4.6 Violence in Institutions 
 
Here, the comparison of the aggregate means allows us to examine the interrelationship 
between conflict and formal and informal institutions, by examining conflict as an independent 
variable for a series of the factors of efficiency. Conveniently, taking a closer look at each factor 
also increases the sample size to, in most cases, 21.  
 
Results are displayed in tables 11 and 12. In table 11, column 1, simple aggregate averages of 
the values reported by both informal and formal institutions in Butembo are tabulated and 
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shown. The raw data was used instead of standardized values since the categories are now 
distinct enough to compare between cities. In column 2, the contrasting aggregate averages of 
the values reported by informal and formal financial institutions in Beni are shown. 
 
Table 12 presents regression coefficients for each performance indicator, when regressed on 
the institution’s exposure to conflict, with added covariates for age and formalization (not 
reported), and the interaction term for conflict and formalization. The dependent variables in 
these regressions are the individual raw values for each institution, and robustness checks were 
run with standardized values.  
Performance Indicator Aggregates by Comparison Unit 
 
  (1) Control (2) Treatment 
 
(a) Total value 
of savings 
portfolio  
Informal 
Institutions Mean  
$1,6035 $498 
Formal 
Institutions  Mean 
$1,467,632 $671,526.25 
(b) Current 
active 
accounts 
Informal 
Institutions Mean  
415 91.6 
Formal 
Institutions  Mean 
3021 4031 
(c) Loans per 
month 
Informal 
Institutions Mean  
4.6 18.5 
Formal 
Institutions  Mean 
39.6 53.57 
(d) Cumulative 
value of 
loans in 
circulation 
Informal 
Institutions Mean  
54331 16942 
Formal 
Institutions  Mean 
948294 296747 
(e) Portfolio at 
Risk 
Informal 
Institutions Mean  
38 22 
Formal 
Institutions  Mean 
14 26 
(f) Cost Per 
Borrower 
Informal 
Institutions Mean  
$117 $5.5 
Formal 
Institutions  Mean 
$160 $40 
(g) Loan Officer 
Productivity 
Informal 
Institutions Mean  
2 6.3 
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Formal 
Institutions  Mean 
2.4 15 
Notes:  
Levels of statistical significance indicated by asterisks: * 90 percent, ** 95 percent, *** 99 
percent 
Sample sizes reported in Table 12 
TABLE 11 PERFORMANCE AGGREGATES BY INDICATOR 
 
 
 Effect of Treatment 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)    (g) 
 Savings Members Loans 
Given 
Total 
Portfolio 
Size 
PAR Cost per 
Borrower 
Loan 
Officer 
Productivity 
 
Coefficient for 
Conflict 
739875 32.45 18.388 244734.92 -17.27 -87.249 11.853 
Conflict* 
formalization 
-880392 1431.060 .494*** -
650024.65 
27.646* -23.680 -9.580 
 
Sample Size 
 
17 
 
18 
 
20 
 
19 
 
18 
 
15 
 
17 
Notes: Coefficient for conflict controls for age, formalization, and a formalization index 
Levels of statistical significance indicated by asterisks: * 90 percent, ** 95 percent, *** 99 
percent  
TABLE 12 EFFECT OF TREATMENT ON PERFORMANCE AGGREGATES 
 
 
(a) Liquidity as savings on hand 
In the comparison of means table for average savings deposits on hand, Butembo institutions 
have roughly triple the amount of available liquidity on hand than Beni institutions, in both the 
formal and informal sector. However, it is difficult to say that conflict would be the cause of 
this difference. Running the related regression controlling for age and regulation, age and 
regulation are statistically significant factors, yet conflict is not. This indicates that, over time, 
and through integration into a formal economy, institutions accumulate capital, which is not 
significantly affected by conflict over the time period observed. The predominance of these 
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savings being clustered in Butembo point to the larger size and age, on average, of institutions 
in Butembo, an important caveat to keep in mind when considering the remaining data. 
 
(b) Average Number of Users of all services   
Indeed, there are only 22% as many users for Beni’s informal financial services as for Butembo’s 
services. This indicator captures active members who may only have a savings account, for 
instance, and not their borrowing activity. The similarity between this and the smaller portfolio 
of savings in Beni compared to Butembo explain why the average wealth of respondents is still 
comparable.   
 
In the formal financial sector, however, service uptake is fairly equal, with 133% the member 
base for formal financial services in Beni.  Here, again, the institution’s status as an unregulated 
or a regulated institution, as well as its age, demonstrates a higher significance in explaining the 
variance in the dependent variable “members”, compared to exposure to conflict. This allows 
us some cautious confidence in claiming that the grouping of cases is comparable across cities.  
 
(c) Average Number of Borrowers per month 
However, relative demands for loans sees a spike in our conflict-affected zone. In both sectors, 
which is of particular interest for the informal sector due to the lower on average membership 
in the conflict-affected area, loan demands and loans granted per month, shown below, are 
higher- indicating increasing reliance on credit-funded activities. Here, the interaction term 
becomes significant, and slightly positive- indicating that, in the presence of conflict, formal 
institutions may actually be lending an additional number of times per month on average (a net 
affect of .4 times, which, although not high, is certainly not indicative of a drop). With this 
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finding, I can start to question critically the finding of Karen Doyle (1998), who claims that 
qualitative data indicates that conflict decreases demand for credit. 
 
(d) Average loan portfolio 
Considering the high volume of loans, significantly smaller loan portfolios in both the informal 
and formal sector of Beni, compared to Butembo, indicates that loan sizes themselves may be 
smaller in Beni. The overall trend of greater financial capacity in Butembo, with equal if not 
more actual loans being made in Beni, however, begs a question of whether the greater loan 
portfolios in Butembo could be justified by increased investor confidence due to security, or 
cultural differences which are difficult to quantify. Entered into regression models, conflict, 
however, is still not a significant determinant of the variance in loan portfolio. Hence, it should 
be attributed to the other factors mentioned above (the higher age on average of institutions in 
Butembo and greater savings on hand) rather than security concerns.  
 
(e) Non-performing loans 
Portfolio at risk (PAR) has an interesting tendency in both the formal and informal financial 
sectors in Beni. In the informal sector in Beni, PAR is insignificantly less than within its 
counterparts in Butembo (although it is still quite high, at 22% on average). However, in the 
formal sector, PAR rises a good 12% higher in Beni than it is  in Butembo. When regressed as 
a dependent variable on conflict, age, formality, and the interaction of formality and conflict, 
the research finds something even more interesting- PAR appears to be insignificantly less in 
conflict affected contexts- but significantly higher when the institution is formal and located in 
a conflict zone.  
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With a current assumption that PAR should unilaterally be significantly higher in a conflict-
exposed environment, the contrary findings indicate, in fact, that the informal sector is perfectly 
capable, if not more so, than enforcing loan repayments in a conflict-affected zone of 
operations. Meanwhile, the formal sector, in these two locations, is less capable of loan 
repayment enforcement in the conflict-exposed area- which conforms to practitioner 
observations (Bartsch, 2004). This begs for further- and deeper- examination of the seeming 
comparative advantages, of the formal sector.   
 
(f) Average Cost per borrower 
With average cost of borrower, a spike in efficiency is again seen - in favour, surprisingly, of 
the conflict-exposed area (with the conflict exposed institutions spending less per borrower). 
However, the findings are not significant. The general direction of the findings indicate, 
however, that disregarding other indicators of efficiency, perhaps institutions do more with less 
in conflict-exposed institutions. If one is to look to our list of factors for efficiency, loan officer 
productivity is another similar variable that could confirm and strengthen this hypothesis. 
 
(g) Avg Loan officer ratio 
And indeed, in Beni loan officers and staff have 3 to 6 times as many borrowers per individual 
staff member than institutions and services in Butembo. However, it does not provide any 
statistical significance for explaining variance. As this model indicates, then, conflict (or the 
location of a financial institution in a conflict-affected zone) is not a significant predictor of the 
risk to performance indicators, as captured by the multi-month dataset. The controls for age in 
months and the dummy indicating the formal registration status of my cases indicate that none 
of the factors compared as aggregates for the six-month period are significantly affected by 
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conflict, except for the slight increase in loans given in the formal and conflict affected 
institutions, and the large increase in Portfolio at Risk experienced by the formal and conflict 
affected institutions.  
 
Finally, the original model, in Table 10, suggests that, by contrast, the age of an institution is 
the most salient determinant in the variance in performance outcomes, followed by a dummy 
for whether an institution has been registered with the central bank or not. 
 
4.7 Robustness Checks 
 
The previous figures, as explained in the beginning of this chapter, are based on the averages 
of six different months.  However, a look at a collection of figures for each of the six months 
can serve as a robustness check. Cross sectional time series data, or panel data, was collected 
across time as explained in the methodology introduced at the beginning of the chapter, for a 
number of key traceable indicators (savings, active members, loan demands and loans given, 
loan portfolio, and portfolio at risk). It has been acknowledged that panel data allows for 
individual heterogeneity and allows for the control of variables that cannot be observed or 
measured. This helps control for unobserved heterogeneity, when the heterogeneity is constant 
over time. The end model looks like this, with fixed effects for month to account for periods 
of high violence, and an interaction term for conflict and formality: 
 
(1) Performance t= α+ β1Exposure to conflictit,+ β2Aget+ β3Formalizationit + β4Montht + 
β6informal*β7conflict + β6formal*β7conflict   +  ϵt 
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The model differs from the previous OLS regressions, in exploiting monthly (t) variants, 
coupled with exposure to conflict, age, formalization, and formalization conditional on conflict 
to determine variance in performance outcomes. Here, Exposure to conflict t can be expanded 
to a categorical variable which captures the number of ACLED recorded armed conflict events 
at location (i) during month (t), βAge is the number of months the institution has been open at 
the branch at location (i), and β Formalizationt, is a dummy for whether an institution is 
registered as a bank (1) or savings and credit cooperative (0) at location (i) in month (t).   
 
Below, a regression table of the panel data results suggests, again, weak results for the salience 
of conflict as a predictor of performance outcomes, paling in comparison to age and 
formalization again. However, in the panel model, the breakdown by months reveals a 
significant, positive correlation between conflict and active membership, with a slight drop in 
loan demands- but only an average of .3 loan demands less per month, which is not a great deal 
less. It is also worth looking at the index of conflict and formalization. Here, findings indicate 
that formal institutions in location where conflict is present do experience a significant decline 
in total portfolio, so whereas they tend to have around 1,700,000 USD more in loan portfolio 
values usually, in conflict zones, this decreases by about 186,000 USD in conflict zones, on 
average. Thus, the model suggests that the formal sector suffers more than the informal sector. 
 Performance Indicators as a Function of Conflict and Other Factors by Month 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    (6) 
 Savings Active 
Members 
Loan 
Demands 
Loans 
Given 
Total Portfolio 
Size 
PAR 
 
Conflict 
51871.966  
958.990**
* 
 
-.329** 
 
8.071 
 
-43783.225 
 
-.036 
 [41420.4133] [236.454] [5.038] [5.940] [46496.303] [.521] 
 
Age 
 
20503.375*** 
 
8.835** 
 
.47 
 
-.375 
 
8833.718*** 
 
-.001 
 [881.909] [4.277] [.088] [.399] [1019.099] [.011] 
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Formalizat
ion 
1591974.199*
** 
-1406.229 -59.470 -114.445** 
 
1694042.438*** -9.632** 
 [324735.800] [5100.468
] 
[39.049] [45.968] [292717.647] [4.114] 
Conflict*F
ormalizatio
n 
20916.801 -484.160 .143 -1.154 -186154.281*** -.097 
 [179184.81] [1394.447
] 
[7.178] [7.974] [640066.481] .762 
 
Adj. R Sq .916 .189 -.024 .099 .664 .128 
 
N 53 40 42 38 52 46 
F Test 57.536 1.907 .904 1.407 11.062 1.659 
 
Notes: Coefficient for conflict controls for age and formalization. Fixed effects 
introduced for month and institution. Levels of statistical significance indicated 
by asterisks: * 90 percent, ** 95 percent, *** 99 percent 
 
TABLE 13 PERFORMANCE AS A FUNCTION OF CONFLICT BY MONTH 
 
4.9 Qualitative Evidence 
 
The main pattern that emerges from a comparison of the two cities is that business must 
continue, and even with a high spatial concentration of armed violence affecting one city (and 
indeed, in a survey of users nearly half had lost a family member to the conflict in the preceding 
year), and an intuitive understanding that the amounts of loaned funds (Portfolio at Risk) is 
steadily climbing throughout the duration of hostile months. The supporting data collected 
from both cities, and in a number of instances, from both branches of the same financial 
institution, can be broken down into three dimensions.  
 
First, the perception of conflict impacted citizens as risk averse-not willing to incur debt, invest, 
or take on financial commitments during period of heightened insecurity-finds little support in 
the models. Rather, when incorporating non-banks such as savings and credit institutions, 
conflict actually increased active membership in financial institutions, relative to conflict events, 
contrary to anecdotal reports of decreased confidence. Hence, actions spoke louder than words, 
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and compared with a counterfactual, I did not find evidence that the poor investment climate 
impeded the willingness of users to engage with credit products.  
 
Secondly, the belief that conflict would incur transaction costs due to the increased difficulties 
of operating in a conflict context found little support in the data. If anything, institutions spent 
less per borrower in a context more affected by conflict. A decline in overall loan portfolio size 
was observed (although statistically insignificant). This was assumed to be due to changes in 
profit, since this is how profits tend to be generated. At any rate, no evidence was found to 
substantiate an empirically significant transaction cost incurred by conflict, contrary to my prior 
expectations. However, physical losses were frequently noted. One international bank in Beni 
remarked, for instance, that “I mean our biggest problem is fraud, which is really hard to 
counter with a poor security situation (confidential, personal communication, September 12, 
2014)”. Examples of effects included the destruction and looting of assets belonging to the 
institution. For instance, instances of road-side robbery, fraud, and looting were frequently 
mentioned. In the informal sector, physical losses figured the most prominently in effects 
bemoaned. A registered cooperative’s manager shared an anecdote from a series of looting: 
 
We were victims of looting because of the war. We lost 250,000 USD to bandits in 
Kasindi and 126,000 from our branch in Oicha. The bandits were arrested but the 
money was not refunded. They were strangers coming over the border from Uganda. 
I’m saying it’s because of the war because the bandits collaborated with the soldiers. 
We also think they military chiefs have taken a part [of the profit] (confidential, personal 
communication, August 25th, 2014). 
 
200 
 
A moneylender echoed the perils of operating in border towns such as Kasindi, sharing that his 
personal business (not related to his moneylending activities) had suffered from the war as 
bandits had robbed some of his shops in Kasindi, and the eruption of the volcano in Goma in 
2002 had burnt another shop(confidential, personal communication, September 19, 2014). It 
was generally felt that the insecurity in border towns such as Kasindi was due in part to the 
conflict and the resulting degradation in the rule of law in the area.  Hence, scattered responses 
indicated a cost of conflict that was unpredictable: these events were a blow, that could be 
borne between multiple branches of the same institution, yet represent a risk posed by conflict 
that cannot be prepared for. In the context of Beni’s conflict, this meant a transaction cost of 
conflict which is unquantifiable- much like the cost of conflict to citizens, there is no average, 
no index that can be constructed, and no weighted averages that can aid the modelling. 
Therefore, it is a random effect, much like the conflict itself, and requires a comparative analysis 
across several companies. 
 
Third of all, and perhaps most surprisingly, there was a lack of evidence to suggest decreased 
overall efficiency due to conflict, except for the rise in Portfolio at Risk, which could be a purely 
temporal effect. It is possible that the survey design was not able to account for spill over effects 
and that Butembo experienced some of the same determinants of efficiency as Beni, yet the 
battery of robustness checks run suggest that Beni respondents were exposed to a much higher 
degree of conflict, creating the basic conditions needed for a natural experiment. Anecdotes, 
for instance such as the below certainly contributed to an impression that PAR would become 
a runaway train due to problems linked to the conflict:  
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There were a lot of days where we didn't work. For example, if today if someone should 
pay back their loan and they’re closed, they won’t pay it back then, so their 
nonrepayment starts adding to the portfolio at risk. We had a lot of credit that we gave 
to groups, like solidarity groups, who are more or less in the zone, I mean the zone 
which is affected. So it’s been a little difficult to give them the loan and also to recover 
the loan. And most of all, groups have the farm and then after the harvest then they 
can repay the loan. So, if they have no customers because of the war, they can’t sell, 
they don’t have money, and they can’t come and repay the loan. We have agents who 
do representation at Oicha, Bulongo, and Magina, and those zones were so militarized 
there and they couldn’t go to supervise those agents. Even to do those money transfers 
to agents was difficult.  So a lot of things like our indicators of performance started 
dropping (confidential, personal communication, April 2nd, 2015). 
 
Meanwhile, a manager of a registered cooperative also argued that there had been changing 
perceptions of microfinance, and that it was a struggle for individuals and institutions to manage 
the poor economic conditions: 
 
With the movement of soldiers, some people decided to go abroad as refugees with 
their capital and invest elsewhere where their security was insured. As our country was 
freshly from the war, and after the presidential elections in 2006, there was an 
expression. It is "lutte contre la pauvrete" This expression came out of several 
Congolese mouths who believed that the government would distribute money to the 
poor through cooperatives and microfinance societies. This has pushed several 
inhabitants to adhere and subscribe by their credit within the institutions without 
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thinking on their mode of refund. We have realized that instead of sucking out poverty, 
the cooperatives and microfinance institutions allowed the poverty to take place. As 
many people were not educated about cooperatives, we have known cases, endless 
cases, of an increase in portfolio at risk linked to the non-repayment of loans. For the 
members begged for credit for investment, but war couldn’t allow them to attend their 
objectives (confidential, personal communication, August 20th, 2014). 
 
However, although conflict sometimes correlates with loan nonrepayment, there was 
substantial variation over institution type in the distribution of portfolio at risk between the 
two geographically distinct locations. In fact, it turned out that most portfolio at risk was in the 
informal sector in Butembo, while most portfolio at risk was in the formal sector in Beni, and 
the introduction of age and formalization as controls largely washed out the effect of conflict.   
 
4.12 Time Lags 
 
It is worth noting that several respondents felt that affects were still yet to be felt. This could 
have been due to the short time period within which the surveying was conducted, which could 
not have accounted for any possible time lag in affects. I interviewed one accountant, for 
instance, who had the best grasp of the financial situation of the cooperative, who shared that: 
 
The impact of the violence cannot be felt at [the period when it happens], it is felt a bit 
later. Our nonrepayment rate is going to get even worse next month, I think, because 
we're contacting members and their giving us red indicators. Of course it’s due to those 
who used to use remote places, like Nobili, Eringeti, Mai-Moya as their markets. We 
have farmers whose farms of cacao and manioc who cannot access anymore their fields, 
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and this is causing them repayment difficulties. These are peripheral villages who have 
borrowed and cannot go to their farms anymore. They have one member who had his 
farm which used to produce 1 ton of cacao each harvest, but the last production was 
wasted and three of his workers were killed. Till now, they’re not able to ask him to pay 
1,500 that he borrowed back, because they know the situation he's in. (confidential, 
personal communication, April 17th, 2015) 
 
Quantitatively, another cooperative’s reflection on active participation reflects a time lag as well: 
 
We finished the year 2014 with 3,104 active accounts. Out of 6,535 total accounts, or 
members, at the end of December. So 47% were active. Now, we're in March. Were 
talking 6,610 accounts. And now, the active accounts are 1,525 accounts, or 23%. I 
think that's because cultivators couldn’t value the impact at the time of the massacres, 
but now we feel their impact. Most of those members have activities in the forests and 
fields and they came here as refugees. So those who have loans here are not able to pay 
loans, and those who used to save don’t have any revenue from their fields. 
(confidential, personal communication, March 13th, 2015) 
 
The structure and methodology of this research did not allow for a concentrated look at the 
possibility of a time lag for effects. However, the observations noted above indicate a promising 
direction for the continuation of this research.  
 
4.12 Conclusions 
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This chapter analysed the dataset constructed in Part 1 of the methodology with three layers of 
analytics. Beginning with a linear, multivariate regression using a composite dependent variable, 
the data is then broken down into a comparison of means for each of the factors chosen used 
in the composite variable. Not satisfied with the robustness of the results, which posit that 
conflict weakly increases the demand for credit in formal, conflict affected institutions, and 
increases the Portfolio at Risk only in formal, conflict affected institutions, a panel data model 
was included with fixed effects with the 6 factors where there was time series data collected. 
This panel data model indicates, in turn, a positive and significant correlation between conflict 
and active membership, a negative and significant correlation between conflict, formal 
institutions, and loan portfolio size, and only a slight decrease (.3 loans less applied for per 
month) in demand. 
 
Taken all together, the bricolage of data implies the substantiation of a theory of shifting user 
preferences, rather than shifting institutional practices, which fits within the greater research 
questions posed by this research. First of all, it seems that in Beni, although aggregate snapshot 
operations, members, savings and even lending rates may be comparable with Butembo 
institutions, these operations increase during periods of intense conflict (when broken into time 
series), and into the informal (when broken into more institutional types). That is to say, rather 
than citizens relying their existing resources, periods of stress call for increased reliance on 
financial services, even if this includes withdrawals from savings accounts.  
 
Secondly, conflict as an independent variable has little explanatory power on most performance 
indicators as captured by the specific natural experiment, except in terms of Portfolio at Risk. 
It would appear that, in fact, that Portfolio at Risk is actually lower among informal institutions 
205 
 
in Beni, the net effect of conflict is 26 points higher in formal institutions, resulting in a net rise 
in Portfolio at Risk by about 10%.  
 
The following sections will further examine the variance here between the informal and formal 
sector, as this may explain the deviance from practitioner comments. What this chapter has 
provided is a statistical foundation for the reformation of earlier hypothesis, and a demonstrable 
explanation for the variance in a number of key factors related to performance efficiency across 
both the informal and formal financial sector. In the following chapter, the data is extended 
further into the informal sector- and into the grassroots, or community, to grapple with the 
more profound question of impact during periods of conflict.  
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Chapter 5 
The Impact of Microfinance in the presence of Conflict: 
Evidence from Two Cases 
 
51. Introduction 
 
The thesis has so far used regression modelling and panel data to address research subquestion 
one: How does the presence of conflict affect the efficiency of formal and informal financial 
service providers? The significant finding from the data reveals an increase in the Portfolio at 
Risk within the formal sector institutions, and a drop in total loan portfolio, again only in the 
formal sector, with limited other affects when conflict is present. In the following chapter, the 
data is applied to the second subquestion posed in the introduction: How does the presence of 
conflict affect the impact of formal and informal financial service providers?  
 
As pointed out in chapter one, positive impact cannot be taken as an assumption even in a 
stable context. Indeed, as Banerjee, Duflo et al state about an evaluation of a microfinance 
program in Hyderabad, India: 
 
While microcredit “succeeds” in leading some of them to expand their businesses (or 
start a female owned business), it does not appear to fuel an escape from poverty…One 
reason may be that the average business run by this target group is tiny…is not 
particularly profitable, and is difficult to expand…Nevertheless, microcredit does affect 
the structure of household consumption. We see households invest in home durable 
goods and restrict their consumption of temptation goods and expenditures on festivals 
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and parties…It expands households’ abilities to make different intertemporal choices, 
including business investments (Banerjee et al, 2015: 51-52).  
 
Given the observations  quoted above, in addition to other similar studies that found no “clear 
evidence, or even much in the way of suggestive evidence, of reductions in poverty or 
substantial improvements in living standards” (Banerjee et al, 2015: 13), assuming 
transformative results from microfinance engagement in either context (conflict affected or 
not) would be premature. However, it is the variance in impact between the samples taken in 
Beni and Butembo that, even if not transformative, could indicate divergence attributable to 
the specific conditions caused by conflict, and allow for an answer to the second subquestion. 
The subquestion is particularly important in understanding the consequences of conflict. If the 
impact of microcredit is compromised further than it already is in conditions where conflict is 
present, then the problems from conflict may well be carrying over into the financial markets 
in ways that affect users more than providers. It is in this sense that the sample of institutions 
that display problematic performance can be seen as endogenous to state failure.  
 
Attributing socio-economic outcomes to microfinance through the use of a control group is 
complicated by several factors. As highlighted in Chapter One of this thesis, programmatic 
decisions by microfinance agencies to favour profitable-looking prospective clients, in addition 
to the endogeneity of programme placement in more favourable locations, have led researchers 
to point to significant perils in assuming the impact of microfinance on clients as conclusively 
causal, due to a supply side selection bias on the part of the institution (Banerjee et al, 2015: 8). 
Additionally, comparing clients who have chosen to participate in microfinance services to 
those who have chosen not to participate in a microfinance service may fail completely to 
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capture the vast inherent differences in these groups, presenting a demand side selection bias 
on the part of the users (Brau and Woller, 2004; Armendariz and Murdoch, 2005, Banerjee et 
al, 2015: 8). In this context, Randomized Controlled Trials through two methods - individual 
level randomization, or randomized program placement - can capture program treatment 
through the random assignment of treatment, ensuring that supply side and demand side biases 
are consistent across the comparative samples. Even if able to establish a valid control group, 
however, estimating the impact of microfinance usage can pose methodological and theoretical 
challenges. The short time frame of most RCTs (14 months, for instance) may not be able to 
capture significant impacts on profits given the limited time period. Low take-up rates of loans 
by samples that are expected to take the loans up at higher rates pose statistical power 
challenges. And attrition, or lack of interest in participating in the follow up survey, can pose 
problems with randomization strategies.  A series of impact evaluations, nonetheless, in urban 
slums in Hyderabad, India (Banerjee et al, 2014), Mexico (Angelucci, Karlan and Zinman, 2014), 
Mongolia (Attanasio et al, 2011), and Morocco (Crepon et al, 2011) have experimented with 
program placement randomization. Other impact evaluations have used individual level 
randomization to estimate the impact of increased services (Karlan and Zinman, 2010; Karlan 
and Zinman, 2011, Augburg et al, 2012.). As Banerjee (2015, 9) points out, however, the main 
downside of randomized program placement is typically the loss of statistical power, since 
access to microfinance programming does not correlate perfectly to take up rates, which may 
be less than 30% of the ‘treated’ population.42  
 
                                                          
42 In Banerjee at al’s study of a microfinance program in Hyderabad, India, for instance, only 33% of 
households selected for their propensity to take up microcredit actually availed themselves of the service 
after a three year study period. This is comparable with take-up rates in similar studies in Ethiopia (31%), 
Mexico (19%), and Morocco (17%) (Banerjee et al, p7) 
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Another option- and the one chosen to implement here for ethics-related concerns43- is to 
identify a workable control group involves comparing incoming clients with longer-serving 
clients, incoming clients are considered as a control group. This cross-sectional method 
therefore identifies two groups who have chosen to engage with microfinance services, thus 
reducing the problem of endogeneity in the measurement error of entrepreneurial spirit, since 
users would probably have similar entrepreneurial abilities in this type of study. As Karlan 
(2001, 2) remarks from his observations: “Such studies have risen recently in 
popularity…USAID, through its AIMS project, encourages this methodology with its 
SEEP/AIMS practitioner-oriented tools”.  Additionally, it can expand the timeframe of the 
study beyond the short timeframe of an RCT since it can study ongoing users, and is not 
dependent on takeup rates for statistical power.  
 
Thus, to address the second subquestion of whether and how conflict affects the impact of 
microfinance services, the results of a cross-sectional cluster design evaluation are presented 
which compares the impact of microfinance services for members of a Beni-based institution 
and members of a Butembo-based institution, controlling for conflict and the length of 
membership. As such, incoming clients are compared with clients who have participated for a 
longer period of time to evaluate significant variance in household consumption, profits and 
working hours. The research fully incorporates the work of Dean Karlan, who pointed out that:  
 
                                                          
43 Concerns raised by the University of York’s ethics committee included the selection of respondents and 
the associated risks related to participating in a survey related to sensitive, personal, financial information. 
As such, it was approved that respondents could be suggested by managers before consent processes even 
took place, ensuring the trust of participants in the researcher’s legitimacy. This also limited the personal 
risks posed by the research to the participants since they were not seen to be targeted for interviews, all 
interviews took place behind closed doors, and respondents didn’t have their daily travel patterns 
interrupted. 
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Although the current tools [The SEEP Network] offer do not address the problem [of 
dropouts], a change to the sampling technique can solve both problems.  Conceptually, 
the two samples are not the same: the veteran group only consists of those who remain, 
whereas the new member group consists of members who will dropout.  One can alter 
the veteran group to include those who dropout, or can alter the new member group 
to include only those expected to remain44 
 
Quartile treatment effects were estimated to cluster the respondents by length of time in the 
cooperative, and conflict is introduced as a co-variate to investigate its significance.  From the 
literature available, the standard families of outcomes usually studied for variance can easily be 
identified- entrepreneurial activity, income, consumption levels, consumption composition, and 
social indicators- and the few which have been documented as statistically significantly 
impacted by microfinance engagement, namely, entrepreneurial activity and consumption 
                                                          
44 Although recommended by the SEEP/AIMS project, there are potential pitfalls of such an approach, as 
pointed out by Dean Karlan (2001). These include two major, untested assumptions which include firstly (1) 
the erroneous assumption that dropouts would have the same income and consumption profiles of those 
who remain in the programme (incomplete sample bias), and secondly, that (2) dropouts would not have 
been made worse off by participating in the programme (attrition bias). To accommodate Karlan’s concerns, 
the research introduced a few solutions through sampling techniques. To accommodate the drop-out bias in 
the sample, veteran member data was compared to dropout members’ data to find predictors of dropout. 
Karlan recommends using econometric tools to weigh the new entrant sample according to their 
probabilities of remaining. However, to simplify the recommendations posed by Karlan, highly probably 
dropouts were excluded in order to create a more balanced sample (thus some outlier new clients were 
removed who demonstrated exceedingly high expenditures compared to veterans’ survey data).  
 
In addition, it was decided not to randomize, since the point of randomization is to ensure 
representativeness, and since the decision rule was determined by the clients who felt they could safely 
participate in the survey, randomization would have only been as representative as the original sample was. 
Instead, at the end of the survey period, a series of summary statistics were compared with the overall 
membership statistics, which ensured that the samples collected were indeed representative of each 
institution’s membership. In this sense, what is more important is that the original groups are comparable, 
save for the treatment being examined, and also reflected the reality of the population of financial service 
users in the area.  
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composition.  In short, then, the testable assumptions for this chapter include that conflict 
would have either a positive or negative bearing on these outcomes, or somehow otherwise 
alter the household economic portfolios of microfinance users.  
 
To highlight further possibilities, the research has established that risk averse borrowers - all 
too often, the poorest of the poor - will be less likely to borrow or engage in microfinance 
services, and thus less likely to see the positive benefits of microfinance services. As such, it is 
expected that risk aversion might be a product of conflict, and that, in the more conflict-
affected location, this will have an impact on engagement with microfinance services, leading 
to variance in impact outcomes. Indeed, this is what the literature suggests as well, if one is to 
refer to practitioner comments who remark on changing (decreased) demand for credit as well 
as immediately following a period of conflict.  Local stories should tell accounts of prioritization 
and decision making affected by stress and conflict, and risk aversion should corroborate 
prioritization away from high risk, high return activities, resulting in a negative affect to the 
impact, if any, of microfinance services.  
 
Measuring Impact 
Impact as a metric presents a range of empirical challenges. Notably, since impact is such an 
integral part of the mission of many savings and credit cooperatives, institutions have developed 
various definitions for internal use, which are often inconsistent for conducting cross-category 
comparisons. If one is to look to the SEEP project for a suitable user-level meaning of impact, 
it suggests that impact can be understood as the changes that occur in clients’ lives, their 
enterprises, their families/households, and their communities, combined with the extent to 
which the identified changes are related to clients’ participation in the microfinance programme 
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(Nelson et Al, 2001; 3). This interpretation of the term is also suitable for cross-categorical 
comparison, and as such is used without modification.  
 
In this study, the outcome data comes from 208 detailed surveys of participating households 
during the period 2013-2015, which will be referred to as samples from Beni and Butembo. 
Each sample was gathered by interviewing approximately 100 households from each city, 
creating a similar sample size at one point in time for each city. Sampling was conducted in each 
location over a two-month period to minimize variance in accounts during the sampling period, 
thus the data is not separated into baseline and endline figures. Instead, incoming clients, 
including some whoregistered for an account but had not yet participated in services, as well as 
recent members, are considered a control group. This takes into account that incoming persons 
to the programme would be similar to existing clients in terms of key characteristics, namely, 
the ability to participate in a financial cooperative.  
 
Institutional dynamics 
Karlan (2001) discusses how microfinance programmes have specific strategies for entering 
specific communities at certain points, a bias he personally witnessed in the field and would 
significantly alter the new member pool from a veteran pool. As such, when choosing the 
institutions from these samples came, their advertising strategies were checked and materials 
for significantly different approaches or methods. The two institutions chosen had extremely 
comparable approaches, not to mention resources (savings reserves, number of staff, age in 
months) and performance indicators. Both institutions, although targeting women, had a 
majority of male members (and survey respondents). In addition, both required either a salary 
guarantee from an employer or a mortgage deed as collateral, and use a similar interest rate (3% 
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monthly digressive, and 3-4% monthly digressive). The survey is thus characterized by similar 
institutions with the most notable difference being their location of operation.  
 
5.2 Study Design and Baseline Summary Statistics 
 
The data used in this chapter was collected as two independent cross-sectional samples from 
two different cities in 2013 and 2015. The main focus of the survey developed for this purpose 
was to capture household expenditures information as well as some limited insight into 
profitability and working hours. Although the survey was designed in order to answer these 
research questions, many of the questions were based on baseline surveying used in 
microfinance impact evaluations and shared with managers following the surveying.  
 
Institution A, or the Butembo Case, consists of two country-level offices in Butembo (North 
Kivu) and Kinshasa (South Central), Democratic Republic of Congo. Between its two main 
membership categories, it had 1684 current members, a reported 80 of which were inactive45. 
At the time of surveying, Institution A had a loan portfolio of 91,000 USD in loans. The 
portfolio is a mixed portfolio of deposits and credit products, ranging from small to medium, 
based on the trust established between the member and the cooperative. The institution also 
gives group loans, although it did not make any the year before surveying due to some 
repayment problems with an NGO that was supposed to guarantee a group lending 
programme. Although registered as a microfinance society at the provincial level in North Kivu, 
at the national level it is regarded as a registered savings and credit cooperative, or an association 
of at least 12 shareholders possessing a minimum of 20,000 USD between them in capital, who 
                                                          
45 Figure estimated on 14 January, 2013  
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have agreed, through a set of bylaws, to run a rotating credit association independent from the 
central bank. It currently employs nine staff, and pays an average salary of 100/staff per month. 
Institution A began as a project of an NGO, and was officially incorporated as a cooperative 
in 2011.   
 
Institute B, or the Beni case, has two country level offices, in Beni as well as Butembo. Its Beni 
office had a loan portfolio of $87,956.00 in current loans at the time of surveying, and 2,789 
accounts, an estimated 762 of which were no longer in use. At the time of surveying, they had 
a total staff of 10, who were paid an average of $90.00 a month in wages each. Just like 
Institution A, Institution B also offers group loans or individual loans, and to apply for either, 
the individual must submit a written letter to the manager and a guarantee. Institution B is also 
registered as a savings and credit cooperative.  
 
We can see from a quick visual view of Table 12 that the baseline summary statistics of both 
programmes users are similar. Both institutions are development oriented, with origins in the 
local community (all staff appear to be local Nande Congolese as well). In fact, it was these 
similarities in institutional dynamics that identified the two institutions as comparable cases and 
led to their inclusion in the research. In the rest of this chapter as well as for much of the next 
chapter, the focus is on how to use the data collected to formulate an estimation strategy and 
describe the results.  
 
Location Type Age 
(Months) 
Borrowers 
(per Month) 
Members Savings Loan 
Portfoli
o 
PAR Average 
Loan 
Size 
 
Butemb
o 
Microfinance Society or 
Bank 
24   729712 2229712    
Savings and Credit 
Cooperative 
103 50 1844 188494.6 211682 9.3 800  
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Savings and Credit 
Cooperative 
396 80 6610 7097382 3344144 6.8 4000  
Savings and Credit 
Cooperative 
102 56 5664 278016 206520 13.9 4130  
Savings and Credit 
Cooperative 
51 15 1851 104688 91000 37 300 A 
Bwakisa Carte,  
Likelimba, or unregistered 
cooperative 
144 4 130 3106 2995 22 272  
Moneylender 84 5 35 0 10000 55 400  
Bwakisa Carte,  
Likelimba, or unregistered 
cooperative 
66 5 1080 45000 150000 38   
Beni 
 
Microfinance Society or 
Bank 
72 27 1161 407500 280000 8.8 400  
Savings and Credit 
Cooperative 
66 10 1000  275000 10 1500  
Microfinance Society or 
Bank 
18 10     5000  
Microfinance Society or 
Bank 
43 5 2250  50000 40   
Microfinance Society or 
Bank 
168 7 800    35000  
Savings and Credit 
Cooperative 
103 189 9705 1320754 915953 14.9 800  
Savings and Credit 
Cooperative 
120 24 6572 906471 356330 17.76 2106  
Savings and Credit 
Cooperative 
91.2 40 1867 139497 77890 18 1597  
Savings and Credit 
Cooperative 
30 100 2993 319583 83465 41 2615 B 
Bwakisa Carte,  
Likelimba, or unregistered 
cooperative 
72 3 75 1800 225 31 17.5  
Bwakisa Carte,  
Likelimba, or unregistered 
cooperative 
118 1 73 195 45 44 15  
Moneylender 12 48  0 2500 12 100  
Moneylender 12 22 127 0 65000 2.69 800  
TABLE 14 INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS: SUMMARY FIGURES AND AVERAGES 
 
5.3 Baseline Summary Statistics 
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The survey was overall successful at producing balance in a broad range of statistics across the 
two sample groups. Since the most interest is in the impact of microfinance as socio-economic 
change, as proxied through increased revenue and household expenditures, the summary 
statistics (previously reported in Chapter 4) capture characteristics believed to be key indicators 
that the sample groups are comparably similar. The focus was on variables that do not change 
or are unlikely to change due to treatment, such as household size.  
 
5.4 Estimation Methodology and Results 
 
With a lack of baseline and end line data to compare at the individual level, a model was 
estimated using OLS regression. A ranked ordinal variable was used that reflected the length of 
time the respondent had been a member (based on their member id number). This, however, 
only showed the length of membership relative to someone else, instead of in incremental units. 
Therefore, the Rank of Account was divided into four quartiles, representing the newest clients, 
fairly new clients, fairly old clients, and old clients. For a given outcome y, the model being 
estimated is thus modified from Angelucci, Karlan and Zinman(2015): 
(1) logY = α +β1MF +β2Savings + β3Revenue + β4 Location  + β5 V+  ϵ  
 
This becomes a log-linear model due to the log-normal distribution of outcomes. Y refers to 
the outcome, or index of outcomes, of individuals.  Y is coded so that higher values are more 
desirable, in the manner of Angelucci et al (2015). In the Appendices, the specific wording of 
all questions used to measure each outcome is detailed.  
 
MF represents length of participation in the cooperative, expressed as a cluster based on relative 
membership start dates. Savings is a raw value for the amount of savings the respondent 
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reported prior to joining the cooperative, while Revenue represents the reported profits from 
the respondent’s primary income-generating activity. Location is a binary variable that is 1 if 
the respondent lives in the conflict affected clusters, and 0 if they are based in Butembo. V is 
an additional treatment measure. It is an interval variable that reflects the actual number of 
conflict-related events the respondent reported experiencing in the last year (i.e. the loss of a 
family member due to violence), or the ranked level of victimization personally experienced at 
the individual level.  
 
The regression was also run with the two locations as separate models, but the lack of 
explanatory power limits the utility of this model (results in Annex 1), which led in turn to the 
following combined model, with conflict as a covariate. The number of loans could also have 
been taken as a co-variate to measure impact, however since I am following the AIMs/SEEP 
methodology is being followed using incoming clients as a control group compared to older 
clients, the impact of lending behaviour is discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
5.5 Regression Framework 
 
A range of proxy categories was used to capture indicators of household economic well-being, 
including monthly expenditures on food, fuel, and recreation, and annual purchases of 
furniture, household repairs, household appliances, vehicles and vacations. The proxies for 
indicators of economic empowerment are based on a baseline survey developed in a 
participatory and consultative manner with local staff of the cooperative, and combining several 
aspects of other microfinance baseline impact assessment surveys.  
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Next, all responses were formatted into comparable amounts and used the manually 
standardized values to create an index for nondurable goods, durable goods, and temptation 
goods. The natural log of the individual variables was used, in order to affect a normal 
distribution on some of the more skewed variables, which also translates the findings into more 
readable results. In this logic, non-durable goods include the natural log of manually 
standardized values for weekly food expenditures, combined with the natural log of 
standardized values of expenditures on fuel. Durable goods include the natural log of manually 
standardized values of household wares, the natural log of manually standardized furniture 
purchases, and the natural log of manually standardized vehicle purchases. Temptation goods, 
meanwhile, included the natural log of manually standardized recreational purchases, such as 
alcohol and food consumed outside the home, the natural log of manually standardized new 
clothing purchases, and the natural log of manually standardized non-essential travel.  
 
I also decided to regress spending on gifts and charity, as well as contributions to extended 
family and social events as a measure of consumption, in the manner of Angelucci et al 
(2015:171) who look at spending on family events. In contexts affected by conflict, I reasoned, 
I would see significant, positive coefficients reflecting a propensity to contribute more to 
extended family needs, as well as the same for members who have participated longer in 
microfinance services. Finally, given its right-skewed distribution and a desire for comparability, 
I took its natural log as well.   
   
These composite variables were regressed individually as divergent outcomes on the rank of an 
individual’s account number, expressed as a quartile depending on the location of the 
respondent. As additional covariates for the right-hand side of my model, a measure is included 
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of the amount of savings held prior to opening an account with the cooperative (in order to 
control for the financial standing of members at the start of their membership) in addition to 
the respondent’s profit from their main business (as a way to control for variances in income).  
 
In running my regressions, the sample size varied across different analyses sets due to some 
item nonresponse (i.e. the amount of savings held before joining the cooperative, since 
respondents generally did not care highly to share details about their savings). When 
constructing indexes of multiple variables, where one variable had a high rate of item 
nonresponse, missing values were replaced with the series mean, as this was less of an 
assumption than attributing zero to nonresponses and necessary to compute an index. 
However, a dummy variable was created to indicate where this value was a series mean, and 
included as a co-variate to control for the addition of the series mean. In addition, where 
responses were zero, in order to take the natural log of skewed variables it was necessary to 
substitute a 1, if only in order to have other than a null result (substituting 1 resulted in a natural 
log of .00). 
5.6 Main Results  
 
Impact on Consumption and Savings 
Table 1 displays the results of these outcomes (variance in spending on nondurable, durable, 
and temptation goods, as well as unforeseen urgent events) regressed on respondent’s length 
of participation, with a range of controls. Ex ante, the prior was that controlling for conflict 
would increase the relative significance of microfinance on consumption expenditures, and 
demonstrate the consumption-smoothing possibilities of microfinance. However, comparing 
the stepped log-linear models for significant change between them did not show that conflict 
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(or conflict events) significantly changes the beta coefficients or the R2 of the original model 
(results not shown). 
 Consumption Effects 
 
Nondurable 
Goods 
(1) 
Durable 
Goods 
(2) 
Temptation  
Goods 
(3) 
Gifts and  
Events 
(3)  
Treatment 
(financial service 
participation) 
-.046 -29.415 .687 -2.024 
[.101] [29.191] [.258]** [5.925] 
Prior Savings .017 26.020 .375 7.900 
[.046] [13.565]* [.118]*** [2.688] 
Revenue .026 29.784 -.165 -19.294 
[.114] [32.782] [.287] [6.591] 
Conflict location -.133 -117.242 .974 25.564 
[.272] [77.269] [.697] [15.838]* 
Conflict events .428 3.058 -.104 15.942 
[.195]** [58.038] [.515] [11.363] 
R2 .049 .056 .256 .165 
N 143 161 161 136 
F test 1.163 1.282 7.456 4.206 
Notes: Levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * 90 
percent, ** 95 percent, *** 99 percent 
 
TABLE 16 CONSUMPTION OUTCOMES AS A FUNCTION OF COOPERATIVE PARTICIPATION 
 
In column 1, the effect of treatment on nondurable consumption is small, slightly negative, and 
not significant. This effect becomes even smaller when controlling for being located in a 
conflict affected zone. However, it rises to being positive and significant at the 95 percent 
confidence interval if the individual has directly experienced conflict events in the last year.  
 
Conversely, in column 2, at indicators of spending on durable goods is seen. Here, a small, 
positive and significant at the 99 percent confidence interval relationship between prior savings 
and purchases of durable goods can be seen. However, no significant correlation is found 
between length of treatment and durable goods purchases, and the co-variates of revenue and 
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direct experience of conflict show no evidence of impact either.  However, a large negative 
impact of being in Beni is found on purchases of durable goods, although it cannot be said to 
be statistically significant.  
 
Next, looking at temptation goods, in column 3, significant, positive coefficients are found for 
the length of membership as a predictor of purchases of temptation goods, in addition to a 
significant and positive coefficient for savings before joining as a predictor of purchases of 
temptation goods. Here, conflict and exposure to conflict events were not found to be 
significant covariates in the model.     
 
Finally, in column 4, a highly significant, and large beta coefficient is found for being located in 
a conflict-affected context as a predictor of spending on unforeseen expenses. In other words, 
with a 1 unit increase in the conflict, an individual is likely to spend up to 25 times as much on 
unforeseen expenses and in lost opportunity costs. This is not surprising, although it is noted 
that directly experiencing conflict is associated with a lesser, but still large and positive 
coefficient.  
 
 
Social Impacts 
Next, some other variables were considered that could have had an impact on the correlation 
between variables. First, it could be argued that women engage with microfinance services 
differently than men, having either more or less purchasing power than men based on their 
relative status within the household.  So, a dummy variable for gender was created, where 
women were 1 and men were 0, and added it to the estimation as a co-variate. However, this 
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did not enter as a significant covariate in any of the consumption index models (results not 
shown).   
 
Impacts on Labour Supply 
Since a number of other studies check whether leisure time has increased as a result of 
participating in microfinance services, I then also regressed Working Hours (only collected in 
the Beni survey) on the length of membership, with the same covariates. Although I collected 
a measure of how many in the household were workings, I did not collect information on the 
gender breakdown or the age of others working in the household, so I cannot estimate a 
measure of changes in youth labour supply or female engagement in the workforce. Working 
hours, termed here as Labour Supply for comparison purposes with other papers, consisted of 
asking participants about their two primary sources of income, how much they devote to it on 
a daily basis, and which days of the week they may not work. When looking at the responses 
from respondents, none of the responses are significant at standard levels.  
 
Labour Supply Effects 
 
Hours work/week: Adults 
(1) 
Treatment .013 
[.326] 
Prior Savings -.026 
[.130] 
Revenue -1.194 
[.753] 
Conflict events -.417 
[.445] 
R2 .063 
N 63 
F test .768 
Notes: Levels of statistical significance are indicated by 
asterisks: * 90 percent, ** 95 percent, *** 99 percent 
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TABLE 17 CONSUMPTION OUTCOMES AS A FUNCTION OF COOPERATIVE PARTICIPATION 
 
Overall, this is consistent with other studies, (Tarozzi et al, 2015;75; Crepon et al, 2015:137, 
and Agelucci et al, 2015:169), which find insignificant reductions in the total amount of hours 
worked by household members for various age ranges vis-à-vis microfinance participation.  
Augsburg et al (2015:197) find a significant increase for hours worked by teenagers aged 16-19 
in their study, but even with adding a covariate for the age of the respondent as a robustness 
check, this did not allow me to reject a null hypothesis.   
 
Impact on Self Employment and Income 
Next, the analysis of impact of membership in a cooperative on households’ economic activities 
for divergent outcomes in revenue. Given the structural inequalities in Nande Society, my prior 
assumption was that certain respondents would have access to higher paying jobs due to family 
connections over the judicious use of financial services, and microfinance service participation 
would not show transformative results. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that the initial savings 
amount used to start the account, as well as the gender of the respondent, might be able to 
control for some of the structural inequalities present in the society. As well, since there is 
interest to see any variance between the conflict affected and non-conflict affected group in 
terms of revenue outcomes, and as both groups were majority Nande respondents, it is worth 
running a regression model. As such, primary business was regressed for profit, in addition to 
secondary business (if any) profit, on the Rank of Account, with added covariates for gender 
(in Beni), initial savings, conflict by location, and conflict by exposure. A final model was also 
run that included a dummy variable for whether the respondent effectively ran their own 
business or not, as a measure of self-employment activities, since Crepon et al (2015:137) find 
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an increase in self-employment by microfinance users is substantial, although the net effect in 
income is offset by a decrease in wage earnings.  
 Revenue Effects 
 
LogPrimary 
Income 
(1) 
Secondary 
Income 
(2) 
LogCombined 
Income 
(3) 
Self 
Employment 
(1)  
Treatment .106 -.168 -.360 -.022 
[.095] [.216] [.792] [.035] 
Prior Savings .069 .176 .268 .029 
[.043] [.089]* [.130]* [.016]* 
Conflict 
location 
.206 .123 -.360 .002 
[.257] [.507] [.792] [.087] 
Conflict 
events 
.172 .482 .807 -.045 
[.181] .286* [.416]* [.069] 
R2 .060 .138 .18 .024 
N 159 63 63 110 
F test 1.912 2.330 2.526 .957 
Notes: Levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * 90 
percent, ** 95 percent, *** 99 percent 
 
TABLE 18 REVENUE OUTCOMES AS A FUNCTION OF COOPERATIVE PARTICIPATION 
 
In columns 2 and 3, having directly experienced a conflict event was positively and significantly 
correlated with an increase in income from both primary and secondary sources, which may 
say more about the viability of the respondent as a target for bandits (reverse causality) than 
allowing us to draw meaningful conclusions about conflict leading to higher income. In an 
index of combined income, both experiencing conflict personally as well as being located in the 
conflict area were significantly and positively associated with higher incomes. However, the 
length of membership in the cooperation, in addition to prior savings, did not show a 
statistically significant correlation with earnings. And finally, none of the covariates was seen to 
bear on the dummy for being a business owner or self-employed.  Alternative explanations for 
the lack of statistical power in the findings of length of membership as a predictor in income 
could be attributed to the fact the lending and borrowing was not captured in the model. 
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However, even adding the number of loans taken in the last year, the null results on the income 
categories for length of membership and savings are noisy, and the confidence interval of our 
few significant findings are made insignificant. 
Revenue Effects with Borrowing 
 
Log Combined Income 
(1) 
Treatment  -.160 
[.364] 
Prior Savings .286 
[.125]** 
Number of loans .011 
 .469 
Conflict location .015 
[.807] 
Conflict events .593 
[.545] 
R2 .159 
N 57 
F test 1.518 
Notes: Levels of statistical significance are indicated 
by asterisks: * 90 percent, ** 95 percent, *** 99 
percent 
 
TABLE 19 REVENUE OUTCOMES AS A FUNCTION OF COOPERATIVE PARTICIPATION\ 
5.7 Discussion 
 
The results suggest modest effects on borrowers, sometimes made more significant with being 
located in a conflict affected zone and/or personally affected by conflict, with some tentative 
implications for further investigating.  
 
First of all, conflict exposure is both significantly correlated with an increase in spending on 
nondurable goods, and a decrease-although not statistically significant- on spending in durable 
goods. This is, while intuitively agreeable, probably the most interesting result from the models. 
If it implies that households are unable or unwilling to make lumpy investments in more fluid 
226 
 
political situations, then it may bear significant impact for the kinds of commercial investments 
made as well during conflict. For instance, if the behaviour is extended to the commercial 
activities of an individual, it may contribute to a preference to spend loan funds on inventory, 
as opposed to infrastructural investments for commercial purposes.  
 
Not being willing or able to invest in fixed assets during conflict has been studied elsewhere. 
At a personal, household level, however, these fluctuations reflected in consumption variance 
are likely to result in what Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) call “scarcity traps” in behavioural 
economics. As repeated purchases of fuel (one of the non-durable goods in the index), in 
preference to investing in a solar powered lantern (one of the durable goods included in the 
index), for instance, will add up, a respondent is eventually forced to spend more than what 
they would have if they had been able to purchase a lantern in the first place. At a commercial 
level, this will translate to less fixed investments, likely exacerbated by discounting the future 
during conflict. And at a national level, I can conjecture, the aggregate effects of these 
substitutions may have long-lasting consequences.     
 
Secondly, conflict, specifically being located in a conflict-affected context, was also found to be 
significant in explaining variance in gifts, contributions to extended family, and expenditures 
on family events. With a large, positive coefficient, I can infer that microfinance participants in 
conflict zones spend more of their disposable funds on their social networks than in stable 
contexts, another intuitively agreeable finding that, through its confirmation, lends support to 
the hypothesis that reliance on informal sources of finance increases during conflict.  
  
Third, variance in consumption of temptation goods, worded in our survey as spending on 
recreational travel among other things, actually significantly increased vis-à-vis longer 
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participation in microfinance services, whereas the opposite has been observed in the literature 
(i.e. See Augsburg et al, 2015:203). I take this as an implication that the choice of treatment 
(participation in microfinance services, not entering into a loan contract as in other studies) and 
the length of the time captured (2 years) smoothed out any short term belt-tightening which 
has been observed in other studies. For instance, Angelucci et all (2015:171) only find a 
significant reduction in temptation goods consumption for the past 1 week.  
 
And finally, the fourth inference I can draw from the data is in relation to the positive and 
significant correlation between revenue and personal experiences of conflict, a relationship 
assumed as being affected by reverse causality, and indeed goes away when controlling for the 
number of loans taken in the previous year. Yet the actual length of participation in the 
microfinance programme is not shown to be significant in explaining divergent revenue 
outcomes, or divergent outcomes in terms of being self-employed. Thus, I cannot reject a null 
hypothesis that microfinance service participation increases revenue, a finding that is echoed 
elsewhere in the literature.  
 
There are additional caveats about the sample, including concerns about internal validity. First, 
there is not a control for spillover effects beyond the unit of clustering for conflict by location, 
although by their very proximity geographically one can infer that there may be indirect effects 
of the conflict experienced by Butembo residents as well. To account for this, of course, the 
covariate of individual conflict experience is included, which captures and reported any 
individual experiences with conflict in both Butembo and Beni, yet it still does not count for 
unobserved effects from conflict in the surrounding area. For example, businesspersons who 
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may have had an import business affected by being unable to transport goods by road through 
Beni would not have been asked specifically about this.  
 
Second, replacing the missing values of answers respondents chose not to engage with a series 
mean, is a risky assumption. The estimate assumes that recalcitrance is based on personal 
choices to reveal intimate information, and not due to embarrassment or the inability to provide 
a quantitative sum due to the insignificantly low value of the specific responses (i.e. revenue 
from an agricultural activity might only be a few sacks of beans and pumpkins, and although 
not worth 0, would also not be worth an average of other, more commercial activities). As such, 
results should be seen as suggestive and interpreted in a suggestive manner. At the same time, 
a dummy variable was introduced for all indexes where series means were used to control for 
whether the value had been replaced, and these were not shown to be significant in explaining 
variance in outcomes.  
 
However, even with the mentioned shortcomings and their workarounds, the data has 
nonetheless modelled findings largely consistent with the literature on the subject- positive, 
small, and insignificant correlations in most cases between participation in divergent socio-
economic outcomes. This chapter has contributed to the growing number of studies on 
microfinance impact evaluations, and taken special care to incorporate access to savings 
accounts as a microfinance service capable of evaluating. Due to security, ethical, and 
methodological considerations, an RCT design was not employed, however comparable cases 
were sought through dividing the samples into quartiles based on length of membership.  
 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
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This chapter has described an experiment designed to evaluate the impact of participating in 
microfinance services, including savings accounts only, to comparable sample groups taken 
across a comparatively safe vs. a comparatively conflict affected location, with an added control 
for spill over effects at the individual level. The results indicate that conflict does indeed bear 
on the significance of microfinance services in explaining variances in socio-economic 
outcomes, in ways that the length of participation in the same services does not (a substitution 
of spending on nondurable goods, away from spending on durable goods, for instance; an 
increase in informal contributions to social and familial networks). In the next chapter, findings 
on informal borrowing support the hypothesis that conflict transforms the engagement of 
civilians in financial services, and attempts to answer how and why. More generally, the results 
from this chapter have cautioned against an assumption of microfinance as significantly 
transformative in either context.  
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Chapter 6 
Violence and Myopic Decisions - Participation in Formal and 
Informal Credit during Contexts of Conflict 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
I have so far looked at the effect of conflict on institutions, through an efficiency lens and an 
impact lens. The thesis has demonstrated that while conflict tends not to have a significant 
overall effect on efficiency, and microfinance has not had a significant impact on users in either 
sample, I can suggest some further findings. Specifically, where conflict is present, formal 
institutions experience a rise in Portfolio at Risk, and their total loan portfolio becomes smaller. 
Secondly, microfinance users in contexts where conflict is present experience a shift from 
consumption in durables to consumption in nondurables, and increased spending on gifts and 
social events.   
 
This insight in particular is contrary to exactly what microfinance has been found to help with 
in other contexts. For example, Banerjee et al (2015), note that “In Mongolia, microcredit 
increases the stock of household durables…One robust finding on consumption is a decrease 
in discretionary spending (temptation goods, recreation/entertainment/celebrations). Five of 
the studies estimate treatment effects on ten such measures (13)”. Thus, the introduction of 
conflict into this model has the effect of rejecting even some of most modest claims that 
microfinance studies have supported. In turn, the findings are consistent with my main 
argument, which is that conflict encourages hyperbolic time discounting behaviour (consuming 
nondurables, spending on social events) and unsustainable lending practices (increased portfolio 
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at risk). At the same time, the research has not found evidence to support a great drop in demand 
for financial services following conflict, also contrary to the majority of the literature.  So, then, 
how exactly do changing perceptions of the future and property rights alter civilian’s engagement 
with financial services, if this is the mechanism that is supposed to explain and link together 
these findings? Why would conflict serve to explain differences between the samples collected 
and microfinance programs and their impact as normal?  
 
The task at hand, as becomes increasingly clear, is how to econometrically differentiate between 
the mechanisms at hand and their effects. To this end, this chapter draws on the natural 
experiment conducted and the 208 interviews conducted in the North Eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo to examine the relationship between individuals’ participation in, reliance 
on, and provision of financial services during periods of intense armed conflict. Since the natural 
experiment exploits exogenous variation in the targeting by armed combatants of semi-urban 
areas around one location of surveying, compared to another, it lends itself well to the 
identification of causal effects of these activities on financial outcomes.  
 
The chapter’s analysis suggests that both indirect and direct exposure to armed conflict lead to 
greater reliance on the informal financial sector- a nearly triple likelihood of borrowing from the 
informal sector, and a 29% increase in likelihood to lend to others. It is argued that this is due 
to hyperbolic discounting of the future- and that informal arrangements are particularly 
attractive for these settings, not for supply-based reasons but more likely changing preferences, 
or demand, for certain types of financial services.  
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Microfinance and Informal Finance 
There are some limited indications from the literature that support the argument that conflict 
will encourage individuals to enter into quick return activities. Geetha Nagarajan (2005:1), for 
instance, notes that “In conflict settings, short-term perspectives often drive youth to engage in 
activities with quick returns and high risks”. This viewpoint seems to validate turning to more 
informal activities, characterized by high risks. Yet the information required to understand the 
informal market in a country affected by civil war is difficult to acquire, and therefore lacking. 
Banerjee et al (2015) acknowledge the dearth of information on microcredit substitution 
between informal and formal sources: i (p.17): “Informal borrowing falls in the one site where 
it was prevalent at baseline (India). This…leaves unanswered the related question of whether 
increased formal access disrupts informal risk sharing and hence the supply of informal credit”. 
Without understanding these relationships, however, the effect of microfinance and take-up 
rates will continue to be misunderstood.  These questions of how informal credit and formal 
credit coexist and are used interchangeably become especially important in, as the research will 
show, extremely difficult operating conditions. This relationship can be formulated as an 
assumption that also rephrases Hypothesis 2: That as conflict increases, reliance on informal 
financial services also increases. An immediate concern, however, is the direction of the 
relationship - are individuals pulled into attractive informal financial contracts, or pushed away 
from formal financial ones?  
 
6.2 Theory 
 
Pull factors  
First of all, it is worth returning to the concept of hyperbolic discounting, introduced in Chapter 
one. The concept that different versions of ourselves (at different points in time) will value 
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current consumption differently than our future selves, is referred to as hyperbolic discounting. 
This is in contrast to time consistent discounting (where it is predicted that we will overvalue 
current consumption exactly the same amount than our future selves, proportionally). As 
Laibson (1997: 4) describes time consistent discounting “This discount structure sets up a 
conﬂict between today’s preferences, and the preferences that will be held in the future.” Time 
inconsistent discounting, on the other hand, pointed to the distinct and individualistic reasons 
that individuals may value different utility maximizing arrangements at different points in time. 
Rubinstein (2003:1208) remarks on the utility of hyperbolic discounting models: “Phenomena 
that “cannot be explained by standard discounting utility functions” appear as equilibrium 
outcomes once the decision maker is assumed to use hyperbolic discounting. Policy questions 
were freely discussed in these models even though welfare assessment is particularly tricky in 
the presence of time inconsistency.” Typically, to test for hyperbolic discounting, questions are 
asked that reveal preferences in the context of intertemporal choices, where the objects of choice 
are of the form (x, t) where $x is received with a delay of t units of time (Rubinstein, 2003; 1210). 
By transitivity, one could also ask whether the delay in accessing formal credit affects the choice 
of loan amount and source during contexts of extreme uncertainty. In short, are borrowers 
willing to pay higher costs to receive credit quicker?  
 
Secondly, another mechanism possibly affecting the decision of credit users, the slack of an 
informal mechanism may be attractive in its perceived leniency (compared to the formal sector) 
and speed. As Shirley Ardener points out, “the organizer (of a ROSCA) might lend money to a 
contributor unable to meet a due, or another member might help, or the defaulter might be 
permitted to pay late…or to borrow from a hardship or loan fund to which members have 
contributed (1995:4-5)”. Flexibility in the informal sector has been pointed out by others (Collins 
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et al, 2009) “Perhaps…most households…simply prefer to borrow from friends relatives or 
money-lenders due to the greater flexibility those sources provide, despite costs such as higher 
interest (from moneylenders).”  A study by Tamsin Wilson for Concern Worldwide (2002) finds 
that informal microfinance providers are more likely to offer credit products better suited to 
their clients. 
 
A third pull factor towards the informal sector, the various practices pursued by the informal 
sector reveal that collateral is not always required for more informal sources of credit. If they 
are required in principle, they may not always strictly be collected, thus invoking quick access to 
liquid assets. For instance, one of the likelimbas I interviewed did not collect any kind of 
collateral, or as they put it, “It’s just a moral guarantee, based on reputation” (confidential, 
personal communication, September 5 2014). Other informal lenders, on the other hand, 
answered to one question “What do you take as collateral?” that they took the borrower's 
mortgage documents or property deed. However, upon further questioning related to repayment 
problems (“How often have you gone to the tribunal over a nonperforming loan?”) they 
indicated that “It depends, because some people bring their bikes as a guarantee. Then, they’ll 
evaluate according to the price of the [whichever] buyer [they can find, to purchase the collateral] 
(confidential, personal communication, September 14 2014)”.  In the same interview, when I 
pressed the issue again (“when do you cancel bad credit?”) the respondent even admitted to 
certain instance without any collateral: “There are some close friends who came for a loan, and 
for those, I don’t take a guarantee, and I can cancel the credit if they have difficulties” (Ibid). 
This essentially points us towards the conclusion that informal service providers are the least 
strict in terms of collateral requirements, a possible pull factor towards informal services despite 
high interest rates. 
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There are therefore a few possible mechanisms linking demand and informal finance, implying 
that reliance on informal finance during conflict may not be related solely to supply-side factors.  
 
Push factors 
As alternative mechanisms under a family of “push” factors, it is also worth considering whether 
the financial sector would push potential borrowers towards the informal sector through supply 
side dynamics. For starters, during wartime, inflation can also make credit products more 
expensive, in order to recover the value of money lent (Guiss, n.d.).  
 
Additionally, as Blattman and Miguel (2010) point out, in contexts of armed conflict, standard 
economic assumptions- that property rights are well defined and protected, and that contracts 
between parties can be enforced- often do not hold. In these instances, lenders risk more than 
they stand to make, since judicial proceedings are so weakly enforced. Thus, poor contract 
enforcement may be a mechanism pushing people towards informal arrangements 
 
Lack of faith in the formal sector without these assurances could also affect decisions. For 
instance, institutions will close temporarily to protect staff safety (Guiss, n.d.), or safeguard 
physical assets. In Beni, curfews, days set aside for the mourning of victims, and closures during 
heavy periods of fighting were reported by some respondents to have affected savings patterns.  
 
And finally, although a variant of the lack of faith mechanism, rampant corruption in related 
sectors will also reduce trust in the financial sector. For example, in Beni, according to Chris 
Kasali (email, November 7 2016) “Five of the top police chiefs in charge of Beni and North 
Kivu were arrested by the central government on suspicion of stealing the salary of the new 
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police force created to protect the rural populations in the affected areas”. Such instances serve 
to undermine the faith in the local population that formal mechanisms can be trusted, and that 
salaried workers, who are often brought in from other regions, will perform duties in accordance 
with expectations. This mechanism can be termed Low levels of trust.  
 
6.3 Empirical Strategy 
 
Thus, there are many possible mechanisms underlying the relationship between conflict and 
microfinance. AsMacCartan Humphreys (2010:13) puts it, “Different mechanisms require 
different sorts of policy responses”. In the following sections, the scope and nature of financial 
service usage is examined in order to differentiate between the rival causal mechanisms specified. 
The following analysis has been chosen to explore the question of substitution. Variations are 
exploited in (i) individual, and month (m) and Year (y) in the occurrence of borrowing instances 
(Usagei,m,y) and armed conflict events (βConflicts) to draw causal inference on the role of conflict 
on the level of credit-related activity during a period of intense conflict. Essentially, the following 
equation is used as an estimate: 
Usageimy= α i+ βConflicts im,y+ϵi,m,y 
 
Here, conflict is conceptualized as a dummy variable based on the city the respondent lives in, 
as well as whether the respondent directly experienced violence in the previous year (both results 
are reported). It is suggested that using variance in conflict as a predictor in credit usage allows 
us to sharpen the explanatory power of commitment devices in user preferences, and revisit 
earlier, empirical models. An initial model demonstrates that conflict does influence user 
preferences (in favour of the informal services).  Then follows a discussion of why, finding that 
hyperbolic time inconsistencies may be more salient than reasons of supply or access.  
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6.4 Data and Measurement 
 
To estimate the effect of armed combat on financial service usage, the formal and informal 
participation in financial activities is compared for the members of two similar savings and credit 
cooperatives, one in Beni, a conflict-affected town and another in a town considered politically 
stable, Butembo. Quantitative and qualitative data comes from a survey conducted in 2013-2015 
by the author and two translators. A total of 208 households were sampled from two savings 
and credit cooperatives membership.  
 
As discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, the survey sought to identity any and all 
visiting members over an extended period (over approximately two months in each location), 
and located and interviewed an estimated 90% of these.46 Given possible selection biases, results 
are compared with reported breakdowns of the cooperative’s real membership by ethnicity, age 
and location from the cooperative’s office in order to approximate a balanced sample. This 
served to create a sample that was essentially ¾ male and ¼ female, almost exclusively Nande 
(94.8% of reported tribal identities), and primarily tradespersons- a breakdown that was, 
reportedly according to the cooperative’s managers, representative of the membership of both 
cooperatives47. 
 
Measuring financial service participation 
The survey included several measures for activities revolving around financial service usage. 
First, prior to questions related to financial strategies, the survey captured baseline indicators on 
                                                          
46 Approximately one in ten approached members declined to participate.  
47 It can be noted that we are not seeking a random sample, but more a random treatment 
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the individual such as tribe, age, sector of work, a dummy related to whether the respondent was 
a business owner, and several indicators of business size such as number of employees and 
average monthly profit.  
 
The survey also measured loan history questions related to the previous 12 months, and savings 
and savings strategy questions related to the last 12 months. This included self-reported 
measures of participation in informal savings schemes (other savings accounts), as well as the 
self-reported sources of all loans taken and applied for. The survey constructed a household 
consumption index based on a series of consumption-related questions. In addition to standard 
baseline household asset questions, questions were specifically asked that would capture 
predicted changes to the supra-household networks brought about by conflict, such as adopted 
children, semi-adopted domestic workers, and questions regarding leisure spending such as 
vacations and vehicle purchases.  
 
Lastly, the survey measured a series of self-related pro-social behavioural questions such as 
family contributions, loans to others, and response strategies to emergencies. Finally, the survey 
asked directly whether the respondent had experienced any direct or indirect crime or violence 
in the previous year, whether the respondent had been prevented from working at least a week 
for any reason the previous year, and to describe such events in more detail.  
 
Measuring exposure to armed combat 
The survey was designed to capture two basic indicators of exposure to armed conflict- at the 
group level, the city of residence of the respondent was a useful dummy to determine general 
exposure to violence. I have discussed the selection of the cities in Chapter four, which follows 
the logic of a natural experiment by which the geographical attributes of Butembo creates an 
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artificial separation from a sample group considered randomly exposed to violent conflict. In 
addition, at the individual level, certain questions related to exposure to violence were used to 
construct a second dummy for whether the respondent directly experienced violence, which was 
used as a robustness check for endogeneity concerns about the location.  
 
To gage Beni residents’ exposure to conflict, the survey asked about household emergencies, 
direct and indirect victimization through criminal attacks or violence, and direct or indirect 
consequences for the respondent based on the situation of insecurity. Self-reported incidents 
indicated strongly that official reports by ACLED represent a fraction of actual conflict events, 
a bottleneck based on limited information verification48.    
 
War in Beni Territory 
 
The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have been located in the Beni territory since 1995, from 
which time they have unsuccessfully promoted the creation of an Islamist State in Central East 
Africa (Raeymakers, 2014).49 Numbering from 1,500-2000, their continued presence in the 
Watalingi area, which encapsulates the city of Beni, has caused the displacement of thousands 
of rural inhabitants to the perceived safety of the city. In addition to this, daily patterns of 
                                                          
48 It was also suggested by key interview informants that figures were consistently underreported on 
purpose in order to maintain confidence in ongoing military-political operations 
49 Their original demands included more autonomy for the Bakonzo/Banande tribe and the creation of an 
Islamic state in Uganda, and their activities have become increasingly brutal, giving them the reputation of 
a terrorist organisation and raising suspicions of linkages with Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Their tactics have 
reportedly become much more organized since the M23 defeat in November 2013, representing the 
biggest threat in Eastern Congo today after the FDLR to the armed forces of Congo (Ibid). 
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transport and travel have been interrupted, owing to a series of ADF-perpetrated massacres 
beginning in September of 2014 and reaching a peak in October and November of 2014.  
 
The average citizen in Beni, owing to the pattern often employed by the ADF of attacking stray 
travelers, farmers, and village centres after sundown, now travels exclusively on main roads 
before sundown. In fact, in November and December the mayor of Beni declared a curfew 
enforcing the de-facto practice (which was subsequently used by activists to deface public 
monuments and enjoy total obscurity). Other conflict experiences recorded include the targeting 
of respondents by armed security forces for petty thefts, the frequent robbery and looting of 
tradespersons on major and side roads, and the kidnapping, murder, and looting of employees 
and immediate family members experienced by two out of five respondents in Beni. Indeed, 
comparing Butembo and Beni residents show that 40% of Beni residents were directly affected 
in the previous year by the conflict, compared with only 3%, approximately, of Butembo 
respondents, a more than 10-fold difference. However, to account for possible spill over effects 
in Butembo, a second measure of conflict exposure was included to account for the error term- 
the actual individualized number of direct acts of violence or crime experienced, including the 
loss of immediate relatives to murder or kidnapping in the last year. 
 
6.5 Results  
Assuming the exogenous targeting of Beni residents compared to Butembo residents as justified 
in Chapter Five, the impact of conflict on financial service utilization can be calculated using a 
binary logistic regression model. The results are displayed in Table 2.  In column 1, the odds 
ratio and standard error are reported for a series of dependent variables, with Beni (coded as 1) 
and Butembo (coded as 0) compared. In column 2, the odds ratio and standard errors are 
reported for the same dependent variables, but the independent variable compares victims of 
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direct effects of violence (coded as 1) with those reportedly unaffected by the violence (coded 
as 0). 
 
To begin with, conflict cannot be found to have a significant impact on the likelihood of 
borrowing- although associated with a 17% lower propensity to borrow if living in a conflict-
affected context, and a 23% higher propensity to borrow if the respondent themselves has been 
directly affected or victimized in the last year, the estimate is not statistically significant, likely 
due to the small sample size. However, the implication- that regular business persons will be less 
likely to strategically borrow in times of increased risk, whereas those directly and negatively 
affected may be forced to - is intuitively agreeable, and indicates the promising direction of the 
model.  
 
The causal impact of conflict on having savings is also not found to be statistically significant, 
although again those directly affected by violent events are slightly less likely to report having 
savings than those not directly targeted.  Repeatedly contributing to family events, emergencies 
and relative’s needs also find little statistical significance, as does lending to others, although in 
both aspects, those residing in Beni indicate higher likelihoods of contributing and lending to 
others and those directly affected or victimized report even higher likelihood of engaging in such 
behaviours. 
 
Determinants of Savings and Borrowing 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Beni versus Butembo Reportedly victimized vs 
non-victimized 
 
Reported borrowing in  
the previous 12 months 
 
0.833 
 
1.233 
  [.361] [.492] 
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N 140 120 
 
Reported borrowing from  
friend or informal source in 
the previous 12 months 
 
2.905 
 
3.607 
  [.504]** [.605]** 
N 88 74 
 
Reported having savings  
 
1.584 
 
.768 
  [.407] [.500] 
 [.642] [8975.383] 
N 130 115 
 
Reported lending money to  
others in previous 12 months 
 
1.293 
 
2.105 
  [.377] [.548] 
 
Notes: Odds ratio for the predictors are reported. Standard errors in brackets. Controls 
were  
included for respondent's monthly income 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%: ***Significant at 1% 
 
TABLE 20 DETERMINANTS OF SAVINGS AND BORROWING 
 
Strikingly, conflict leads to a 190% increase in borrowing from an informal source of credit in 
Beni, however, a finding which is significant at the 3% level. This rises to a 260% increase in 
propensity to borrow from an informal source of credit if the respondent has directly 
experienced a negative or victimizing consequence of the conflict, also significant at the 3% 
level.  
 
6.6 Qualitative Evidence 
 
The data here suggests that a clear preference for informal services may be contributing to the 
elevation of their importance post-conflict- and that those directly affected or victimized by 
conflict participate with an even greater magnitude in informal services than those only affected 
by their location of habitation.  Surprisingly, the research has not established a significant 
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correlation between exposure to conflict and changes in overall savings and likelihood to utilize 
credit. I have, admittedly, a small sample size in a limited number of locations. However, since 
the survey is unique in taking special measures to capture involvement in informal and traditional 
structures, and it is shown that dependence shifts to this sector in times of conflict, this shift 
may be comparable to the reported “dampening” of demand often reported by the formal sector 
related to conflict. Indeed, this pattern holds if I further examine qualitative interviews with 
users and providers, and add confidence to our supposition that conflict increases supra-
household reliance. In fact, it is necessary to turn to our qualitative evidence, to distinguish 
between the rival families of mechanisms identified at the beginning of this chapter. In the 
following sections, qualitative evidence highlights some of the mechanisms identified, and allow 
us to substantiate the theory proposed in the beginning of the thesis. 
 
Wealthy Beni Residents 
For many respondents, it was found that the general climate of corruption created cash-flow 
shocks from an informal source, requiring a solution from an informal source. One respondent, 
a 27-year-old university graduate named Patrick (confidential, personal communication, March 
18 2015), had not borrowed any money in the last year, yet his lending to others demonstrated 
some key patterns. During the period of intense violence from October to December 2014, 
Patrick’s profits went from being around $100 a day to around $40, which only let him save 
about $10 a day. Additionally, during a strike in the city, he was prevented from working a little 
more than a week in 2014. Finally, when he travelled to Kisangani, bandits attacked his bus in 
Epolu park, robbing everyone on the bus, including him personally of 80 USD.  Yet, with a 
higher than average income from his business activities, Patrick was not obliged to borrow from 
any source.  Two of his friends, however, borrowed from him in the last year, including one 
who borrowed 320 USD for a business idea and has paid it back. The second friend went to 
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visit a friend in prison and the guard accused him of trying to free the prisoner they were visiting, 
and took them into prison. Patrick bailed out his friend for 400 USD, the amount requested by 
the soldier. Finally, Patrick has supported his extended family 4 times in the last year, 
contribution on average $40 each to funeral costs of relatives who have been killed in attacks in 
the area.  
 
In Patrick’s story, one can see how the by-products of conflict, such as the creation of a 
militarized zone where both regular civilians (bandits) and soldiers can intimidate local 
populations through sheer bravado, create a context where civilians seek to ensure physical 
safety through any means necessary, in this case through illicit, untraceable and involuntary 
payments.  
 
Another typical respondent, Jackson, (confidential, personal communication, March 27 2015) is 
both a primary school teacher and a trader, with a monthly income of about $250 from both 
lines of work. In the same month of the survey, Jackson had come to borrow 300 dollars from 
the formal cooperative he was a member of, even though he was also a member of a likelimba. 
When he joined the cooperative, he originally had $650 in savings, and today has about $1000, 
a fair increase for the year or so of his membership. But he said he didn't save during the period 
of massacres in Beni. He also suffered a hit to his savings when his wife gave birth, and was 
forced to stop his trading work for about a week due to taxes. But perhaps the biggest hit to his 
savings was due to the kidnapping of his brother. Without the identity of his kidnapper known, 
the family (it is assumed Jackson's extended family, not necessarily his nuclear one) paid a 
ransom sum of 7,000 USD. Jackson has continued to extend a helping hand even given his own 
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troubles, however; he loaned 340 to a friend shortly before the massacres began happening (in 
June 2014), and lent 30 USD again in February to another friend. 
 
In Patrick’s case, his higher than average income meant that his savings balance remained 
positive, but it can easily be seen how, without his initial savings, the costs incurred by avoiding 
bodily harm would have driven him to borrow (into the negative), and in Jackson's case, this 
had indeed happened (Although his savings were still negative, he felt the need to borrow). 
However, these were fairly successful businessmen, who preferred the reliability and capacity of 
their savings and credit cooperative to informal financial mechanisms. (For instance, Patrick had 
another savings account, but this was with a formal institution, a competitor savings and credit 
cooperative). Yet both of these wealthy respondents had become lenders, informally, due to the 
mechanisms highlighted earlier, quick access to liquid assets. 
 
Less Wealthy Beni Residents 
This research did not target the ultra-poor, since participation in a savings and credit cooperative 
indicates meeting the basic threshold of affording an account opening fee. However, the 
research can categorize some respondents as lesser in income than others, and since Patrick and 
Jackson may be atypically successful, it is worth examining a few respondents who reported 
lower incomes.  
 
Muisa, (confidential, personal communication, April 9 2015) a 28-year-old high school graduate, 
for instance, may be more typical of rural Congolese. A timber salesman with a side business in 
agriculture, he only saves in one financial cooperative, and estimates his monthly income to be 
50 USD. During October to December 2014, he failed to save money. He also reports not 
working since the poor security in the forest made it impossible to resell wood, losing him an 
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estimated 200 USD in profits. One day, he shared with us, coming from the forest near Eiringeti 
[where there is an ADF camp reportedly in the forest], he met unidentified bandits who took 
his cell phone. All of these things he said, caused him to borrow 100 USD from a family member, 
who charged him 10% interest on the informal loan. He invested the loan into his business, and 
was able to pay it back without delay. He says he has also been approached by multiple people 
for loans, and says that “I lent 2 people 100 USD each. They told me they wanted to do the 
wood selling business but they still haven’t paid me back. Their plans didn’t work because of the 
insecurity in the forest”.  
 
Another respondent, David, is a 26 year old shoe seller, who also cultivates cacao. He says that, 
(confidential, personal communication, April 19 2015) in the period of the massacres, the 
military prevented him from going to his field, losing him some income from his cacao 
cultivation. This may have been in his best interests, however, since on another occasion when 
he was at his field, the ADF started attacking his workers and killed several people. He was 
unharmed, but his bike was stolen. David applied to a formal cooperative for a loan but he says 
“they had a meeting about me, but then I kept returning and returning and they didn’t make a 
decision and I got tired”. In the meantime, David applied for and was successfully given a loan 
of 150 from a likileimba, with a 10% interest rate, which he says he repaid on time.  
 
Returning to the third hypothesis introduced at the onset of the thesis:  
 
Citizens are well-aware of the levels of risk tolerated by formal and informal institutions, and 
intuitively understand their comparative efficiency. Therefore, citizens act accordingly in order 
to maximize individual utility from financial service usage. In periods of violent conflict, citizens 
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will sacrifice efficiency in financial services in favour of services which are more risk tolerant, 
even if it costs a premium.  
 
The data appears to suggest that the hypothesis is supported. Even with high rates of interest 
such as 10% digressive, as found in this anecdotal evidence, increased borrowing from the 
informal sector reflects a preference for accessible, quick, and less formally documented financial 
transactions- inferences that are anecdotally supported by the research, and point to the quick 
access to liquid assets mechanism, in addition to hyperbolic discounting. There is some limited 
evidence, i.e. in David’s case, of a push from the formal sector towards the informal sector as 
well, a la the low levels of trust mechanism.  
 
In summation, the data suggests that being located in a conflict-affected context, and even more 
so when having been directly affected by conflict, individuals find informal sources of credit 
more attractive than formal sources of credit. Yet, with the high costs of these loans (see chapter 
three for the comparison of their relative interest rates), people will pay a cost for the easy access 
to this credit, although it appears this does not figure large enough to be a deterrence.  
 
This phenomenon is not unique to the conflict affected. In fact, in Sendhil Mullainathan and 
Eldar Shafir’s book, Scarcity: Why Having too little Means so Much (2013), they show how 
situations of scarcity, including in terms of personal finances (and even scarcity problem that 
affect the wealthy, such as a scarcity of time) cause individuals to borrow in a way that will 
ultimately aggravate their situation of scarcity, and demonstrate counter-intuitive preference for 
the highly accessible, and excessively costly payday lenders used by some of the poorest 
Americans to fight immediate fires, at the expense of their future financial health.   
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According to these behavioural economists, a scarcity trap can begin with this kind of 
firefighting, in combination with what the authors refer to as tunnelling, which is the result of 
scarcity forcing the individual to focus on meeting a specific need. Focusing on the need at hand, 
or tunnelling, pushes the individual to juggle commitments through a series of trade-offs, which 
in turn taxes their ability to pursue the most efficient course of action possible for them.   
 
The authors only discuss shocks in terms relative to their studies conducted, which includes 
street vendors in India, and students at a community college in New Mexico; yet they find, if 
anything, increased tendencies to borrow as a result of shocks: “Instability can have such an 
impact…When you lack savings or a second car, and have no dinners to cancel, this becomes a 
serious challenge. Where will you get the money? At that moment, you tunnel. You borrow. You 
start a path back into a scarcity trap.” 
 
I can map these findings directly onto our samples and categorize conflict as a kind of shock 
that promote behaviour described by Mullainathan and Shafir. But I can also go further. Suppose 
I assume that conflict is creating the tendency to rely on the more informal and accessible, yet 
costly, mechanisms within the financial sector. Mullainathan and Shafir have explored why - 
people act irrationally when psychologically affected by scarcity, preferring quick fixes despite 
the deferred costs to their future selves - but they have not answered the next question: why 
does this matter? In other words, what consequences does this have, past the level of the 
individual? In fact, Mullainathan and Shafir seem to propose that poverty traps are a kind of 
scarcity trap. They go further, and aggregate from the individual level to the institutional level 
to illustrate how scarcity traps cause institutional inefficiencies.  
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But if we follow the same logic, and aggregate scarcity traps at the institutional level to the 
national level, perhaps we can say something about post-war reconstruction efforts. In fact, I 
would propose that scarcity traps at an institutional level may result in sparse networks at a 
national level, in what I will call a “sparse networks trap”.  
 
6.7 Network Fragmentation, through Several Variant Channels 
 
 
For those respondents who have lost a family member, been assaulted, or had a family member 
violently assaulted in the previous year due to the ongoing political conflict, the loss of physical 
security combined with an impression of institutional neglect is a terrible burden, both 
immediate and lingering. But the fragmentation of the financial services sector into disparate 
enclaves, a more latent phenomenon captured by this research, may also be posing burdens not 
immediately realized. The mechanisms identified through the research- preference in liquid 
assets, hyperbolic discounting, and reduced trust in formal networks- allows me to point to a 
bigger picture for the theoretical implications of this research, and possible consequences of 
such ongoing trends.  
 
First, in the hypothesized sparse networks trap, we will see a decline in the ability of the formal 
sector to mobilize savings, whether through increased reliance on informal vehicles or through 
the division of savings into disparate, unlinked repositories. Secondly, with the inability to 
mobilize savings, we will see decreased investments. And thirdly, with the lack of investments 
in infrastructure, there will be less jobs available (or less full time employment), leading to a 
variety of coping mechanisms. And finally, these coping strategies might include reliance on 
alternative economic activities, (i.e. war-invulnerable sectors like small-scale agriculture), 
reverting to sub-optimal employment such as in the extractive industries or through fighting, 
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and, in extreme circumstances, distress migration.  In establishing these aspects, it can be shown 
how a sparse networks trap might encourage war entrepreneurs and raise other conflict risks, in 
an endogenous model of a conflict-affected economy.  
 
 
Diversifying the location of personal savings 
 
The intimate nature of social networks is worth examining because people generally tend to infer 
quite positive things about the inherent advantages of social networks. It is generally thought, 
for instance, that (Germidis et al, 1991), transaction costs are low. Or that “the informal sector 
has a dense and effective information network at the grassroots level for close supervision and 
monitoring of borrower activity- particularly their cash flow- whether they are members of an 
informal association or not. This contributes to the efficient mobilization of savings and ensures 
high loan repayment rates (Ibid)”. However, efficiency is questionable in a financial service 
sector with such limited evidence of mobilization. Participation in a diverse array of savings 
mechanisms, for example, is often driven by a belief that hedging bets will increase the chances 
of access to credit when needed. One respondent in the Beni sample, for instance, said “I have 
an account at this savings and credit cooperative, but I have two other savings accounts. I have 
one at the BCDC (the Central Bank of Congo), and also I am in a likelimba with just two other 
friends. At BCDC, it’s like it’s for big fish, but here (at the savings and credit cooperative), it’s 
like it’s for small fish, it’s more flexible. (confidential, personal communication, April 4 2015)” 
In fact, participation in multiple savings deposit schemes were so common that, in the sample 
of 208 respondents surveyed, only 41% of respondents had one savings account, while other 
respondents had as many as 4, 5 and 6 savings accounts that they could recall when asked. 
Further investigating the types of accounts held confirm that North Kivu is not atypically 
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saturated with formal banking services- of these reported other accounts, only 18, or 1% of the 
sample, were using a formal bank’s services, which corresponds to the national statistics for 
Congo. 
 
Examining if there was a significant difference between the dependence on secondary, informal 
savings accounts held in Beni and Butembo (counting registered savings and credit cooperatives 
as a formal account), I could not reject the null hypothesis that conflict had a significant bearing 
on the likelihood to save with an informal savings deposit scheme, compared with a ‘formal’ 
savings deposit scheme (results not reported). However, the significant variable here (at the 
90% confidence interval) is that being located in a conflict zone may increase the likelihood of 
having additional, or multiple, savings accounts. 
  
Effects of Conflict Exposure on Having Multiple Savings Accounts 
  Coefficient T-ratio 
Conflict Exposure by  
Location 
 
.361 
[.202]* 
1.788 
Conflict Exposure by  
Victimization 
-.147 
[.161] 
-.908 
Primary Income 
 
.002 
[.001]*** 
3.953 
Adj R2 .13  
N 158  
F Test 6.657  
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%: ***Significant at 1% 
TABLE 21 EFFECT OF CONFLICT EXPOSURE ON HAVING MULTIPLE SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 
 
This echoes the portfolio substitution effect penned by Collier (1998). People may not trust that 
their society has real chances of peace, especially during the midst of conflict events, and so 
make private choices to liquidate and diversify their assets. With a history of failed cooperatives 
in the area, and a number of physical losses withstood by even the most formal institutions, 
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citizens are wary of keeping all their eggs in one figurative basket. And this is significant for 
several reasons. For starters, the informal sector, and even the registered savings and credit 
cooperatives sector, does not invest, nor pool the savings it mobilizes. Thus, international 
companies wishing to invest in the region must depend on the loans in the formal sector, which 
may have limited loan funds available. A key respondent for this research explained, for instance:  
 
This one [International] bank in Congo really had a problem. They lent money to a 
company that was subcontracted by the Government in Kinsasha to provide 
infrastructural repairs. They had agreed on a payment for the work that would have easily 
covered the cost of the borrowed funds. But at the end of the day, the Government was 
unable to pay the subcontractor the full amount of the contract due to budgetary 
mismanagement, so the company was unable to repay the loan that it had taken to this 
international bank. So I mean this bank was really in trouble, because like 5 million 
dollars of its reserves was suddenly gone (confidential, personal communication, May 16 
2016) 
 
This may have explained the fact that, when the local branch of this same bank in Beni was 
visited in April of 2015, the accountant actually explained to me that the bank was currently not 
making new loans, only salary advances to Brasimba50 factory workers. While it is hard to imagine 
that a 5-million-dollar project in a city 2,000 kilometres to the East of Beni would prevent an 
international bank from continuing its lending operations, this is actually a good representation, 
or illustration, of how little savings the international banks have to mobilize.  
 
                                                          
50 A local beer 
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Lowered priorities for investment in local infrastructure 
Another channel of network fragmentation, conflict has an impact on the propensity of 
microfinance to invest in durable goods. Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee discuss in their 
book, Poor economics: a radical rethinking of the way to fight global poverty (2012), how, for 
example, in the lack of a strong financial infrastructure, citizens in developing countries tend to 
invest in property assets instead of cash savings. Property investments, even if just the addition 
of rooms onto existing houses, resist the vulnerabilities of wide swings in inflation rates as 
materials can be resold at market rates. And indeed, these proclivities are reflected in the research 
findings in the non-conflict affected sample.  
 
However, when separating the answers related to the respondent’s intention for saving money 
with their respective cooperatives, conflict was found to have an impact on citizen’s intention 
to invest in these kinds of projects. Below, respondents in Beni were almost 3 times less likely 
to report intending to invest in construction.  
 
What are you saving money for? Housing, Property Purchase, or 
Construction 
Beni 11% 
Butembo 40% 
TABLE 22 PURPOSE OF SAVINGS 
While this may echo the disintegration of property rights observed in post-war contexts, it also 
provides another example of an investment in a durable good that seemingly slips from the 
priority list during contexts of uncertainty, for reasons above and beyond the ownership contract 
issues highlighted. For instance, investing in construction in Beni requires a deal of trust that the 
value of the property will not depreciate, the owner will have constant access to the location of 
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the property, and the materials and workers invested in are trustworthy choices for the allocation 
of the allocated funds.  
 
 A tendency to diversify businesses 
Thirdly, 65% of clients reported a secondary business, or a second source of income which they 
ran or worked for in addition to their primary profession. This ranged from being a small-scale 
cultivator to having a secondary retail business, or a part time job. Secondary businesses tended 
to reflect a time un-intensive occupation which could jointly be pursued by the respondent’s 
relatives or otherwise taken over, as necessary. One could predict that, in Beni, the surrounding 
insecurity might threaten or limit the livelihoods of cultivators, and reduce the types of activities 
engaged in.   However, in Beni the rate of having a secondary job or business spiked. 80% of 
respondents reported having a second income source, as opposed to 49% in Butembo.   
 
Do you have a secondary source of income? Yes 
Beni 80% 
Butembo 49% 
TABLE 23 LIVELIHOOD DIVERSIFICATION 
 
Here, the research sees evidence of Collier (1998)’s portfolio diversion effect51. I can also 
perhaps substantiate a portfolio substitution to war invulnerable sectors such as agriculture, since 
it seems the activity that accounts for the majority of the divergence observed in the sample. 
What kind of secondary livelihood do you have? Agriculture 
                                                          
51 One might call it evidence of increased investment in business activities, but to be cautious, the majority 
responded “yes” to the question “were you doing the same kind of work before you joined (the 
cooperative)?” 
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Beni 36% 
Butembo 11% 
TABLE 24 LIVELIHOOD DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY 
 
Participating in informal social protection activities   
Finally, it is worth examining the phenomenon noted earlier of increased support to extended 
social networks, another kind of informal financial flow. In another study in Liberia in 2010 
(Smith, 2010), for example, a trend was documented among urban Liberians to send children to 
live with extended family members as a result of economic pressures, a kind of distress migration 
exacerbated by conflict. As such, several questions were incorporated related to changes in 
family structure in the individual level survey, including “Do you have any adopted children?” 
“Do you have any domestic workers?” “Do you pay your domestic worker, and how much?” In 
North Kivu, it is also traditional for distant family members, who may have more children than 
they can afford to raise, to send their children to the homes of more affluent family members, 
usually in more urban areas. These adopted children are treated in a range of manners depending 
on their original circumstances and proximity in familial relations52. Thus, it is a question if the 
conflict would have increased the rates of these kinds of familial-rearrangements, with so many 
attacks on rural populations in the area.   
 
                                                          
52 For instance, a son of a brother, born in a neighbouring large city, may be treated just like a family’s 
actual son, and have the fees of a good quality school paid for in addition to uniforms and spending money; 
whereas the son or daughter of a distant cousin, born in a rural village, may come to Beni or Butembo and 
end up similar to a restavik child in Haiti: expected to do the majority of the domestic work in the 
household, either sent to a lesser quality school or not sent to school at all, and given the castaway or 
leftover goods of the family to subsist on. However, even this is seen as immensely charitable, since even 
the most put-upon “domestique” has access to a better quality of life than in their home village, is allowed 
to attend church on Sundays, and is encouraged to eventually marry and have their own family (with the 
adoptive/employing family responsible for the wedding costs). 
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Here, the control variables “savings amount” and “primary income” are used to construct an 
OLS model of the likelihood to have 1 or more adopted children in the household.  
 
Effects of Conflict Exposure on Having Adopted 
or Semi-Adopted Family Members 
  Coefficient T-ratio 
Conflict Exposure by  
Location 
 
.280 
[.445] 
.628 
Conflict Exposure by  
Victimization 
.547 
[.291]* 
1.879 
Primary Income 
 
.002 
[.001] 
1.576 
Amount of Savings -2.832E-5 
[.000] 
-.507 
Adj R2 .067  
N 155  
F Test 2.591  
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%: ***Significant at 1% 
TABLE 25 CONFLICT AS A DETERMINANT OF FAMILY STRUCTURE 
 
By choosing these control variables, we are left with the implication that personal exposure to 
conflict results in a higher likelihood to adopt more non-biological children. For each incidence 
of armed conflict or crime which was experienced by a respondent, their likelihood to absorb a 
new family member rises by 80%, a strong indication that my predictions are headed in the 
correct direction.  
 
6.8 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined the demand-side of microfinance in conflict, and determined that 
there is a significant shift in user preferences from the formal to the informal sector. Examining 
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both populations located in a conflict-affected city and those directly affected by the conflict in 
the previous year, the likelihood to borrow from an informal sources rises from an increase in 
190% likelihood to an increase in likelihood of 260%. Since the supply of microfinance has 
remained at a constant in the cases studied, then the shift in demand to the informal sector 
cannot be said to be driven by a change in supply. Rather, hyperbolic discounting and a 
preference for liquid assets have been identified as more significant factors influencing these 
decisions, in addition to reduced trust in the formal sector, which will require different policy 
responses. As greater reliance on the informal sector decreases reliance on the formal sector, we 
will see the long-term consequences of such imperfect decisions weakening the formal sector 
and contributing to sparse networks. This includes, in turn, disparate enclaves of production and 
capital, unable to adequately repair some of the damages caused by the conflict.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
At the onset of the thesis, some of the shortcomings highlighted in the sectors identified include 
a limited understanding of the effect of conflict on the determinants of the impact of civil war 
(Costalli, Moretti, and Pischedda, 2014), such as social violence (Hoeffler and Fearon, 2014). 
From the more practical spectrum of the microfinance community, a dearth of knowledge about 
the informal sector during conflict (Nagarajan and McNulty, 2004) was also highlighted, and 
when and why substitution between financial service providers happens (Banerjee et al, 2015). 
As the research from this thesis shows, however, one key effect of conflict may be found in the 
informal sector, and on subsitutiton rates, and the understanding of the one partially anwers the 
question of the other. In other words, when substitution of formal financial services with 
informal ones spikes during conflict, as this research has documented happens, the dissavings 
effect caused by the flight of capital into the informal sector reinforces a key determinant of 
GDP. This is the total savings available to an economy (Solow, 1956), determining, in one way, 
the impact of the conflict as well as the future of the country’s reconstruction efforts.  
 
Thus, I have found that Collier’s (1998) suggestion of portfolio substitution towards war 
invulnerable sectors has found support in my data, in terms of relying heavier on social networks 
thorugh informal financial service providers. In addition, the research has identified an 
underresearched, under-theorized, determinant of the impact of civil war- the scale to which 
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capital flight towards the informal sector happens- and provided original documentation of the 
features and particularities of how, when, and why this can occur. In doing so, the demonstration 
of applying such a methodologically robust evaluation in such a volatile location is perhaps the 
aspect of this research that will have the most impact. For instance, remember that Matabisi 
claimed that informal finance in conflict was not possible to analyse, because “there are no 
objective means to reliably measure its relevance pre and post conflict as no reliable records 
exist” (Matabisi, 2011:42). Yet, by creating typologies that crossed institution type, and questions 
that used generally applicable terminology, the research was able to do so. It compared a number 
of informal financial services, even against formal ones, and documented the quantitative trends 
possible by a combination of estimation, observation, and consultation.  
 
7.2 Theoretical Findings 
 
This leads me to the possible theoretical contributions stemming from the research. The 
research uses the household economic portfolio model and Macartan Humphrey’s methods of 
mechanism specification to theorize that such a spike can lead to a reinforcing trap. The 
predictions that savings will also become more difficult to mobilize, networks will become 
fragmented, and a resulting scarcity trap may encourage reliance on sub-optimal coping 
mechanisms during contexts of armed conflict has also found some support through the 
variables proxied to substantiate these linkages. In the remainder of this chapter, these key 
findings are highlighted for their ability to answer the original research questions posed at the 
outset of the thesis, and for their ability to indicate the direction of policies that could combat 
some of the effects observed.  
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The research question developed for the research can be re-examined in light of the empirical 
findings of the thesis: 
 
How does violent conflict affect the efficiency and impact of informal and formal financial 
service providers, and/or change citizen engagement with financial services?  
 
Reflecting on the research questions devised from existing accounts of conflict and 
development, the proposed answer from the research integrates the meso and the micro-level 
and predicts the likelihood of selective participation in contractual financial services:  
 
Institutional actors, on the one hand, seek profit-maximizing arrangements, which in the case of 
larger (formal) institutions will translate to a preference for high-yield loans, and in the case of 
smaller (informal) institutions will translate to a preference for higher transaction volumes. 
Conflict will highlight the certainty that informal institutions will be likely to loan to individuals 
quicker and easier, and uncertainty will discourage the investment in high-yield loans from 
formal institutions, pulling individuals towards informal services.  
 
The informal sector, as a price setter and potentially in a dominant positionof at least a sector 
of the credit market, will be presented the opportunity for price gouging, but will also be 
responsible for its lending operations in contrast to- and sometimes in direct opposition to- best 
banking practices. In time of conflict, then, the shift in household economic portfolios towards 
social network-based mechanisms can create a precarious bubble of unsustainable lending 
practices, at the expense of the formal financial sector, not to mention problematically disparate 
enclaves of production and capital. This in turn substantiates mixed results from post-war 
reconstruction efforts.  
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Kalyvas (2015:355) warns that reliance on suprahousehold networks may look solidaristic, but 
they are fundamentally dual in nature: conflictual and solidaristic. Returning to the Household 
Economic Portfolio Model introduced at the beginning of the thesis (from Cohen, Chen and 
Dunn, 1996), the research has shown that in non conflict-affected environments, households 
use inputs and expenditures to produce, consume, and invest. In turn, income and other 
additions to resouces reinforces the original capital, as well as feeding reciprocally into social 
networks.  
 
However, there are a number of changes to household portfolios that happen during conflict, 
which the research allows us to finally assert with statistical confidence. First, instead of going 
to formal credit and debt sources, odds are that people will go first- or at higher rates- to their 
social networks. Secondly, a decrease in investing in durable goods is substituted with increased 
purchases of nondurable goods, so expenditures, at least in investments, declines. Thirdly, being 
situation in a conflict location and being affected by conflict increases the propensity to 
contribute charitably to one’s extended social network, and being affected by a conflict 
personally increases the chances one will incorporate adopted or non-biological family members 
into their household,  in another form of social insurance. Therefore, in conditions where 
conflict is present, the research has found, various forms of social insurance are actively paid to 
a wider social network, whose importance is aggrandized. As such, the transformation of the 
Household Economic Portfolio Model for a conflict-affected situation will do well to situation 
household flows in relation to a larger supra-household network- or increased flows in relation 
to the supra-household network. This variant reliance on social networks reflects a robust 
indication for portfolio substitution which is worth considering for its policy implications. If 
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capital is being pooled within social networks, for instance, is there any way to regulate it in 
order to reduce the concurrent fragmentation of the broader economy and reduce subsequent 
conflict dynamics?  
 
Each of the chapters, from chapters three to six, have contributed different parts of this answer 
to the research question. In the following section, the primary findings from each empirical 
chapter are teased forward to illustrate how the chapter has not only answered a specific research 
sub-question or two each, but built upon the previous chapter and literature review to advance 
a part of the composite picture drawn by the overall research.  
 
7.3 Empirical Findings 
 
In chapter three, an introduction of the typologies of financial services available in the context 
studied serves as an original contribution to the field. Very little is known about the informal 
financial arrangements introduced in the chapter, and what is known is primarily about 
operational practices and anecdotal. A comparison of the quantitative performance indicators 
between these typologies, however, reveals the wide ranging strengths of the more formal 
institutions, and allow us some confidence in our groupings. It also uses the research to 
substantiate the first hypothesis, that ultimately, formal institutions are more efficient.  
 
In chapter four, in a sample of 21 financial service providers where I sough to isolate the effect 
of conflict on financial services, anecdotal evidence suggests repayment difficulties from clients, 
a decline in loan portfolio size, risks to physical infrastructure, and isolated instances of robbery. 
But by and large the performance figures collected over a six-month period for a conflict 
affected sample of institutions and a non-conflict sample of institutions showed few significant 
263 
 
negative transformations due to conflict during the time period observed, except for a rise in 
Portfolio at Risk in the formal sector by about 10%, accompanied with a drop in total loan 
portfolio, at an average of 186,000 in loans. This allows for a tentative answer to research 
subquestion 1: How does the presence of conflict affect the efficiency of formal and informal 
financial service providers? Demand is not shown to significantly decrease, as loans on average 
requested per month were only .3 loans less overall, and active membership actually significantly 
increased during the time period.  
 
In Chapter five, a series of models looked at how the impact of two comparable institutions 
might differ in contexts of conflict. I wanted to determine, is microfinance participation more 
or less significant in conflict zones in explaining variances in socio-economic differences? And 
how do the systemic issues recently raised in the microfinance community affect these findings? 
Does examination of a conflict zone shed any light on the recent findings in the microfinance 
community? The chapter allowed me to answer research subquestion number 2: How does the 
presence of conflict affect the impact of formal and informal financial service providers? It 
indicated, in turn, that microfinance participants in conflict zones may be less likely to invest in 
durable goods, as compared with microfinance participants in safer regions. However, other 
transformative effects based on length of participation in microfinance programs were not 
found. 
 
The transformative shift, if any, can be isolated to the users of services themselves. In chapter 
six, in a cross-sectional impact assessment, various questions reveal an increasing trend to seek 
financial services from informal sources. This is not, as my institutional survey showed, due to 
changes in accessibility or the availability of credit from formal sources, but is more likely 
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attributable to changes in expectations about the future, a greater emphasis on building trust 
through investing in forms of social protection, and a tendency to prefer liquid assets over 
illiquid ones. This, in turn, brings us to research subquestion 3: How does the presence of 
conflict affect citizen engagements with financial services? The chapter, in turn, finds that users 
of financial services in a conflict zone are 190% more likely to borrow from informal sources, 
and those personally affected by the conflict are 260% more likely to borrow from informal 
sources. Through an examination of qualitative evidence, reasons such as discounting the future, 
preferring quick access to liquid assets, and reduced trust in the formal sector emerge.  
 
The onus of the thesis therefore becomes, then, to show how, why and where choosing 
informal financial services over formal ones becomes relevant. In other words, I can turn to 
question 4: What are the implications of solidarity-based forms of survival for post-conflict 
reconstruction? The thesis posits that borrowing from informal sources, saving in informal 
sources, and not investing in durable goods creates cyclical effects which prolong post-war 
reconstruction through increasingly sparse and disconnected networks. Thus, I can situate the 
study as one that illustrates a substitution of household economic portfolio activities into war 
invulnerable sectors, and suggest that through a reliance on the informal network, the formal, 
broader economy is weakened, in a conflict-reinforcing mechanism known as sparse networks. 
These linkages can be posed as testable assumptions, and are tested using the available survey 
data, an exercise also begun in Chapter 6. The preliminary findings situate that the assumptions 
are being fulfilled, and also point to the wider picture revealed.  
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7.4 Practical Implications 
In such a context as the Congo, as Nicholas Kristoff (2016) says about South Sudan, “Big 
Government Looks Great When There is None”.  The implication from all of this, I believe, 
are that the next questions can be more practical in nature: i.e. How can the government, or 
international actors, introduce effective regulations that don’t alienate the informal sector, but 
rather encourage it to consolidate reserves with the formal sector? If the diversification and 
substitution of savings accounts is really an impediment to long-term efficiency, then it is a 
straightforward argument to make that there should be efforts to incorporate, combine, or 
consolidate savings accounts. This leads to several recommendations which the central bank and 
related actors are currently, to the best of my knowledge, a long way from requesting. 
 
1.) Encourage the integration of mutualities and ROSCAs into formal networks 
through special allowances and reducing obstacles 
 
A new policy, best put forth by the Central Bank, could make an exemption in charging 
likelimba’s or mutualities account opening or account maintenance fees. This could encourage 
them to open bank accounts for the safeguarding of their money, which would allow these 
savings to be mobilized. The Central Bank could also lower the capital requirements for financial 
institutions in order to encourage more unregistered operating cooperatives a realistic chance to 
register. Or, like in India’s Self-Help group bank linkage programme started by NABARD in the 
1980s, the BCC could offer matching loan funds to mutualities after six months’ membership 
with a bank, for instance, to increase their potential depth of impact.  
 
2.) Provide Assistance in Quality Control for Smaller Cooperatives 
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The Central Bank also already does some quality control, but it could do more. For instance, it 
could regularly review the loan portfolios of registered cooperatives to ensure that investors are 
footing the bill for loan losses, not savers. In addition, it could monitor cooperative 
administrative expenses as a ratio to cooperative revenue in order to protect savers from 
shouldering the burden of staff salaries, or other administrative expenses being “borrowed” 
from savings accounts. 
 
Alternatively, one of the international agencies working on good governance in DRC could task 
itself with becoming more pre-occupied with this. The results of this study, for instance, could 
be used as a starting point to launch a larger study on credit-institution shortcomings and 
proposed solutions, that could be eligible for multi-donor funding opportunities such as through 
the UN’s Stabilization unit in Goma (ISSSS). Although World Bank and IMF staff may be 
prohibited, security-wise, from travel in some of the most affected regions of the DRC, 
subcontracting these kinds of studies to independent researchers could be a starting point for a 
multi-year program informed by such an evaluation.  
  
3.) Provide Assistance in Contract Compliance Measures 
 
The Central Bank could (and this is perhaps more hypothetical) also encourage cooperation 
between mutuality’s and local-level law enforcement representatives, such as police. Police could 
work around weak judicial systems and difficulty in enforcing more vague contracts during 
contexts of conflict, by visiting non-compliant borrowers, and encouraging loan repayment 
before non-repayment rates become unsustainable.  The Central Bank could also designate 
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certain courts for loan contract dispute resolution, and work with those courts towards an 
understanding that all cases related to loan disputes would also be reviewed by a second party 
(i.e. the Central Bank HQ in Kinshasa).  
 
4.) Encourage Investment Through Low-Interest Business Loans 
 
Finally, although this may raise questions of sustainability, it is precisely the role of a Central 
Bank to encourage investment, yet as has been shown, there is little being done to assure citizens 
that new business ventures in Beni will be worth the risk. In fact, long wait times, interest rates 
of up to 4% monthly (which would be 12% for a three-month loan), and the frequent use of the 
home as loan collateral may be contributing to some of the trends I have outlined, including a 
preference for “war-invulnerable” livelihoods. At the same time, other cooperatives are finding 
ways to promote investment that could be scaled up or copied by the Central Bank- one 
cooperative, for example, offers a 1% annual interest rate on school-expansion loans, in an effort 
to increase educational facilities (this loan fund, however, is backed by an American organization, 
and guaranteed in the case of losses).  If the Central Bank could encourage low interest programs 
(i.e. 1-2% annual) for those applicants demonstrating, say, that jobs would be created as a direct 
result of the loan, then it may simultaneously encourage investment, while reducing the burden 
of those ambitious enough to put themselves forward.    
 
5.) Promote the creation of a provider platform to provide mutual assistance 
within the cooperative sector 
 
With rising credit requirements for licensing, apex funding between partnering groups of credit 
cooperatives could mimic the pooling of credit that happens between some banks that operatate 
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like this. Short of creating these technical and complex risk-sharing mechanisms, networks of 
cooperative providers could provide the chance to encourage the exchange of experiences 
between financial service providers and jointly address issues such as hyperinflation, collateral 
fraud, and client credit history information. Such an example can be found, for instance, in Iraq 
already, with the USAID supported Tijara Provincial Economic Growth Program, which helped 
12 Iraqi microfinance institutions hold a series of workshops, expand their product menu, reach 
more vulnerable populations, increase their available funds thorugh direct investments, and even 
helped change the Iraqi legal code in allowing the establishment of non-banking financial 
instututions in the private sector.  
 
6.) Provision adequately for hyperinflation and area yield losses 
 
At the provider level, institutions would do well to pay more attention to portfolio health, 
specifically in areas where hyperinflation, or lower than projected agricultural yields because of 
movement limitations, are expected to have a negative impact on repayment. One microfinance 
program visited in Butembo, for instance, hopes to avoid hyper-inflation side affects by 
liquidating all of its local currency through larger than standard loans, and requiring repayments 
in USD. Yet these requirements can be costly for users. In these instances, microfinance 
programs can partner with research institutes, such as the Centre for Microfinance, or the Abdul 
Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, to design conflict-specific solutions to such issues. These could 
include index-based crop-microinsurance products, or inflation-adjusted repayment calculations 
as part of loan loss provisioning.  
 
7.) Increase trainings on numeracy and financial literacy 
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Finally, in the most rural and underdeveloped areas, a serious need for understanding cash flow 
concepts better could be bearing negatively on portfolio at risk, and even on understanding the 
deferred costs of resorting to informal financial service providers. Economic development 
NGOs and development actors should accompany programs aimed at providing access to 
finance with trainings for partners and beneficiaries. These trainings could demonstrate cash 
flow calculations, assist service users in creating stronger business proposals, and help users 
make better financial decisions through capacity building in calculating projected profits.  
 
For smaller financial service providers, these trainings may even be necessary for staff. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the lack of cash-flow analysis of business proposals contributes to some 
of the shortcomings in the informal financial sector, and currently discourages the discussions 
needed to create the types of partnerships and consolidations put forth in the preceding 
recommendations. Only when financial service providers have a clear understanding of their 
assets, risks, capital, and portfolio at risk can they seriously engage in partnership talks as equals. 
 
7.5 Methodological Implications 
 
This research’s contribution has a few features distinct apart from the findings that further the 
literature in the field, related to the actual data collection, which may be useful to share. First of 
all, the research by itself is an undertaking that illustrates that it is possible to conduct empirical 
research in conflict settings. Futhermore, it is an illustration that it is possible to conduct 
empirical research on the informal financial sector. Both of these areas are typically understudied 
for a number of reasons, including personal security and data unreliability, yet solutions can be 
found to many of these issues. Several lessons can be taken from these two points: 
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1.) Empirical research in conflict settings 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the security limitations imposed by most international NGOs 
operating in the area were not present in this research, which probably allowed for a closer 
examination of private financial data than if the research team had been accompanied by an 
armed escort, for example. However, researchers would do well to only follow these kinds of 
research techniques if they are hosted by an international organization that has security 
protocols, and in the absence of this, should be capable of speaking the local language, 
evacuating quickly if needed, and having contacts that could help in the instance of any security 
incidents, such as kidnapping and ransom insurance, medical evacuation insurance, or bribery 
and extortion insurance. These products can be purchased for individuals through groups such 
as AIG travelgaurd, Battleface of Lloyd’s, and Hiscock’s.  
 
At the same time, researchers should analyze existing conflict data for trends and patterns that 
would help avoid direct involvement in conflict situations. For instance, if conflict tends to 
happen more frequently on a particular avenue, or at a particular time of day, or on a particular 
day of the week, there is an obvious incentive to avoid exposure to the identified trends. This 
applies to research subjects, as well. In the case of Beni, attacks usually happened between 8:00-
10:00 pm. Thus, most surveying was done in the morning, visits to mutualities that happened 
outside of working hours were conducted as early as 6-7 am, and no meetings lasted past 5pm.  
 
Finally, the remarks by Lijphart (1971) that in political science, there are moral caveats to 
conducting randomized controlled trials, appear to be even more salient in conflict-affected 
contexts. Take, for example, the traditional structure of a randomized controlled trial evaluation 
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of a microfinance program, wherein those eligible for a microfinance program are first identified, 
and then the control and treatment groups are randomly assigned. The control group, in these 
instances, has been made aware of the program, selected, and then denied services, at least for 
ther period of the survey, which can be 14 months. In the context of the socio-economic 
behavioural changes identified in contexts of conflict, i.e. the need for quick access to liquid 
assets, this could mean the difference between resorting to the distress related coping 
mechanisms or not. Thus, creating randomized controlled trials with microfinance in conflict 
zones have heightened ethical implications for microfinance programs. To address this, 
researchers seeking to conduct empirical research in conflict settings may wish to seek 
alternatives to randomized controlled trials.  
 
2.) Empirical research on the Informal Financial Sector 
 
In addition to the methodological limitations posed by conflict, there is another set of challenges 
in measuring the informal financial sector. This research was made possible both by local 
connections but also a willingness to do a fair bit of calculations on behalf of respondents who 
would ordinarily not know the answer to quantitative questions. As such, it was found that 
recall periods for informal financial service providers can be shortened, portfolio at risk can be 
calculated by hand, and even number of borrowers per month can usually be taken entirely by 
recall by respondents. Perhaps the most painstaking part of this research, such documentation 
of those defined by their lack of documentation proved, as the research showed, a valuable 
component of piecing together a composite picture of the financial sector. In conclusion, the 
methodological finding from applying empirical research methods to the informal financial 
sector can be said to be two-fold: 1) it is best to have a consistent and clear understanding of 
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the objectives of the research at the start, or such research risks becoming uncomparable across 
categories, and 2) that which demands the most explanation, reassurance, and relationship 
building, or that data hardest to come by, may be the very data that answers a puzzle in the 
literature.  
 
7.6 Areas for Future Research   
 
In addition to being informative for post-conflict practitioners, the implications of portfolio 
substitution to the informal financial sector has policy implications not necessarily limited to 
post-conflict practitioners and microfinance practitioners. At least in the short term, research 
based evaluations informed by this dissertation could identify areas where capacity building 
efforts by international NGOs could reach the most war-affected populations, and also 
appropriate activities to include rather than marginalize affected persons.  
 
More economically minded research initiatives could follow the logical extension of this work 
and look at how the dissavings effect identified contributes to reduced capital and investment 
in periods following conflict. An analysis of how this research’s findings does or does not bear 
on the Solow-growth model could provide an alternative or complementary narrative to the 
investor flight narrative told by conflict empiricists about investment as a function of savings.  
 
In the longer term, a project to test the hypothesized sparse networks traps identified could 
also add depth and clarity on issues only briefly touched upon in this research. If the formal 
sector is being weakened by portfolio substitution to the informal sector, it would be fascinating 
to know if the informal sector is becoming more dense or efficient as a result of this trend. 
More details about the relationships between these choices and the resources made available to 
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increasingly sparse networks promises to be a rich and engaging research subject for future 
researchers.   
 
7.7 Conclusions 
 
While reduced trust may engender informal mechanisms that are simpler, less complex, and 
more time intensive, they may have unintended consequences that engender closer knit-
networks at a local level. Thus, along with reduced trust of non-kin members, heightened levels 
of trust may co-exist at the same time within communities, in ways that are both deeply validating 
and personal. The principal finding from this research is that choices made cannot be found to 
be consistent with general economic theory- and that, in order to understand the intersectionality 
of conflict with these choices, the deliberate untangling of personal accounts has to be done 
with a great deal of care, sensitivity, and affection for the research subjects. Otherwise, we will 
never capture the depth of the elusive secondary economy. I can only hope that this work 
encourages further investigations of this nature. As mentioned at the outset, the daily 
management of financial risks can be terrifying for those in extreme poverty, who can feel 
constantly one choice away from destitution. A shift in emphasis on financial regulation in the 
direction of user preferences- or even acknowledging these- could be a transformative one in 
the post- conflict development world, and a promising new area of research for the microfinance 
community. 
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Appendix 1 
List of Interviews 
Number of 
Interview 
Interviewee's 
Location 
Interviewee's Short Description 
1 Beni Truck driver 
2 Beni Accountant 
3 Beni Electrician 
4 Beni Trader 
5 Beni Fuel seller 
6 Beni Soap seller 
7 Beni Private school teacher 
8 Beni Trader  
9 Beni Service agent 
10 Beni Service agent 
11 Beni Service agent 
12 Beni Bean seller  
13 Beni Pharmacy worker  
14 Beni Gas station attendant  
15 Beni Trader 
16 Beni State teacher  
17 Beni Secretary  
18 Beni Electrician  
19 Beni Trader 
20 Beni Butcher 
21 Beni Trader  
22 Beni Trader  
23 Beni Trader  
24 Beni Windowpane cutter 
25 Beni Shoe seller  
26 Beni Service agent 
27 Beni Nurse  
28 Beni Food seller  
29 Beni Student 
30 Beni Trader  
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31 Beni Farmer 
32 Beni No job description 
33 Beni Service agent 
34 Beni Cashier with a cyber café  
35 Beni Trader 
36 Beni Service agent 
37 Beni Trader 
38 Beni Service agent 
39 Beni No job description 
40 Beni Trader 
41 Beni Farmer 
42 Beni Trader 
43 Beni Service agent 
44 Beni Trader 
45 Beni Service agent  
46 Beni Trader 
47 Beni Service agent 
48 Beni Trader 
49 Beni Trader 
50 Beni Motorist 
51 Beni Trader 
52 Beni Service agent 
53 Beni Trader 
54 Beni Information Technologist  
55 Beni Service agent 
56 Beni Service agent 
57 Beni Trader 
58 Beni Fuel company representative 
59 Beni Humanitarian 
60 Beni Service agent 
61 Beni Service agent 
62 Beni Farmer 
63 Beni Trader 
64 Beni Trader  
65 Beni Trader  
66 Beni Trader  
67 Beni Trader  
68 Beni Service agent  
69 Beni Trader 
70 Beni Trader  
71 Beni Animal breeder  
72 Beni Logger 
73 Beni Shop owner  
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74 Beni Service agent 
75 Beni Trader 
76 Beni Investor 
77 Beni Service agent  
78 Beni Security worker  
79 Beni Trader 
80 Beni Trader  
81 Beni Service agent  
82 Beni Trader 
83 Beni Tailor  
84 Beni Service agent  
85 Beni Service agent  
86 Beni Service agent 
87 Beni Service agent  
88 Beni Teacher  
89 Beni Pharmacy worker 
90 Beni Service agent 
91 Beni Service agent 
92 Beni Trader 
93 Beni Trader  
94 Beni Service agent  
95 Beni Trader  
96 Beni Service agent 
97 Beni Service agent  
98 Beni Trader 
99 Beni Service agent 
100 Beni Trader 
101 Beni Teacher 
102 Beni Teacher 
103 Beni Service agent 
104 Beni Trader  
105 Beni Service agent  
107 Butembo Social worker 
108 Butembo Reporter 
109 Butembo Teacher 
110 Butembo Teacher 
111 Butembo Teacher  
112 Butembo Teacher  
113 Butembo Team assistant 
114 Butembo Team assistant 
115 Butembo Salon cashier 
116 Butembo Accountant 
117 Butembo Shoe seller  
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118 Butembo Businessman 
119 Butembo Teacher  
120 Butembo Professor 
121 Butembo Coordinator of an NGO 
122 Butembo Trader 
123 Butembo Food vendor 
124 Butembo Fruit vendor  
125 Butembo Businesswoman 
126 Butembo Trader 
127 Butembo Teacher 
128 Butembo Teacher 
129 Butembo Farmer 
130 Butembo Motorcycle garage owner  
131 Butembo Health products vendor 
132 Butembo Food vendor 
133 Butembo Cellphone credit vendor  
134 Butembo Trader 
135 Butembo Service agent 
136 Butembo Firewood seller 
137 Butembo Food vendor 
138 Butembo Teacher 
139 Butembo Manager 
140 Butembo Taxi driver 
141 Butembo Computer Scientist 
142 Butembo Farmer 
143 Butembo Nothing 
144 Butembo Seamstress 
145 Butembo Service agent 
146 Butembo School director  
147 Butembo Worker for an education association 
148 Butembo Car parts salesman 
149 Butembo Headmaster  
150 Butembo Teacher  
151 Butembo Car washer  
152 Butembo Lab assistant 
153 Butembo Businesswoman 
154 Butembo Businesswoman 
155 Butembo Hairdresser  
156 Butembo Trader 
157 Butembo Trader 
158 Butembo Producer of palm oil 
159 Butembo Electrician  
160 Butembo Cafeteria owner 
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161 Butembo Tailor  
162 Butembo Cultivator 
163 Butembo Business 
164 Butembo Veterinarian  
165 Butembo Teacher  
166 Butembo Hardware seller 
167 Butembo Hardware seller 
168 Butembo Hardware seller 
169 Butembo Farmer 
170 Butembo Food vendor  
171 Butembo Trader 
172 Butembo Seamstress  
173 Butembo Hairdresser   
174 Butembo Teacher  
175 Butembo Trader 
176 Butembo Clothing seller 
177 Butembo Clothing seller  
178 Butembo Builder  
179 Butembo Trader 
180 Butembo Trader 
181 Butembo Personal assistant 
182 Butembo Trader 
183 Butembo Basket maker  
184 Butembo Food vendor 
185 Butembo Food vendor 
186 Butembo Manager of mental health 
187 Butembo Civil engineer 
188 Butembo Journalist 
189 Butembo Teacher 
190 Butembo Teacher  
191 Butembo Teacher 
192 Butembo Teacher  
193 Butembo Teacher  
194 Butembo Teacher  
195 Butembo Teacher 
196 Butembo Teacher 
197 Butembo Trader 
198 Butembo Teacher 
199 Butembo Teacher 
200 Butembo Farmer 
201 Butembo Nothing 
202 Butembo Secretary 
203 Butembo Factory Manager 
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204 Butembo Trader 
205 Butembo Shoe seller  
206 Butembo Food vendor 
207 Butembo Welder  
208 Butembo Trader 
209 Butembo Clothes selling  
210 Butembo Cooperative accountant  
211 Butembo Cooperative manager  
212 Butembo Cooperative manager  
213 Butembo Bank manager 
214 Butembo Cooperative director 
215 Butembo Likelimba chairman 
216 Butembo Microfinance director 
217 Butembo Cooperative manager 
218 Butembo Moneylender  
219 Butembo Cooperative accountant 
220 Butembo Cooperative manager 
221 Butembo Cooperative accountant 
222 Beni Mutuality manager 
223 Beni Bank manager 
224 Beni Cooperative manager 
225 Beni Cooperative manager 
226 Beni Cooperative manager 
227 Beni Cooperative manager 
228 Beni Cooperative accountant 
229 Beni Mutuality president 
230 Beni Mutuality secretary 
231 Beni Mutuality president 
232 Beni Moneylender  
233 Beni Moneylender  
234 Beni Cooperative accountant 
235 Beni Failed cooperative manager 
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Appendix 2 
Surveying tools 
EXAMINING FINANCE IN CONFLICT 
 
Part A1. Information Sheet for Institutional Staff 
Please take time to read/listen to the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you 
wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you wish to know more. 
 
The aim of the project 
The aim of the research is to evaluate some strengths of financial services, and compare formal and 
informal financial services in North Kivu. It also seeks to determine whether the intensity of conflict 
affects the operations of financial services and how. It will therefore be necessary to examine the: 
 
Operations of formal financial service providers 
Operations of informal financial service providers  
 
Who is doing the study? 
The study is managed by Julia Smith, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of York’s Post-war 
Reconstruction and Development Unit. The research will be an important step in documenting how 
financial services are affected by conflict. Julia Smith is a member of the board of directors of Pro-
Microfinance International (which has an office located at 5 Mikundi Avenue, Butembo) and as such 
has visited Butembo regularly since 2010. However, the data collected today will not be shared with 
other members of Pro- Microfinance, as this is an academic research project intended to collect Phd-
level data.  
 
What will I be asked to do? 
If you would be willing to participate in this study, this would involve us sitting with yourself or a 
designated member of staff, in a private office or any other place you choose, at a date and time that 
would best suit you.  We would like to interview you about whether your financial services and 
institutional operations. We would also like to discuss any effect of the conflict on operations. We 
expect that the interview will take about one to one and a half hours.  
 
What are the benefits and risks in taking part in the project? 
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There may be no direct benefit to you by participating in the research but from the information you 
provide we will be able to better understand the experiences and needs of microfinance providers 
which will inform future microfinance programming.  
 
Although we are taking institutional information which we understand is sensitive, alll the information 
you give us is confidential.  We will not discuss what you have told us with anyone and we will not 
disclose to anyone that you are taking part.  Reports from the research will not identify anyone who 
has taken part.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
If you decide not to take part, that’s OK.  If you do decide to take part and later change your mind, 
you can withdraw at any time.  You do not have to give a reason.  
 
What will happen to the information? 
All the information you give us is confidential.  We will not discuss what you have told us with anyone 
and we will not disclose to anyone that you are taking part.  Reports from the research will not identify 
anyone who has taken part. When we have completed the research, we will produce a summary of the 
research. You will be sent a summary of the research for your comments and opinion.  
 
This research has been approved by the University of York’s Economics, Law, Management, Politics 
and Sociology Ethics Committee. If you have any questions please feel free to contact the Chair of the 
Economics, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology Ethics Committee, Celia Kitzinger, The 
Department of Sociology, University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD.  Email. 
Celia.kitzinger@york.ac.uk 
 
If you would like to get in touch with the researcher, please feel free to contact Julia Smith, (email: 
jls515@york.ac.uk). Alternatively, you can contact the director of the Post-War Reconstruction and 
Development Unit, Kenneth Bush, The Post-war reconstruction and Development Unit, University of 
York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD.  Email. Kenneth.bush@york.ac.uk 
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Part B1. Informed Consent from Institutional Staff 
‘EXAMINING FINANCE IN CONFLICT’ 
Lead researcher: Julia Lynn Smith 
Consent form for Institutional Staff 
This form is for you to state whether or not you agree to take part in the study. Please read and 
answer every question. If there is anything you do not understand, or if you want more information, 
please ask the researcher. 
 
Have you read and understood the information sheet about the study? 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions about the study? 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
 
Do you understand that the information you provide will be held in   
confidence by the research team? 
 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
 
Do you understand that you may withdraw from the study at any   
time and for any reason, without affecting any services you receive? 
 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
 
Do you understand that the information you provide may be used in future 
research? 
 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
 
Do you agree to take part in the study? 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
 
If yes, do you agree to your interviews being notated?  
(You may take part in the study without agreeing to this). 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
     
All data is held by the researcher in accordance with the Data Protection Act. 
 
Your name (in BLOCK letters):___________________________________________ 
Your signature: _____________________________________________________ 
Interviewer’s name: ____________________________________________________ 
Date: _____________________________________________________________ 
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Part C1. Interview Guide (for Institutions) 
Basic 
How old is the organization? 
 
How did it start?  
 
What capital did it start with? 
 
What is the total loan portfolio outstanding currently? 
 
How many loans are made in a month (average)? 
 
Outreach  
How many accounts have been opened? 
 
How many accounts have been opened and then not active? Is there a way to easily tell who 
is not active? 
 
What tribe do most of your clients come from? Is there a way to tell the precise breakdown? 
 
Can I see copies of the information used to raise awareness about the activities?  
 
What outreach is being conducted? 
 
How active is the manager in supervising and encouraging outreach? 
 
Lending  
What is the procedure for applying for a loan? Are there business visitations and what 
information is collected from these?  
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What is the procedure and criteria for deliberating on loan applications (is it quantifiable)? 
 
Who are the decision makers? 
 
What is the maximum amount for an individual loans? 
 
What is the average amount of a loan? 
 
How do people apply for an individual loan as opposed to a group loan? If you don’t offer 
group loans, did you ever offer group loans? Why or why not?  
 
What is the interest rate? 
 
Collecting  
What is the PaR? Can it be broken into PaR30 and PaR90? 
 
What are the follow up mechanisms for group loans and individual loans? 
 
What is the client to loan officer ratio? 
 
What kind of collateral is being collected, and are these realistic to confiscate if people default 
on their loans? 
 
How many times in the last year has the organization taken legal action against indebted 
clients? What kind of action was taken? What was the outcome? In the last three years? 
 
What is your opinion of property rights here? Do clients ever experience violation of their 
property rights that affects their repayment ability?  
 
Is there a loan loss provision?  
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What is the loan write-off ratio?  
 
Which businesses tend to have the most repayment issues? Why do you think this is? 
 
Internal Processes 
What is the system used to manage the information related to clients’ accounts? Who has 
access to these systems and the power to edit them? 
 
What analysis is there of ongoing loans? Any regular reports generated?  
 
Who has the power to write-off loans or reorganize the portfolio? 
 
Who manages the income from operations? What is being done with it now? 
 
Who keeps track of administrative expenses? What are they on average per month? 
 
Human Resources  
What is the hiring process for staff? 
 
What are the staff salaries? 
 
What personal growth or performance-based opportunities are offered to staff as incentives?  
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EXAMINING FINANCE IN CONFLICT 
 
 
Part A2. Information Sheet for Financial Service Users  
 
Please take time to read/listen to the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you 
wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you wish to know more. 
 
The aim of the project 
 
The aim of the research is to evaluate some strengths of financial services, and compare the 
experiences of financial service users in in North Kivu. It also seeks to determine whether the 
intensity of conflict affects the impact of financial services and the experiences of its users. Through 
this research, we wish to see whether your financial services have been helpful and how they could be 
improved.  
 
Who is doing the study? 
 
The study is managed by Julia Smith, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of York’s Post-war 
Reconstruction and Development Unit. The research will be an important step in documenting how 
financial services are affected by conflict.  
 
Julia Smith is a member of the board of directors of Pro-Microfinance International (which has an 
office located at 5 Mikundi Avenue, Butembo) and as such has visited Butembo regularly since 2010. 
However, the data collected today will not be shared with other members of Pro- Microfinance, as this 
is an academic research project intended to collect Phd-level data 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
 
If you would be willing to participate in this study, this would involve us sitting with yourself in a 
private location, at a date and time that would best suit you.  We would like to evaluate how useful the 
financial services you are receiving at the moment are and any needs you might have that are not being 
met by the services being received.  
 
The aim of the interview is to collect client’s information on the usefulness of the service they are 
receiving. We also want to discuss your household spending on a number of comparable items over 
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certain time periods. We expect that the interview will take around a half hour to forty-five minutes. 
We would like to take notes during this interview.  
 
What are the benefits and risks in taking part in the project? 
There may be no direct benefit to you by participating in the research but from the information you 
provide we will be able to better understand the experiences and needs of microfinance users. We 
hope to provide a brief summary of opinions to the management of the institution including any 
recommendations you may wish to share anonymously. 
 
Although we are taking personal information which we understand is sensitive, alll the information 
you give us is confidential.  We will not discuss what you have told us with anyone and we will not 
disclose to anyone that you are taking part.  Reports from the research will not identify anyone who 
has taken part.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
If you decide not to take part, that’s OK.  If you do decide to take part and later change your mind, 
you can withdraw at any time.  You do not have to give a reason.  
 
This research has been approved by the University of York’s Economics, Law, Management, Politics 
and Sociology Ethics Committee. If you have any questions please feel free to contact the Chair of the 
Economics, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology Ethics Committee, Celia Kitzinger, The 
Department of Sociology, University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD.  Email. 
Celia.kitzinger@york.ac.uk 
 
If you would like to get in touch with the researcher, please feel free to contact Julia Smith, (email: 
jls515@york.ac.uk). Alternatively, you can contact the director of the Post-War Reconstruction and 
Development Unit, Kenneth Bush, The Post-war reconstruction and Development Unit, University of 
York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD.  Email. Kenneth.bush@york.ac.uk 
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Part B2. Informed Consent from Financial Service Users  
 
 
‘EXAMINING FINANCE IN CONFLICT’ 
Lead researcher: Julia Lynn Smith 
 
Consent form for Financial Service Users  
This form is for you to state whether or not you agree to take part in the study. Please read and 
answer every question. If there is anything you do not understand, or if you want more information, 
please ask the researcher. 
 
 
Have you read and understood the information sheet about the study? 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions about the study? 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
 
Do you understand that the information you provide will be held in   
confidence by the research team? 
 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
 
Do you understand that you may withdraw from the study at any   
time and for any reason, without affecting any services you receive? 
 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
 
Do you understand that the information you provide may be used in future 
research? 
 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
 
Do you agree to take part in the study? 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
 
If yes, do you agree to your interviews being notated?  
(You may take part in the study without agreeing to this). 
 
Yes ❒ No ❒ 
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All data is held by the researcher in accordance with the Data Protection Act. 
 
 
Your name (in BLOCK letters):___________________________________________ 
 
Your signature: ________________________________________________________ 
 
Interviewer’s name: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date: _______________________________________________________________ 
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Part C2. Questionnaire  
 
1.1 Respondent Information  
 
Gender: 
Tribe: 
Age: 
Length of time with an Account: 
 
 
1.3Respondent References – Please provide  
 
1. Do You Own a Business?  
Y / N  
 
1.1 What is your MAIN BUSINESS engaged in?  1.2 Do you have a SECONDARY BUSINESS?  
Y / N  
MAIN BUSINESS  SECONDARY BUSINESS  
a) Trade  a) Trade  
 
b) Services  
 
b) Services  
 
c) Agriculture/farming  
 
c) Agriculture/farming  
 
d) Production  
 
d) Production  
 
1.3Are other members of your family working? Who earns the primary source of income for the household? 
 
 
 
1.4 How long has the MAIN BUSINESS been in existence?  
RECORD NUMBER OF YEARS AND MONTHS  
1.5 How long has the SECONDARY BUSINESS been in existence?  
RECORD NUMBER OF YEARS AND MONTHS  
______________YEARS_________________MONTHS  ______________YEARS_________________MONTHS  
1.6 Is the main business registered?  
YES NO  
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1.7 Do you have any employees in the main business?  
ENTER NUMBER  
1.8 Do you have any employees in the secondary business?  
ENTER NUMBER  
1.9 What are your working hours? How much can you usually make in profit? 
 
Main business: 
 
 
Secondary business: 
 
 
1.10 Before you joined (name of COOPEC), did you have the same business(es)? Has there been any change in profit? 
 
 
 
SECTION 2.  
 
2.1 How many outstanding/current loans does your household have?  
LOAN 1 .1  LOAN 2 .2  LOAN 3  
.3  
2.2 Who provided the loan?  
a) Bank (SPECIFY NAME)  
b) Microfinance Institution (SPECIFY NAME)  
c) Other Non-Banking Financial Institution  
d) Relative  
e) Friend  
f) Pawnbroker  
g) Other (SPECIFY)  
h) Don’t Know  
 
2.3 IF “OTHER” ENTER SOURCE OF DEBT/LOAN  
2.4 What is the amount of the loan?  
2.5 What is the monthly payment amount?  
2.6 What did you use the loan for?  
2.7 When was the loan received?  __ __ / __ __ __ __  __ __ / __ __ __ __  __ __ / ___ __ __  
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ENTER MONTH AND YEAR 
(MM/YYYY)  
2.8 What is the repayment period on this loan?  
2.9 How much is left to be repaid?  
2.10 Before coming to the COOPEC, did you try to borrow the money 
from any other source?  
Y / N  
2.11 From how many places did you try to borrow money?  
SOURCE 1 .1  SOURCE 2 .2  SOURCE .3  
2.12 From whom/Where did you try to borrow this money?  
a) Bank (SPECIFY NAME)  
b) Microfinance Institution (SPECIFY NAME)  
c) Other Non-Banking Financial Institution  
d) Relative  
e) Friend  
g) Other (SPECIFY)  
  
2.13 Did they offer you a loan?  
  
Y / N Y / N  Y / N  
Comments: 
 
SECTION 3. HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION  
 
 
3.1 How much money did your household spend ON FOOD to be consumed at home during the last week?   
 
3.2How many people are staying in your household? Are any of these “adopted”? 
 
3.3 Did your household spend money on 
[ITEM] during the last month?  
CIRCLE ANSWER .1  Enter Value (KM) .2  
 
3.3.1 Rent for residence  
 
Y  N  
 
3.3.2 Combustibles (fuel for the stove, fuel for 
heating, gas, petrol)  
 
Y  N  
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3.3.3 Transport services (shared cars, buses, 
micro-buses, taxis and other forms of paid 
transport)  
 
Y  N  
 
3.3.4 Clothes and shoes  
 
Y  N  
 
3.3.5 Recreation (concert, cinema)  
 
Y  N  
 
3.3.7 Fees, Insurance  
 
Y  N  
 
3.4 Did your household spend money on 
[ITEM] during the last year?  
CIRCLE ANSWER .1  Enter Value (KM) .2  
 
3.4.1 Education expenses (transport, books, fees 
etc. excluding clothes & shoes)  
 
Y  N  
 
3.4.2 Furniture, carpets, household textiles  
 
Y  N  
 
3.4.3 Repairs (home, car, etc.)  
 
Y  N  
 
3.4.4 Household appliances (iron, microwave)  
 
Y  N  
 
3.4.5 Purchase of vehicle such as car, bike, 
motorbike  
 
Y  N  
 Y  N  
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3.4.6 Vacation (all-inclusive trips)  
 
 
4.1  Does your family (including your spouse and your children) 
have any money saved? This can include money saved in a bank, 
at home or invested in stocks or other savings methods.  
  
Y / N / Don’t know  
  
4.2 What is the total value of these savings ?  
 
  
 
4.3Before joining the COOPEC, did you have the same amount 
of savings?   
 
 
4.4 What are you saving money for?  
Allow for multiple response  
 
a) for future business expense  
b) education  
c) medical expense  
d) provide for old age  
e) house repair  
f) emergency events  
g) secure consumption  
h) bequest  
i) pay for debt  
j) festival expenses (wedding etc.)  
k) other (SPECIFY)  
 
 
5. Has anything happened in the last year that meant you couldn’t work for a week? 
 
5.1 Did you have to contribute (family emergency, etc.)? How much? 
 
5.2. Did you have anything you would consider an emergency happen in the last year, and how did you deal with it? 
 
5.3 Have you experienced any violent crime or indirect effect of the poor security situation in the last year? What happened and how 
did you deal with it? 
  
5.4 Have you lent money to anyone in the last year? How much and what was it for?  
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